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ABSTRACT 
In the last thirty years we have seen a flurry of school reforms (e.g., charters, school 
choice, vouchers, NCLB, Race to the Top, mayoral control, emergency management, statewide 
recovery school districts, etc.). However, most researchers have studied such reforms in isolation 
from the other rather than as symptoms of broader change, especially in the way that we govern 
schools. A historical analysis, this study seeks to understand school governance change by 
examining the Detroit Public Schools (DPS) since 1980, a single urban school district in which 
most of the school reforms mentioned above have been implemented. I situate the study within 
the overall history of public schooling in the United States and use urban regime analysis to 
highlight how politics—especially informal political arrangements—influences and sustains 
governance change. Analyses reveal that there are five key school reforms that have culminated 
in the dismantling of Detroit’s traditional school governance system and the emergence of a 
possible third wave of school governance change in U.S. history. Case studies of mayoral 
takeover (1999-2004) and the Education Achievement Authority (2012-present) tell the story of 
how policies gradually eroded local control and weakened the traditional governance regime, 
enabling the rise of new educational actors to support governance change. I argue Detroit is a 
case study of Jeffrey Henig’s idea of “the end of exceptionalism,” the notion that public 
schooling is losing its special status as a closed system of government and being reabsorbed into 
general-purpose government. The shifting of who controls schools has also resulted in school 
battles that occur within the racial resonances of postwar Detroit. I conclude the study with a 
discussion on neoliberalism as a possible framework for further understanding the logic behind 
 	  xii 
contemporary school reform and the lessons drawn from this study: a stern warning about the 
structural crisis that has developed under such policies and a call for a better politics around 
education if we are to have any success in improving urban schools in the twenty-first century.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 	  
 During a visit to Detroit Public Schools (DPS) in 2009, Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan said that the DPS was “ground zero” for education reform. Appointed earlier that year 
by President Barack Obama, the secretary told reporters that Detroit was New Orleans only 
without Hurricane Katrina, which had wiped out most of the city’s schools four years ago.1 
Indeed, the secretary was describing a school district in one of the most economically depressed 
cities in the nation, a city portrayed as desolate, abandoned, and in ruins. The DPS was 
shouldering a crushing $300 million deficit and suffered from chronic low achievement. Most of 
its fourth and eighth grade students were unable to score at a basic math level on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the lowest performance in the history of this 
particular standardized test.2 Even more devastating, only 16 percent of DPS eleventh graders 
were proficient in math and 37 percent were proficient in reading on the Michigan Merit Exam 
(MME).3 A 2003 report declared that DPS was arguably the worst school district in the nation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See “Detroit Schools ‘Ground Zero.’” The Washington Times, May 14, 2009, accessed January 31, 2015, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/14/detroit-schools-ground-zero/; Claudio Sanchez, “New Orleans 
Enters the Charter School Era,” NPR, August 29, 2014, accessed February 7, 2015, 
http://www.npr.org/2014/08/29/344318608/new-orleans-enters-the-charter-school-era. 
2 The NAEP is the largest nationally representative assessment of what American students know and can do in 
various subject areas including mathematics, reading, science, writing, the arts, civics, economics, geography, U.S. 
history, and Technology and Engineering Literacy (TEL). See Robin Erb and Chastity Pratt Dawsey, “Detroit 
Students’ Score Record Low on National Test,” Detroit Free Press, December 8, 2009, accessed January 31, 2015, 
http://archive.freep.com/article/20091208/NEWS01/91208020/Detroit-students-scores                                                               
-record-low-national-test. 
3 The MME is Michigan’s minimum-competency test required for all high school students in 2008 and beyond. As 
required by No Child Left Behind, the MME is used to measure Annual Yearly Progress (AYP).  
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with a 21.7 percent graduation rate.4 Although graduation rates were reportedly on a steady rise 
around the time of Duncan’s visit, DPS nevertheless faced dire circumstances: decades of poor 
academic achievement, more budget cuts, layoffs, school closures, increased classrooms, 
incidences of violence in the hallways, and volatile disputes around efforts to change the system.5  
 The Education Secretary implored DPS to consider reforms that were working in cities 
like Chicago. Duncan had first-hand experience reforming Chicago’s schools since he had served 
as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Chicago Public Schools. He claimed to have increased 
student performance and graduation rates in Chicago by leading an aggressive reform agenda 
that included closing underperforming schools and opening more than a hundred new schools 
supported by public-private partnerships.6 Michgan’s governor, Jennifer Granholm, agreed with 
Duncan’s message telling the press that DPS’s turnaround was within reach. She had recently 
appointed the school district’s first emergency manager, a leader Granholm believed would enact 
the types of reforms that had “transformed” Chicago.7 
At first glance, such combined federal and state attention and pressure on reforming DPS 
seems unprecedented. However, by 2009 Duncan and Granholm were merely joining a long line 
of reformers and national and state efforts designed to overhaul the public school system of 
Detroit, particularly regarding the ways schools are governed. This dissertation argues that 
Detroit has been the site of some of the most dramatic school reforms since the Progressive Era 
nearly a century ago. Indeed, the relentless flurry of policy initiatives experienced by Detroiters 
reads like a catalogue of 21st century reform efforts: accountability, high-stakes testing, schools 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This particular graduation rate is from the Gates report. See Data Driven Detroit, State of the Detroit Child: 2010 
(Report, Detroit, Michigan, August 2011). 
5 Depending on methodology, the DPS graduate rate ranged from 21.7 to 44.5 percent for the class of 2003. The true 
graduation rate has been a point of contention for years. See Data Driven Detroit, Detroit Child: 2010.  
6 Press Room/Senior Staff, “Arne Duncan, U.S. Secretary of Education—Biography,” last modified February 5, 
2015, accessed February 7, 2015, http://www2.ed.gov/news/staff/bios/duncan.html. 
7 Detroit Schools ‘Ground Zero.’” 
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of choice, mayoral control, No Child Left Behind, charter schools, contracting with private 
education providers, emergency financial management, and most recently, a recovery school 
district. Seemingly unconnected with one another, I argue that taken together these “innovations” 
have essentially dismantled Detroit’s century old system of a local administrative board, 
arguably the most lasting legacy of the Progressive Era. Called the “one best system,” by David 
Tyack, the days in which the school board and its superintendent made educational decisions and 
enforced educational policy are a thing of the past.  
Most researchers have studied these initiatives in isolation from one another, thus missing 
the overall transformation of Detroit’s public schooling system. As Jeffrey Henig has observed, 
“most accounts fail to capture the underlying nature of the change.”8 This dissertation seeks to 
contribute to the understanding of what Henig calls a “seismic” shift in school governance, a 
broader movement of structural change likely to have consequences well beyond Detroit in 
shaping public schooling for the twenty-first century.9 Examining this transformation is 
necessarily a study of who has the power to make educational decisions in Detroit, thus this 
dissertation also seeks to make sense of “some of the most high-stakes political battles,” a 
byproduct of the social struggles and conflicts that invariably accompany changes in who 
governs.10   
In many ways, this dissertation is an effort to extend Jeffrey Mirel’s seminal study of 
schooling in Detroit, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System.11 Mirel argued that there was 
a time, however, when Detroit and its school system thrived. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jeffrey R. Henig, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education; The Changing Politics of School Reform 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education Press, 2013), 1. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Jeffrey Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System: Detroit, 1907-1981, Second Edition (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1999). 
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in response to the socioeconomic and cultural changes of the new industrial era, a small group of 
elites transformed the city’s schools from a ward-based system to a small nonpartisan school 
board in 1916. The transformation and the school board’s consensus on key policies contributed 
to DPS’s rise as one of the world’s finest school systems. 
During this period, millions of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe were 
flocking to the great industrial cities like Detroit looking for better economic and social 
prospects. The public schools, Mirel argued, provided a largely good and effective education for 
the children of these first generation Americans for two reasons. First, industrialization and the 
automobile industry led to a burgeoning economy enabling Detroiters to amply fund public 
schooling. Second, Detroit’s business establishment, labor unions and immigrant groups 
supported the school board’s initiatives, thus providing a political consensus regarding school 
reform not seen in other cities. As a result, DPS’s school board was able to implement nearly 
every important educational reform initiative of the Progressive Era. This broad political 
consensus greatly contributed to, as Mirel claims, Detroit’s national reputation as having one of 
America’s, if not the world’s, best public school systems.12 
 However, beginning in the Great Depression, the consensus that supported the schools 
slowly dissolved, breaking up over funding issues and curricular debates. The honeymoon 
between business and labor ended when fiscal resources became limited in the 1930s. The school 
budget and teacher salaries in particular were contentious issues: the business leaders of the 
Progressive Era battled for cutbacks on salaries and the “fads and frills” of school, while 
organized labor defended higher spending on education. While typifying national political 
divisions during and after the Depression that pitted New Dealers against conservatives and labor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid. 
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unions against business leaders, the city’s economic woes after the Great Depression contributed 
to political divisions over how to fund Detroit’s schools and how to spend those funds. 
Dramatically altering the racial composition of the city and its schools, the migration of 
Blacks from the Jim Crow South to Detroit after WWII13 would also lead to tensions and 
ultimately the breakup of the political consensus that had once supported how DPS school 
leaders governed and represented its constituents. As early as the 1940s, Black civic leaders 
joined with White liberals and labor leaders using class-based discourse to form a coalition in 
support of educational reforms, often in opposition to business. However, African Americans 
would soon develop concerns specific to the education of their children, putting a strain on the 
coalition. Schools quickly became segregated due to, in part, housing tactics such as restrictive 
covenants that kept Blacks concentrated in the poorest and most densely populated sections of 
the city. Consequently, African American children most often attended the oldest schools, raising 
concerns about facilities among the African American community.14 As Whites moved to the 
outer ring of the city and the metropolitan area expanded,15 their children attended newer schools 
and thus further increased both racial segregation and concerns over inequitable facilities. As the 
Black population continued to grow, increasingly they became an important voting block and a 
significant member of the coalition that supported DPS. Indeed, by the 1950s, partnerships 
between the NAACP and organized labor such as the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13In 1930, Blacks were 7.7 percent of the population. By 1950, they were 16.2 percent of the population. See 
Thomas J. Sugrue. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 23. 
14 Mirel, Rise and Fall, 187-188; Also see Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a 
Modern American City (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
15 Between 1954 and 1960, Detroit lost nearly 90,000 jobs that contributed to White flight. (Thompson, Whose 
Detroit?, 26.) 
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Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT) forged a powerful liberal-labor-black coalition in support 
of addressing educational inequalities and the public schooling of all children.16 
However, in the early 1960s, amidst rapid inflation, the need for better school facilities, 
organized labor’s demands for improved teacher salaries, and a soon-to-be Black majority in the 
city’s public schools, would put pressure on this coalition of school supporters. While the liberal-
labor-black coalition benefited from the growing support for the civil rights movement—one 
newspaper admonished residents “Don’t Let Detroit Become Another Little Rock17—the 
different and competing goals of its members proved to be its undoing, particularly after the riots 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.18   
 For example, by 1963, though the majority of city residents were White, the majority of 
students in the DPS were Black, which increased the difficulty of getting voters to pass school 
funding proposals.19 The year after the Detroit riot (or rebellion) of 1967, school and union 
leaders campaigned for the largest tax increase for public schools in Detroit history. However, 
working class Whites rejected it by a large margin, marking a major turning point in both 
Detroit’s finances and its educational coalition. Mirel argues, “Never again would large numbers 
of white working-class voters support a tax increase for the Detroit public schools.”20 Race—not 
class—became the major political dividing force in Detroit, fracturing support, and positioning 
business, labor, Blacks, and working class Whites in different camps regarding schools issues. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Mirel, Rise and Fall, 186. 
17 Ibid., 242-243 
18 One survey of over three hundred young people in Detroit revealed the extent to which the city’s job market had 
narrowed the opportunities of Detroit’s Black youth. At the time of the riot, between 25-30 percent of young blacks 
(aged 18-24) were out of work. Some also refer to the riot as a rebellion, which launched “a revolutionary black 
press, media, and theology” that was a turning point in the political history of the Motor City. (Sugrue, Origins, 26 
and Thompson, Whose Detroit?, 85.)  
19 By 1960, Blacks were more than a quarter of the population and the city remained geographically divided between 
Blacks and Whites: “two Detroits.” Racial discrimination confined Blacks to Detroit’s oldest and worst housing 
areas and further contributed to Blacks’ already deep distrust of Whites and White institutions. (Sugrue, Origins, 23, 
257.) 
20 Mirel, Rise and Fall, 313, 325. 
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The fault lines dividing these camps grew wider, exacerbated by industrial 
transformation, suburbanization, and the national break-up of the New Deal and New Society 
coalitions in the 1970s and 80s. Mirel points out that the hopes of the early 1960s were shattered 
by the 1970s, reflecting the overall national mood: “The hopes for a great society, for a newer 
world, lay among the ruins of that turbulent decade.”21 In 1974, when the Supreme Court struck 
down desegregation plans in Milliken v. Bradley, ruling that busing could only occur within 
Detroit and no further, it essentially took the wind out of the NAACP’s decades long focus on 
schools as providing the main leverage for civil rights and racial justice.  
Moreover, by this time, manifesting from a deep discontent with the lack of racial justice 
and progress, Black Nationalists were able to thwart the DPS school board’s plans for integration 
and instead demanded for community control, breaking up the district into several wards each 
with its own school board. Mirel interpreted decentralization as a crisis that in part reflected the 
political failure of the period. “From the ruins of the coalition emerged a new politics of 
education,” argued Mirel, which—quoting from Joseph Featherstone—was dominated by “only 
groups pursuing self-interest to the edge of self-destruction.”22 The key point for this study is by 
the 1980s the coalition that once supported the Detroit Public Schools had disintegrated. 
Detroit’s school board no longer shared wide support, an educational coalition to protect or 
support the formal governing structure that in the past was responsible for making all educational 
decisions. As Mirel wrote, “The schools had simply become another arena where embittered 
interest groups battled for supremacy.”23 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mirel, Rise and Fall, 369. 
22 Jeffrey Mirel quotes Joseph Featherstone who studied decentralization in New York City: “Sooner or later 
discussions of these matters come round to the need for national political coalitions for which there would seem to 
be no realistic immediate prospects. The decentralization crisis is in part a reflection of this political failure. Behind 
the struggle for community control of the ghettoes lies the somber truth about America in 1969; here, as St. Paul 
says, we have no continuing city, only groups pursuing self-interest to the edge of self destruction.” (Ibid, 370.) 
23 Ibid. 
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In short, by 1980, DPS no longer had a strong and enduring education coalition. Clarence 
Stone has argued that in postwar cities such coalitions—what he calls urban regimes—with a 
level of high civic capacity, or cooperation across sectors, increase the chances of implementing, 
organizing, and sustaining institutional changes, changes needed, in theory, to improve urban 
life, or in our case, the performance of urban schools.24 Stone’s idea of urban regimes has helped 
me to rethink the more distant as well as the current history of efforts to improve DPS by 
reforming its governance. I use it to frame the last thirty years of school politics in Detroit, 
arguing that the urban regime that sustained the “one best system” of local control in educational 
decision-making continued to weaken over time, enabling more powerful political agents, 
particularly those in the governor’s office and the state legislature, to infiltrate decision-making 
that was once exclusive to the DPS school board and its constituents (i.e., parents, students and 
voters). 
Since 1980, the Detroit Public Schools is a case study of the dismantling of the corporate 
governance model. During this period, politicians and reformers have sought to shatter the 
Progressive era school system, a bureaucratic organization in which the school board, 
superintendent, and district office is at the heart of the institution. I see the case of Detroit as a 
forecast of what Jeffrey Henig calls the “end of exceptionalism in American education,” in 
which the “special status” of public schools—autonomous and independent from general-
purpose government—is coming to an end.25 
This rearranging of political order has been central to the tension and conflict within the 
Detroit community. Of course, there has always been conflict around public education in 
Detroit—a matter of interest groups vying for a limited resource—but I argue that the nature of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Clarence Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988 (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989). 
25 Jeffrey Henig, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education: The Changing Politics of School Reform 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2013). 
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the conflict has changed over the last thirty years, reflecting the broader social, economic, and 
political changes at the turn of the twenty-first century. In the 1950s, the battles and struggles 
over schools were rooted in issues of classism. Then in the 1960s, and persisting into the early 
1980s, the conflicts gradually shifted to matters of race. Today, I argue, public schooling battles 
are the effects of a fundamental political reordering of the public school system, what Henig calls 
a “tectonic shift” in the institutional landscape of American education. 
Inevitably, in the midst of disruption and change there will be some winners and losers. 
This dissertation tells a story of an older regime, or the traditional governance regime—the 
school board, unions, teachers, and administrators—losing out in the wake of an emerging 
coalition of new actors consisting of governors, mayors, legislators, education entrepreneurs, 
philanthropists, and foundations. Thus, this dissertation is also a political story of the social 
upheaval that accompanies the task of establishing a new political arrangement for a new era of 
public education. The battle for an equitable and quality education for all, it appears, is being 
fought on different terrain from that of fifty years ago.  
Obviously, this study is not the first attempt to characterize this contemporary period of 
public education in the United States. For example, education historian Diane Ravitch has told a 
story about the death and life of the great American school system in which she argues that 
testing and choice are undermining education; it is a scathing critique of most efforts to reform 
schools.26 Her book and her ideas have helped to launch “Save Our Schools,” a nationwide 
campaign against the corporate machine that is out to destroy public schools. As such, the battle 
lines have been drawn between two camps: those in favor of school choice and charters and 
those who are fighting against it. It appears to me that educational researchers have also been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are 
Undermining Education (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 
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prone to situate themselves within this dichotomy. In this way, my study is distinctive. Ravitc—
and others—fail to see that school governance is at the epicenter of change. My dissertation 
reveals that the days in which public schooling is defined by a publicly elected school board and 
superintendent who make almost all educational decisions around a local funding stream are far-
gone. Thus, I offer critique from a different angle, one that recognizes the structural crisis that 
has resulted in the transformation of public schooling in Detroit. I also appraise the potential of a 
historic shift in the way that urban public schools are governed. Indeed, my study seeks to bring 
to light the institutional shift that is occurring and generally ignored in contemporary debates 
about education policy.27 
I present my dissertation in seven chapters. Chapter Two sets the historical context for 
my study by using existing literature on how school governance transformed over 175 years of 
public schooling in America. I argue that the literature indicates that new patterns of school 
governance are emerging and Detroit is a case study of those major shifts at the turn of the 
twenty-first century. 
Chapter Three presents how I studied school governance change in Detroit. While 
historians usually embed their method in the footnotes and introduction, I actually adapted some 
tools and concepts from qualitative research that are worth articulating especially because I argue 
that historical analysis should play a greater role in framing educational policy. I also discuss in 
this chapter how I use urban regime analysis to support my observations. 
Chapter Four provides an overview of five major reforms that I argue have completely 
altered Detroit’s educational landscape and the ways in which decision making occurs. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Jeffrey Henig, Patrick McGuinn, and Paul Manna are the few scholars who argue that school governance is 
understudied. See Henig, End of Exceptionalism; See Patrick McGuinn and Paul Manna, ed., Education Governance 
for the Twenty-First Century; Overcoming the Structural Barriers to Schools Reform (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2013). 
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provides the reader an impression of key policies, events, and figures that over time led to the 
fragmentation of Detroit’s school system, making a case for my argument, and setting a critical 
backdrop for the next two chapters.  
Chapter Five and Six are case studies of two school reforms that I have identified as key 
to dismantling the traditional public school system: mayoral takeover and the Education 
Achievement Authority (EAA). Chapter Five argues how mayoral takeover in 1999-2004 was 
the “beginning of the end,” a period in which the state significantly weakened the traditional 
governance regime that enabled the rise of a new regime to support and maintain school 
governance change. Chapter Six argues how the EAA formed in 2011 definitively marked the 
end of one era and the beginning of another, one in which the new regime—in the aftermath of 
dismantling the public school system—searches for new order.  
Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation by discussing how Detroit is a case for the end 
of exceptionalism. I also present how neoliberalism might be a possible framework to further 
examine the structural crisis as a context in which policymakers and reformers respond to and 
make decisions. I end the chapter by discussing the lessons that can be drawn from this study to 
various audience members including policymakers, educators, activists, educational historians, 
and researchers. 
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CHAPTER II 
School Governance Change in the United States, 1840 to the Present 
There is nothing new about Americans tinkering with school governance. The concept of 
changing the formal structure of governance—the process or act of ruling or managing—to 
improve schools has deep roots in American political and intellectual history.28 Although there 
has never been a national system of schooling in the United States, there have been two patterns 
of school governance in the history of American public schooling: what I call village school 
governance and corporate school governance. Emerging in the antebellum period, the village 
school system was a loose arrangement of rural schools managed by laypersons or the 
committeemen of disparate “villages” spread across the United States. Remarkably, the village 
school system resulted in a relatively literate population by the end of the 19th century. However, 
by the early 20th century, a new generation of educational reformers argued that this system no 
longer served citizens in the advent of rapid industrialization and urbanization in America. These 
reformers of the Progressive Era thus set out to transform the nineteenth century village school 
system into the large, bureaucratic, and centralized systems of the twentieth century, a new 
managing arrangement that quickly spread across the country. The reformers, an elite group of 
business and educational experts, sought to control and professionalize schools through the 
establishment of a school board at the top of an hierarchical system. Impressed with the order 
and efficiency of new technology and forms of organization that were ushering in a modern era, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jeffrey R. Henig and Wilbur C. Rich, “Mayor-centrism in Context,” in Mayors in the Middle: Politics, Race, and 
Mayoral Control of Urban Schools, ed. Jeffrey R. Henig and Wilbur C. Rich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 6. 
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reformers believed that they could consolidate the village schools into what David Tyack has 
called the “one best system” to address an increasingly urbanized population.29 Thus, the new 
corporate school system reflected an organizational model found in, for example, the division of 
labor in factories, the hierarchy and coordination in modern businesses, and even the punctuality 
of the railroads at the beginning of the twentieth century.30. 
By the early twentieth century, corporate school governance would come to dominate as 
village schools across the U.S. were centralized into large bureaucratic school districts with a 
board of directors (i.e., the board of education) and a chief executive officer (i.e., the 
superintendent) at the top of educational decision-making. The school district was also a 
relatively autonomous government “with dedicated revenue streams and nonpartisan modes of 
selecting schools boards” seen as a way to buffer schools from the politics of urban machines.31 
Corporate school governance became the unofficial national system as almost all large districts 
and smaller ones adopted it by mid-century.  
By the 1960s and 1970s, however, social and demographic changes in U.S. cities and 
attacks on the quality of education, especially among the historically disadvantaged and poor led 
to severe critiques and attacks of the “one best system.” Arguing that the Progressive Era reforms 
had led to an overly centralized and bureaucratic schooling system, a new wave of reformers 
sought to once again alter the formal structures of school governance. It is the corporate school 
system, I argue, that politicians in Michigan and Detroit have gradually dismantled in order to 
usher in a new governance model at the dawn of the twenty-first century—the central story of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 David Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1974), 28. 
30 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1993) and Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1967). 
31 Henig & Rich, “Mayor-Centrism,”6. 
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this dissertation. This chapter sets the context for this transformation by using existing literature 
on how school governance formed and changed over approximately 175 years of public 
schooling in America. Overall, this chapter provides a synthesis of historical perspectives, 
concepts, and recurring themes (i.e., consensus and conflict) in which I situate my study and seek 
to contribute to understanding the nature of new and emerging pattern of school governance and 
the implications for future policy in cities like Detroit. 
The Village School System, 1780-1890 
 In the early national period, most Americans lived and taught their children in rural 
areas.32 The village school system was informal and local, thus men like Thomas Jefferson and 
Benjamin Rush envisioned and proposed a statewide system of common schools and 
universities. However, they failed to persuade most Americans about the need for public 
schooling when most were satisfied with their village schools.33   
When his common school bill failed in Virginia for the third time in 1817, a frustrated 
Jefferson attributed the bill’s defeat to people’s “ignorance, malice, egoism, fanaticism, religious, 
political, and local perversities.”34 Indeed, early nineteenth century Americans resisted common 
schooling.35 Devoted to local control and individual choice, many were not willing to pay new 
taxes for other people’s children and were skeptical of “new institutional regulations by the 
central government.”36 Still, Carl Kaestle has shown that while it took almost half a century 
before Americans would agree to legislate a common schooling system, political leaders and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The early national period spanned from 1780-1830. See Carl F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools 
and American Society, 1780-1860 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 9. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 9 
35 It was not until a century later did Virginians adopt a statewide free school system for white children. (Ibid.) 
36 Ibid. 
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educationists had long imagined a system of tax-subsidized schooling for all children. 37 By the 
1830s, White Americans would nevertheless become the most literate people in the world 
through its “non-system” of village schools (which had grown in number particularly in northern 
states such as Massachusetts).38 At the time, the village school system sufficed.  
What made Americans change their mind? As the U.S. entered into the industrial era, it 
became increasingly urban as manufacturing spread, transportation networks forged, and the 
population significantly grew in large cities. 39 From 1840 to 1850, the number of immigrants 
entering the country in search of work increased by 240 percent.40 With such a rapid increase in 
jobseekers, poverty became an urgent issue, along with the question of how to prepare children. 
Urbanization presented such vexing social problems that political leaders soon felt that a formal 
system of schooling was needed in order to restore social stability. Kaestle writes, “The more 
anxious they became about the security of their world, the more they favored mass education.”41 
Urbanization also transformed the countryside. The burgeoning capitalism of this period 
“affected the rural areas of the North as profoundly as it affected cities.”42 Rural families were 
confronted with ever-expanding markets in which they became both producers and consumers.  
The countryside experienced a population drain: the local economy strained as people left for 
jobs in the city. Kaestle observes that by 1860, all of these forces worked to break down the rural 
community’s insularity from and resistance against state regulation and expenditures for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The early policymakers and educationists’ vision of schooling “for all,” however, did not include African 
American children or other non-White children. 
38 William J. Reese, America’s Public Schools: From the Common School to ‘No Child Left Behind,’ (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 11. 
39 “Urbanization proceeded as a faster rate between 1820 and 1860 than in any other period of American history. 
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40 Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic, 64. 
41 Ibid., 35. 
42 Ibid., 24. 
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education.43 David Tyack argues common schooling was an aggressive plan to address the “rural 
school problem” in the 1890s, designed to help the countryside catch up with a new world 
order.44 
This mix of economic and social anxiety drove many Americans to change their mind 
and to move forward with establishing a common schooling system. Particularly during the 
postbellum period, with so many village schools and charity schools, the informal system proved 
capable of expansion, and the establishment of a single system seemed all but inevitable. 45 The 
concept of the public schooling system was a cosmopolitan solution to the problems that arose 
from a new era in which literally people from the old world was converging in the cities of 
America. Kaestle writes, 
The fact that state intervention in education succeeded in this period while earlier 
it had failed, and the fact that it coincided with accelerating urbanization, 
industrialization, and immigration, suggests that there were causal connections 
between educational reform and social change in the years from 1830 to 1860.46 
 
Most scholars agree that the common schools in America was borne out of the need to bring 
social order in the midst of a rapidly changing world and society. Riots and public disorder had 
become common in cities, reflecting the growing social tensions between rich and poor, native 
born and immigrant. A new generation of reformers, like Horace Mann, conceived a formal 
system of schools as “cement[ing] bonds in a world where community ties had dissolved.”47 
Mann summarized his vision in 1848, “Education, then, beyond all other devices of human 
origin, is the great equalizer of the conditions of men—the balance-wheel of the social 
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machinery.”48 Educational leaders like Mann set out to reform the village school system into one 
that would better serve the needs of a new urbanized America.  
The Administrative Progressives’ One Best System, 1890-1940 
Until the 1890s, most large cities schools were governed by wards, each with its own 
board that had substantial powers—but “the whole mode of lay management was diffuse, 
frequently self contradictory, and prone to conflict.”49 Too many school leaders were laymen, 
and their decision-making at its best was “inefficient meddling;” at its worst, “the school system 
was just another source of patronage and graft.”50 Reformers were convinced that there was a one 
best system of education to not only improve the management of schools but also respond to the 
issues of urbanization. They sought to discover and implement it.  
They were impressed with the order and efficiency of the new technology and 
forms of organization they saw about them. The division of labor in the factory, 
the punctuality of the railroad, the chain of command and coordination in modern 
businesses—these aroused a sense of wonder and excitement in men and women 
seeking to systematize the schools.51 
 
Thus, for the next several decades—between 1890-1940—reformers obsessed with structural 
changes that would establish a “professional bureaucracy” in which “lay control was carefully 
filtered through a corporate school board.”52 They portrayed their struggle for structural reforms 
as one in which unselfish and enlightened citizens were fighting against the forces of corruption, 
inefficiency, and ignorance.53 
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These reformers—whom Tyack calls the Administrative Progressives—believed that a 
corporate school board system consisting of successful businessmen would ensure efficiency and 
a rational and expert process of decision-making.	   The urban schoolmen reformers themselves 
were “successful men”: business and professional elites, including university professors and new 
school managers.54 In short, the administrative progressives envisioned the professionalization of 
the system, including the establishment of training schools for teachers, adopting methods for 
examining and certifying teachers, properly classifying pupils, designing uniform courses of 
study, and standardizing examinations.55  
From classroom to central office they tried to create new controls over pupils, 
teachers, principals, and other subordinate members of the school hierarchy. 
Although they often used the nonpolitical language of social engineers, they were 
actually trying to replace village forms in which laymen participated in 
decentralized decision-making with the new bureaucratic model of a closed 
“nonpolitical” system in which directives flowed from the top down, reports 
emanated from the bottom, and each step of the educational process was carefully 
prescribed by professional educators.56 
 
In the face of “continual pressure to improve and expand public services,” it was a major shift in 
school governance, one in which a select professional and corporate-minded elite came to 
govern.57  
Although the administrative progressives often campaigned their cause as “keeping the 
schools out of politics,” this rhetoric often obscured the actual patterns of power and privilege.58 
In reality, the common schooling enterprise had always been political because the majority rule 
dictated what was to be taught: “The whole point of common schools, after all, was to teach the 
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same things to every white child […].”59 Reformers who were White Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
(WASP) males saw their values as key and superior to nation-building, and often cared little to 
incorporate the values of other groups until after WWII. As early as the 1830s and 1840s, 
outsider groups like the Irish Catholic clergy contested WASP values (ultimately establishing 
their own system of parochial schools).60 Critically, what we see is, from its onset, public schools 
have been an arena in which culture wars have been waged, beginning with, for example, debates 
over religion. Later in the early 1900s, concerned more with social justice and democracy than 
with social efficiency, there were “reform-minded” citizens (including middle-class women, 
socialists, and urban activists) who fought against elite control.61 In short, changing school 
governance, especially in terms of who made educational decisions, was not without conflict or 
struggle.  
Still, by 1940, the administrative progressives had nearly won all of the school wars, 
successfully transforming the public school system from a loose arrangement of ward boards to a 
single small board of elites that had “enormous, decisive power in hiring teachers, awarding 
contracts for building and supplies, and overall policymaking.”62 The corporate model of 
schooling—controlled by a homogenous group of elites—would dominate the greater part of the 
twentieth century. 
Dissatisfaction with the One Best System, 1960s & 1970s  
By any number of criteria, this system was remarkably successful. First, it had developed 
the capacity to at least manage—if not educate—almost all of America’s children and youth. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Reese, America’s Public Schools, 37. 
60 Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars: A History of the New York City Public Schools, (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
61 Opposition from such groups did influence the Progressive Era movement in that many educational innovations 
“originated with the grass roots and only later came under the authority of the experts and professionals who ran the 
schools.” (See Reese, America’s Public Schools, 127, 136.) 
62 Reese, America’s Public Schools, 178. 
 	  20 
Indeed, in the post-WWII years schools had become the custodial institution for American 
children and adolescents. For example, by 1960 over 86 percent of 14- to 17-year-olds were 
enrolled in high school.63 The U.S. was among a handful of nations to provide free and universal 
secondary education—virtually the only nation to have done so in the midst of the Great 
Depression. Second, while certainly contested, many scholars have argued that the one best 
system was a high return investment.64 For example, Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz argue 
that it was no coincidence that the twentieth century was the “American Century” in which a 
mass educated workforce helped to produce and sustain a flourishing economy.65   
However, lying below the surface was a growing criticism of the system, particularly the 
ways in which America’s schools failed to provide a quality and equal education. The turning 
point was after World War II. Arthur G. Powell and colleagues observe, “If the prewar years 
were marked by general agreement about what a mass system of high schools should do, 
subsequent decades saw unremitting criticism of the system that had been built, and 
unprecedented divisions over schools’ missions and priorities.”66 Dissatisfaction with the one 
best system would erupt during the 1960s and 1970s as efforts to improve public schooling rose 
to the top of the agenda for Americans across a wide range of political, economic, and social 
interests. 
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The famous ethnographic studies of Elmtown high school and Middletown high school in 
the 1940s began to shed light on the lack of rigor in America’s public schools. Both studies 
found that the average American high school was little more than a social center.67 The majority 
of students at Elmtown and Middletown spent most of their time at school socializing and 
participating in a variety of extracurricular activities and sports. Some scholars have argued that 
the very nature of the American high school was a “stroke of genius”: as industry and technology 
changed and society no longer needed a huge labor force, high schools were a holding place for 
restless adolescents.68 But the studies offered a darker conclusion regarding the average 
American student: “one could not expect much in the way of academic effort.”69 Soon, however, 
Americans would no longer accept the mediocrity of a public schooling system established by an 
earlier era. 
 When the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik in 1957, Cold War anxieties reached an 
ultimate high. Alarmed and threatened by the Soviet Union’s military and scientific achievement, 
political leaders criticized the lackadaisical nature of the America’s public schools. Soon the goal 
of increasing secondary school enrollments in mathematics and science gained bipartisan support 
in Washington as the Eisenhower administration passed the National Defense Education Act in 
1958.70 This unprecedented federal intervention underscored society’s deep dissatisfaction with 
the quality of the one best system and the growing perception that major reforms were needed in 
order to keep up with a modern and technological economy.”71  
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The burgeoning Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s would also illuminate the 
inequalities of public schooling. Preoccupied with social efficiency, the Progressive Era 
reformers believed that one goal of education was to scientifically determine and sort children 
into different educational tracks. One administrator at the time pictured the educational system as 
having the very important function of a selection agency, “a means of selecting the men of best 
intelligence from the deficient and mediocre.”72 But tracking would, for instance, place Black 
students of the Detroit Public Schools into “the academically deficient general high school 
curriculum at twice the rate of white students, thus dooming them to four years of watered-down 
required courses and life adjustment-style electives.”73 Millions of Blacks who migrated to 
centrals cities from rural areas between 1940-1970 in hopes for better opportunities found 
themselves in educational wastelands. Racial discrimination and de facto segregation resulted in 
Black pupils disproportionately attending the worst schools. African Americans and other 
American minorities had long been dissatisfied with the one best system. Finally, in Detroit, for 
example, Blacks would gain some political leverage by the late 1940s and began organizing 
around the educational needs of their children, some of the first steps taken by the civil rights 
movement.74 
Then in 1954, the Brown decision of the United States Supreme Court to desegregate 
schools gave hope to American African Americans across the country that at last their quest for 
educational equality had the sanction of law. The civil rights movement had also begun to prick 
the conscience of White Americans. In 1957, when Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus interfered 
with the integration of Central High in Little Rock “television cameras brought the ugliness of 
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racism home to everyone’s living rooms.”75 By the mid 1960s, it was clear that America’s 
education system was far from equal between the races. In 1965, the federal government 
responded with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act enabling poor school districts to 
receive additional federal funding. Remarkably, once again, the federal government had 
intervened, launching an initiative that essentially declared that improving urban public schools 
was one of the prime weapons in the War on Poverty.76 
While the one best system was still lauded by some as a shining model of democracy, 
many more were critiquing the system. Tyack wrote in 1974,  
Despite frequent good intentions and abundant rhetoric about “equal education 
opportunity,” schools have rarely taught the children of the poor effectively—and 
this failure has been systematic, not idiosyncratic. 
Talk about “keeping schools out of politics” has often served to obscure actual 
alignments of power and patterns of privilege. 
Americans have often perpetuated social injustice by blaming the victim, 
particularly in the case of institutionalized racism.77 
 
In short, for Tyack, the “search of the one best system” had “ill-served the pluralistic character of 
American society.”78 By now, a slew of scholars had formulated theories about how the school 
system actually reproduced social inequality.79  
 Though efforts to desegregate schools through busing spread across a number of cities, 
the corporate school system remained largely in tact. In the late 1960s, however, Whites were 
still staunchly resisting integration while Blacks and minorities grew increasingly disenchanted 
with the slow pace of change. This discontent resulted in minorities demanding for community 
control as way to improve the quality of schooling for their children, a completely different tactic 	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than busing. In Detroit, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the Black Nationalists (who grew 
out of the militant faction of the Civil Rights movement) successfully resisted efforts to integrate 
schools, implementing community control by breaking up the school district into eight wards 
each with its own board. As Tyack puts it, 
many members of outcast groups demanded community control by their own 
people in place of the traditional corporate model of governance which sought to 
rise above “interest groups”; they substituted self-determination as a goal instead 
of assimilation; they rejected “equality” if that meant Anglo-conformity […] To 
many blacks the schools were not ‘above politics’ but part of the struggle for 
black power.80 
 
For the first time since the early national period, government agencies entertained the 
experimentation of “human-scale institutions that were rooted in ethnic neighborhoods,” a major 
contest to the behemoth and bureaucratic one best system.81   
Thus, as Americans grew increasingly dissatisfied with the one best system after WWII 
they called for more academic rigor and equal access to a quality education. Such demands 
implicated the existing structure for its failure to educate all children well, challenging the basic 
foundations and assumptions of the one best system, and nowhere more vociferously than in 
America’s cities.82 Critically, for the first time since the Progressive Era, reformers were again 
conceptualizing urban school reform vis-à-vis tinkering with governance. In many cities, this 
was a brief experiment with community control. In Detroit, community control lasted for ten 
years before it returned to a single-elected school board. Furthermore, during this period, we 
witness an unprecedented authority and influence of the federal government in the matters of 
public education. Thus, we can argue that a new pattern of school governance begins to 
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materialize during this period in which the one best system was under attack. This dissertation 
seeks to understand this new pattern of school governance that is still unfolding.	  
Consensus and Conflict: Examples from Chicago, Newark, and New York City 
 To set the context for the Detroit story, it is useful to briefly review the story of issues 
around school governance change in other related urban centers, such as Chicago, Newark, and 
New York City. By reviewing these particular works that detail the educational histories of these 
cities, we can see shared patterns of consensus and conflict around the transition from village 
school governance to corporate school governance. Chicago, Newark, and New York City 
represent the dilemmas most industrial cities faced after the Depression, a postwar context in 
which educational decisions were made.83 First, cities began to experience significant financial 
decline and thus school boards competed for increasingly scarce revenue. Increases in the 
population and school age population added additional stress to the fiscal challenges cities and 
schools faced mid-century. Second, while ethnically diverse at the turn of the last century, 
northern cities grew more racially diverse as more Black migrants from the South joined 
immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, and South America who sought to live in northern cities. 
This increase in numbers of racial minorities in cities combined with the out-migration of second 
generation White ethnics further exacerbated and complicated the existing social, political, and 
economic issues after the Great Depression. 
 Jean Anyon’s description of the Newark Public Schools in the early 1900s is strikingly 
similar to Mirel’s description of DPS.84 Between 1860-1929, Newark was one of the most 
wealthy industrial cities in the nation and its school system was also one the of finest. An elite 	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school board dominated by businessmen erected palatial school buildings that came to symbolize 
the city’s power and wealth. Like Detroit, however, the Great Depression had a grave effect on 
the city, a critical turning point after which Newark’s schools would steadily decline. Like so 
many other post-industrial cities, Newark’s ability to raise money for education waned 
considerably after the 1930s. Newark’s fiscal crisis, Anyon points out, is one key factor that 
would eventually put tremendous strain on the corporate school system. 
In her account of Chicago Public Schools (CPS), Dorothy Shipps argues how conflicts 
among interest groups put pressure of Chicago’s corporate school system.85 Beginning in the late 
19th century, the Commercial Club of Chicago (CCC), a group of elite businessmen, began to 
wield great influence in shaping the city’s school district. In addition to radically transforming 
school governance into a centralized bureaucracy, the CCC also proposed a system of vocational 
schools. Their vocational school plan, however, drew protest and conflict from organized labor, 
who contended that working class children should also receive a liberal arts curriculum. Shipps 
argues that the Progressive Era was riddled with contests between Chicago’s businessmen and 
labor. And while the CCC failed to create a system of vocational schools, Chicago’s business 
elite won most of the school battles, most importantly the establishment of a corporate model of 
schooling. This model and the idea that large urban school systems can be substantially 
improved through better managerialism has remained essentially unchanged in Chicago.  
 Gradually, however, in the latter half of the twentieth century, conflicts between business 
and labor would shift to tensions between the corporate school governance decision-makers and 
racial minorities. By the 1960s, under the leadership of Mayor Richard Daley, business and labor 
had actually become governing partners in the Democratic machine. Shipps argues that while 
teachers were winning their rights under the Daley machine, this corporatist governing 	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arrangement largely ignored the intensifying racial cleavages of the city. Like Detroit, after 
WWII, the Black population in Chicago had doubled.86 By the 1960s, Chicago’s schools were 
segregated and unequal and even though Blacks were one-third of the teaching force, “most were 
relegated to second-class status throughout Daley’s tenure.”87 But rather than confront race head 
on, Mayor Daley called upon the Commercial Club leaders who addressed the issue by framing it 
as a need for holding schools accountable and not school integration. Shipps writes, by the early 
1980s, 
[…] integration was beside the point.  Chicago’s corporate leaders had already 
reframed the public school problem and were seeking to convince black members.  
They believed that the central problem was a lack of consequences for adults 
when students did not perform well (accountability), rather that the racial bias of a 
system that routinely gave black and Latino students an inferior education.88 
 
Shipps’ history of the conflict between various interest groups demonstrates how issues of race 
ultimately put pressure on the one best system. But because of the paths not chosen—integration, 
community control, etc.—racial resonances continue to affect the politics of education reform in 
Chicago today. 	  
Similarly, in the end, Newark Public Schools also failed to address the racial issues that 
came along with population change. This began as early as the 1920s when two thirds of 
Newark’s children were either foreign or children of immigrants.89 Anyon contends that the 
single largest factors to Newark’s failure was the inability of the corporate school governance 
elites to properly respond to immigration:  
[…] the failure of the schools to respond successfully to poverty and cultural 
difference even in a period of relative affluence and strength reveals a 
phenomenon that continues to grow in Newark and other American cities: the 	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power of social class—poverty—and racial difference to overwhelm educational 
efforts to reform schools.90 
 
In Anyon’s interpretation of schooling history, the pattern was set early on. Thus, when southern 
Blacks migrated to northern cities they were a “racially” different population infiltrating the city. 
And, this time, with the combined effects of redlining, suburbanization, and White flight that 
resulted in concentrated Black poverty, this rendition of population change further exacerbated 
the system’s plight to educate non-Whites well. Overall, Anyon argues, the decline of Newark’s 
schools can be traced back to national, state, and local policies—the general disinvestment of the 
city and absence of corporate accountability—that disenfranchised the nation’s urban ethnic 
residents from political power. As with Shipps’ account, Newark’s racial history continues to 
cast a long shadow on efforts to reform its schools today, with poverty and racial isolation 
making it especially difficult.	  
 In her history of New York City Public Schools, Diane Ravitch conceptualizes such 
pressure and conflict on the one best system as school wars.91 As early as the 1840s, there was 
such a clash between the Public School Society, a group of elites who began the first common 
schools in New York City, and the Irish Catholic clergy. Even though the Public School Society 
espoused a non-sectarian philosophy, in truth, nonsectarianism was really sectless Protestantism. 
Thus, the Irish Catholics, one of the largest immigrant groups in the early nineteenth century 
were angered by the overtly Protestant nature of public schools and launched “one of the bitterest 
debates in the history of American education.”92 Ravitch argues that the Protestant elites failed to 
see how they privileged their own native status over that of new immigrants. The Catholics went 
on to establish their own system of parochial schools. 	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Over a century later, when Black and Puerto Rican children became the majority of the 
New York City school register, the stage was set for yet another school war. Echoing the 
separatism of the Catholics in the 1840s, Black militants demanded for community control.  
Ravitch writes, 
Once they agreed that the system consciously conspired not to educate their 
children, it became imperative to wrest away control of the schools.  The 
corollary to this view was the inference that black children would learn in a black-
controlled school, where there was no clash between the culture of the teachers 
and the pupils.93 
 
With racial riots exploding in Newark in 1964 and Detroit in 1967, New York Mayor John 
Lindsay, not wanting to be responsible for any incident that would escalate into a riot, urged the 
school board to decentralize. Like so many other large urban school districts at the time 
(including Detroit), the racial conflict resulted in brief experimentations with decentralization. 
Ravitch, however, emphasizes how the conflict between Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and the White 
corporate school system were manifestations of reoccurring tensions between the culture and 
ideology of the native versus the non-native, underscoring Tyack’s idea that the one best system 
has always ill-served a pluralistic America.  
 Again, these case studies serve as examples of how by the 1960s and 1970s the corporate 
school system came under fire. Chicago, Newark, and New York City are stories about how 
there was enough agreement to forge and develop the corporate school governance model in the 
early twentieth century. However, achieving consensus became significantly more difficult in the 
postwar economy—especially as conflicts were increasingly racial in matter—challenging the 
basic assumptions of this system. Although Shipps makes the case that Chicago largely ignored 
the issues concerning the educational equality of African American children, professionals, and 	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citizens, in total the uprising and protests of Blacks and minorities in urban centers across the 
nation put these issues at the forefront of policy and research. These accounts indicate that the 
history of racial conflicts—or the ideological and cultural school wars—not only put pressure on 
the system that ultimately led to change but it also continues to cast a long shadow on the racial 
politics of urban school reform today. Thus, these case studies help to situate my analysis of 
school governance change in Detroit, particularly as repercussions of postwar policies (e.g., 
disinvestment of the city and the concentrated poverty of Blacks and minorities) and today’s 
“school wars.”  
Changing Conceptions of Public Schooling in the Twentieth Century 
 Connected to the understanding of how Americans came to lose faith in the one best 
system are the changing conceptions of the purpose of public schooling. Just as economic, 
technological, demographic, and social changes put pressure on the system, so did it change 
people’s views on the purpose of public schooling as more came to believe that the Progressive 
Era system no longer addressed the needs of the society. “Americans have traditionally 
considered their schools mechanisms for social improvement,” observes Patricia Albjerg 
Graham.94 While this has remained true, ideas and beliefs about what social improvements are 
needed have changed over the century. While there are volumes written about the varying 
purposes of public schooling over time, relatively less is known about how this has ultimately 
impacted school governance change. Thus, it is useful to briefly synthesize some of the relevant 
literature on this subject in order to situate Detroit’s story as an analysis of a new emerging 
pattern of school governance as a response to changing educational goals. 
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Graham has conceptualized public schooling’s purpose shifting from assimilation to 
adjustment to access in the twentieth century. In the first quarter of the century, “schools 
performed the astonishingly successful transformation of taking many children whose family 
culture and often whose family language was foreign and converting them in to adults who were 
Americans.”95 Graham argues that schools were able to do this because parents were keen on 
acclimating their children in a new land while political leaders were concerned with producing 
loyal Americans. Thus, in response to the social need for figuring out what do with immigrants, 
reformers primary saw the purpose of public schooling as a process of assimilation.  
Then in the middle of the century, when public schooling became a holding place for 
youths, Graham argues that public schooling’s purpose was largely characterized by the idea of 
adjustment, “adjusting” children to what they will do later in their adult life, which was often 
tacitly limiting. For instance, women were largely expected to become homemakers and thus 
would go through a corresponding curriculum. During this era, the perceived need for society 
was a socially well adjusted next generation, but to many scholars, including Graham, it was 
actually a poor interpretation of what Dewey meant as “teaching the whole child.”96 The anti-
intellectual sentiment of this era would soon come under attack in the 1960s. If poor and 
minority children were to have any chance for social mobility, they needed formal instruction in 
reading and mathematics not “life adjustment” curriculum. When the federal government passed 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965, it essentially ushered in a new era 
focused on access in which reformers became concerned with raising student achievement in 
historically disadvantaged neighborhoods. By the end of the twentieth century, the demand for 
universal academic achievement had become a norm. Consequently, Graham argues, reforming 	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the schooling system around universal access has largely been a struggle to undo the ideology 
and practices of progressive education. 
Along the same lines, David Labaree, argues that at least three different educational goals 
developed over the century—democratic equality, social efficiency, and social mobility—are 
often in competition with each another, complicating today’s efforts to reform schools.97 
Achieving democratic equality, the goal of preparing students for citizenship, was the most 
compelling justification for the founding and early diffusion of common schools in the mid-
nineteenth century. The Progressive Era then produced a second goal, social efficiency, which 
aimed to prepare students for work. In the late 1990s, as people gravitated towards new ideas 
about markets and schools, they established a new goal of social mobility—preparing individuals 
to compete for social positions. This third educational goal, Labaree contends, has appeared to 
trump the other goals, changing the nature of education from a public good to an almost private 
good—a drastic shift from the acquisition of knowledge for the welfare of society to the 
acquisition of knowledge as a credential. Like Graham, Labaree also argues that there is a 
struggle to reform the system around this new educational goal, but partly because the other two 
goals—at least ideologically and politically—are in conflict with the social mobility goal.  
While Graham and Labaree’s concepts allude to how changing educational goals might 
affect the nature of the system, Michael W. Kirst explains how different goals during different 
periods influence which institutions are chosen to govern schools.”98 Kirst argues that the “major 
alterations in the socioeconomic environment” affect which institutions govern schools and the 
“accumulation of policies over many years embodies a set of preferences about which 	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institutions should govern what components of a policy area.”99 Yet, “institutional choice” is 
“complex, uncertain, and subject to continual political change.”100  Kirst argues that at times 
certain institutions are chosen to temporarily settle a debate among the numerous and conflicting 
goals that the public has for education. Not surprisingly, Kirst identifies 1900-1920 and 1965-85 
as two periods that experienced the most significant changes in institutional choice. And like the 
other scholars, Kirst sensing new changes on the horizon, argues that contemporary reformers 
are actually advocating that the institution of a democratic government has become inappropriate 
for schools and rather the market is a better new institutional choice. 
Scholars like Kirst indicate that new educational goals change the institutions that we 
select to govern our schools. On the other hand, David L. Kirp has shown that in other instances 
institutions like the Supreme Court have intervened and changed the course of educational goals 
first.101 For instance, Southern states were notably the last to establish public schools and 
especially did little to finance the education of Black children. Therefore, “correct[ing] those 
gross inequities” and “to bring about ‘simple justice’ nationwide” became a theme of educational 
policy and constitutional law after the Brown v. Board of Education decision in the 1954.102 Kirp 
makes the case that a critical set of legal battles in the twentieth century have transformed the 
purpose of public schooling. Kirp’s argument highlights the growing influence of institutions 
like the Supreme Court and other higher levels of government (e.g., municipal, state, and federal) 
in public education.  
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 In summary, in the wake of dissatisfaction with the one best system, new educational 
goals have arisen but not without struggle and conflict, particularly in large urban school districts 
that must operate within the reality of postwar economies and the racial resonances of failed 
Great Society programs. As the literature indicates, the gradual breakup of consensus in the 
twentieth century have resulted in competing goals but nevertheless are shaping contemporary 
efforts to change school governance. The next section explores what patterns of school 
governance emerged after the great contests against the corporate school system in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
Emerging Patterns of School Governance, 1980-2013 
In spite of serious challenges to the one best system, by the early 1980s the Progressive 
Era system was still largely intact. Graham likened America’s public schooling system to a 
battleship. 
“Large, powerful, cumbersome, with enormous crews, these giants of the ocean 
go where they are told to go by some distant authority, which presumably 
understands better than anyone on the ship, including the captain where and why 
the should go. Maneuverability is not their strength.”103 
 
To many, the large bureaucratic structure of school was just not responding quickly enough to 
the many calls for change. However, in the next decade, there would be innovations like 
vouchers, parental choice, and charters that were efforts to better respond. By the mid 1990s, 
there were all sorts of “new, specialized ships” that were addressing the calls for change better 
than the single battleship model.104 Increasingly, the one best system was regarded as an 
antiquated model and reform efforts, particularly in urban school districts, were largely about 
dismantling the corporate school system left over from an earlier era. This final section of the 	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chapter explores some of the literature attempting to explain the “breakup” of the battleship and 
new and emerging patterns of school governance at the turn of the century. 
The flurry of reform initiatives beginning in the 1980s can be categorized into at least 
three strategies of educational reform: standards-based reform, differentiation of schools, and 
market-based reform.105 Ultimately, however, they are all interrelated or connected in some way, 
together having influenced the extraordinary restructuring of the public schooling system. 
According to Diane Ravitch, standards-based reform originated with the 1983 report A 
Nation At Risk.106 The report claimed, “the educational foundations of our society are presently 
being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a 
people.”107 Thereafter, “much of the energy in large-scale change in public education has focused 
on raising standards.”108 The standards movement was also born out of the economic anxiety of 
that time and spun into the report was the idea that the nation’s global competitiveness depended 
on a better-educated workforce, a prevailing belief that continues to impact school reform 
today.109 With the ascendancy of President Ronald Reagan, standards-based reform was also a 
conservative backlash against the radical and freewheeling reforms of the late 1960s and 
1970s—the call for a back-to-basics education.110 Then, the core elements of standards-based 
reform was incorporated into federal policy beginning with President Bill Clinton’s Improving 
America’s School Act in 1994 to President George W. Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act in 
2001. Over time, however, Bulkley explains that the goals of the standards-based reform evolved 	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from establishing a rigorous curriculum and instruction to creating a high-stakes accountability 
system based on the outcomes of assessments tied to standards. 
Ravitch thus distinguishes these as two movements: standards and accountability. In a 
scathing critique, she argues that the standards movement was “hijacked” by the accountability 
movement, arguing that President Clinton’s Goals 2000 legislation—codifying the testing of 
student performance as a way of keeping schools and districts accountable—shifted efforts away 
from raising standards since the late 1950s to the extreme testing culture of the 2000s. Both 
conservatives and liberals had come to believe that accountability via testing would lead to better 
outcomes. NCLB brought the accountability concept home by requiring all schools to make 
adequate yearly progress (AYP) or else be sanctioned. Ravitch argues that the rewards and 
punishment system of NCLB resulted in a culture in which teachers were punished, vilified, and 
fired, schools were closed, and unions were hard-pressed to do anything. NCLB was also the 
largest expansion of federal authority of schools in American history. 
Ravitch also explains how the accountability movement actually originated from 
aggressive efforts to reform city schools. As early as 1987, the hard-lined, uncompromising, and 
unrelenting top-down managerial approach of NCLB was already being tested and tried in New 
York City. Anthony Alvarado, the superintendent of District 2 in New York City, drew national 
attention when he dramatically turned around his district, replacing two-thirds of his principals 
and half his teacher workforce when they failed to use his methods.111  In 1998, Alvarado would 
replicate his method in San Diego.112 Significantly, Ravitch points out, there was already 
considerable replication of what would become the NLCB approach and a network of individuals 
and policy actors that would be increasingly called upon in the 2000s.  	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At the same time, large urban school districts were also experimenting with a second 
reform strategy: differentiation of schools. This was an obvious shift away from the common 
school model and towards schools that were distinct in some way.113 Magnet schools, smaller 
themed schools, and charter schools claimed to serve several different educational purposes, 
including “offering a range of schools within a system of choice, providing schools that 
incorporate an array of instructional practices and thus service the varied needs and interests of 
students, and giving opportunities for educational innovation.”114 Notably, the Gates Foundation 
pushed towards differentiation of schools through their five-year initiative to fund the creation of 
new, small, and autonomous high schools.115 Other philanthropies sought to fund charter school, 
which would gradually evolve into broader strategy of utilizing the market to improve schools. 
Market-based reform, the third reform strategy, actually originates during the 
empowerment era in the 1960s and 1970s. The original purpose of charter schools was to enable 
a group of parents, educators, or community activists to establish an independent school in order 
to be more innovative, effective, and responsive to special needs.116 According to Fuller, for the 
first time, reformers began to “experiment with human-scale institutions that were rooted in 
ethnic neighborhoods.”117 The rise of Reagan and conservatism, however, would soon redirect 
the movement, steering “empowerment” in quite a different direction and laying the foundations 
for the market-based movement. In the 1980s, true empowerment was redefined as to mean 
when all parents could choose the school of their own choice. Fuller writes, 
The new policy discourse dropped the earlier progressive elements of community 
empowerment and democratic participation, aimed at transforming society, in 	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favor of a story about “devolving” the state’s authority and delivering Adam 
Smith’s dream of ever-widening market choices. Conservatives argues that a lack 
of accountability and competition were the culprits, not family poverty, unequal 
school financing, or uneven teacher quality.118 
 
Thus, Reagan conservatives increasingly viewed charters, vouchers, and other open enrollment 
schemes as a means of pressuring “bureaucratic school managers to compete and be held directly 
accountable to parents.”119 Influenced by Milton Friedman’s 1955 The Role of Government in 
Education, which opposes government regulation and champions the private marketplace as a 
solution for increasing both access to and the quality of schooling, reformers actually began to 
envision the marketplace as a new institution to govern public schooling.120  
In 1989, at the first “Education Summit” in Charlottesville, President George H.W. Bush 
and fifty governors agreed that school choice would be a major component to their national 
agenda to reform public education. The education summit and subsequent events like it would 
lead to a widespread (and bi-partisan) belief that creating a market of public schools for parents 
to choose from would lead to improved educational opportunities and outcomes. Two years later, 
in 1991, Minnesota passed the first charter law, marking the beginning of a market-based 
movement that would quickly spread across the country, particularly in large urban centers. 
In the 1990s, increasingly, advocates began to argue that market-based reform was the 
only way to “deconstruct the cumbersome institution of public education.”121 John Chubb and 
Terry Moe’s 1990 book Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools was hugely influential in 
pinning the problem squarely on bureaucracy. They write, 
[…] the specific kinds of democratic institutions by which American public 
education has been governed for the last half century appear to be incompatible 	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with effective schooling. Although everyone wants good schools, and although 
these institutions are highly sensitive and responsive to what people want, they 
naturally and routinely function to generate just the opposite—providing a context 
in which the organizational foundations of effective academic performance cannot 
flourish or take root. The problem of poor performance is just as much a normal, 
enduring part of the political landscape as school boards and superintendents are. 
It is one of the prices Americans pay for schooling to exercise direct democratic 
control over schools.122 
 
In other words, Chubb and Moe were arguing that democratic control, the organizational 
foundations of school (i.e., the school board and superintendent), was actually the major barrier 
to improving academic performance. The market would not only singlehandedly disrupt this 
governance structure but also provide a new and compatible institution for effective schooling.  
 Among all three reform strategies, market-based reform has had the most obvious impact 
on changing school governance, but all three strands have resulted in the gradual dismantling of 
the corporate school system and the shaping of a new and emerging pattern of school 
governance.   
Mayoral Control and Integrated Governance 
One key indicator of a new and emerging pattern of school governance is mayoral control 
of school boards. In the beginning of the 1990s, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago and Mayor 
Thomas Menino of Boston were at the forefront of this “groundbreaking movement.”123 
According to Kenneth Wong and his colleagues, school boards were overwhelmed and 
“outmatched” by the challenges of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and as a result mayors “found 
themselves in a new role in relation to city schools, namely, as crisis managers.”124 Thus, a 
driving factor behind the shift to change school governance is the mayor’s newfound role of 	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reinvigorating cities where the improvement of schools is seen as a major way of improving the 
quality of life of city residents. 125 In the new era of urban school reform, city schools are not 
viewed as a autonomous units of government but rather increasingly a part of the mayor’s 
system-wide focus. 
While Jeffrey Henig and Wilbur C. Rich describe mayoral control as the outcome of 
Americans losing faith in the corporate school system, reformers have also found that mayoral 
control can be a mechanism by which to circumvent a deeply entrenched school board often 
dominated by teacher union interests, which can be vehemently resistant to change.126 But Some 
scholars have found that market-based reforms are actually predicated on mayoral control or 
state takeover, which greatly reduce the bureaucratic and local political processes that would 
otherwise hinder or compromise market-based reforms.127 A growing number of states have 
legislated mayoral control, essentially making it possible to facilitate the aforementioned reform 
strategies. As a result, in many instances, corporate school governance, which once kept mayors 
and other political leaders from interfering with public schools, has been replaced with a new and 
emerging governing paradigm, which Wong and his colleagues call “integrated governance.”128 
They write, “Within an integrated governance framework, school district governance is no longer 
isolated from but is incorporated into the governance of the local municipality.”129 
In the same vein, other scholars have observed that educational decision-making has not 
only shifted upwards to the local municipal level but also to the state and federal level. For 
example, Jeffrey Henig describes, in addition to the mayor’s office, we are witnessing the rise of 	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“education executives” in the State House and the White House.130 Kathryn A. McDermott 
suggests “the evolution of state sanctions against underperforming schools and districts in the 
late 1980s and 1990s” represents a substantial shift in the state role in education.131 David 
Gamson argues that it is a combination of federal and state mandates that have essentially 
rendered the corporate school system ineffective.132 In Douglas S. Reed’s historical study of 
Alexandria schools in Virginia, he contends that the United States actually aspires to build a 
“federal” schoolhouse, a new era in which the concept of the neighborhood school (i.e., 
educating all children within its attendance zone) is increasingly seen as outdated.133 Scholars 
like Paul Manna have also explored how this unprecedented and new role of the federal 
government in education has actually clashed with state and local realities, seeking to explain a 
sort of disconnect between policies at the federal level and how the policies are actually 
operationalized in local and state settings.134   
Critically, integrated governance has introduced—in addition to education mayors and 
presidents—other new educational actors into the public schooling arena, especially the role of 
foundations and philanthropists. For example, in the late 1990s, when Alvarado implemented his 
unrelenting top-down approach in San Diego, the city’s superintendent, Alan Bersin, raised more 
than $50 million from the Gates Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Broad 	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Foundation, and others.135 In 2002, Mayor Michael Bloomberg attained mayoral control of New 
York City public schools, and with chancellor Joel Klein’s assistance, aggressively moved 
forward with making the school system a major testing ground for market-based reforms—five 
years later, the Broad Foundation, one of the biggest donors for market-based reforms, awarded 
the city with most improved urban school district in the nation.136 Ravitch writes, “Never in 
American history had private foundations assigned themselves the task of reconstructing the 
nation’s education system.”137  
Sarah Reckhow’s work focuses on the new role of foundations and the interrelationship 
between its activities and the degree of mayoral control of urban school districts.138 Reckhow 
argues that the largest grant makers actually tout a strategy of funding only school districts in 
which mayoral control or state takeover has occurred. For instance, the Broad Foundation 
reported “the conditions to dramatically improve K-12 education are often ripe under mayoral or 
state control.”139 Reckhow has found that foundations hoping to catalyze dramatic reform seek to 
do so in cities where “a change in governance” (i.e., mayoral control) offers an “an opportunity 
to shape new policies and introduce new actors into district-level decision making.”140 Thus, the 
characteristics of new patterns of governance include mayoral and/or state takeovers and new 
policy actors such as foundations. 
“The End of Exceptionalism”  
In spite of the variety of work conducted on grasping these recent changes in school 
governance, Jeffrey Henig has observed that the elements of change are still too often studied in 	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isolation from the other.141 It is the problem of researchers narrowly analyzing components of 
change within their own specialized areas. In his most recent work in in 2013, Henig seeks to 
explain the broader transformation and the underlying nature of school governance change.  
Seemingly chaotic, the flurry of change is symptomatic of a major structural shift. That is, Henig 
argues, public schooling has been gradually losing its “special status,” the ability to self-govern 
and remain exempt from the goals and politics of other levels of government. For the greater part 
of the twentieth century, public schools have been governed as a single-purpose government: an 
autonomous governing system, a closed and local arrangement of a few special interest groups, 
and with the single purpose of managing schools. Today, Henig explains, the whirl of school 
reforms are actually manifestations of a larger effort to “reabsorb” public schooling into general-
purpose government: an open system subject to multiple levels of government in which the issue 
of educating children has been combined with a wider range of policy problems and issues.142 
 Henig writes, “The broad changes under way constitute the end of education 
exceptionalism in the United States.”143 Not to be confused with “American exceptionalism” 
(how America’s institutions, norms, and political practices differ from other nations), Henig 
directs our attention to how the handling of education in the past was vastly different from the 
treatment of other major domestic policies. That is, historically, “Education policy in the U.S. 
has traditionally been seen—and treated—as different and distinct, a thing apart.”144 Thus, Henig 
argues that the end of exceptionalism in American education means that the management of 
public schooling is becoming more like other domestic policy areas. 
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Indeed, the sharpest manifestation of the end of exceptionalism is mayoral control, 
vigorous efforts towards eliminating or weakening the publicly elected school board, which is at 
the crux of the corporate school system. Additionally, so-called “education executives” (i.e., 
mayors, governors, and presidents) are increasingly involved in educational decision-making. 
The new influence of the judicial branch, Congress, state legislatures, city council, and new 
educational actors such as foundations all suggest the emergence of a new pattern of school 
governance, which Henig describes as the immersion of education into general-purpose 
government. (See Table 1.) 
 
Table 1. Patterns of School Governance in the United States 
Timeline 1780-1890 1890-1950 1960s to present 
School 
Governance 







• village school system • corporate school system 
• “one best system” 
• Progressive era 
governance 
• traditional school 
governance 
 
• “end of exceptionalism” 
• integrated governance 
• new style governance 
Features Rural; loosely organized; 
decentralized; “one-room 
schoolhouse”145 
Urban; multiple schools; 
centralized; bureaucratic; single-
purpose government; closed 
system 
 
Urban; multi-systems; integration 
with other policy domains; 
integrated or general-purpose 
government; open system  
Central actors Laymen (i.e., local school 
committeemen); village 
community 
School board consisting of 
professional elite (i.e., 
businessmen and educational 
experts); superintendent; teacher 
unions; parents 
 
“Education executives” (i.e., 
mayors, governors, presidents); 
legislative entrepreneurs; 
educational entrepreneurs; multi-
issue groups (e.g., foundations, 
business, etc.); philanthropy 
 
Values Local and “tribal” Professionalism; order; local 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has set up the context for Detroit’s story in the last thirty years. Jeffrey Mirel 
claims that the history of the Detroit Public Schools largely exemplified the patterns of school 
governance in the United States: from village school governance to corporate school governance, 
followed by attacks on the system in the 1960s and 1970s. Does Detroit’s public schooling 
system continue to reflect broader changes in school governance particularly in large cities at the 
turn of the twenty-first century?  
In the last thirty years, the Motor City has experienced a flurry of reforms including 
mayoral control, appointing powerful emergency managers with the capacity to close schools 
and revise contracts with school employees, the spread of charters, and a statewide recovery 
school district called the Education Achievement Authority. After President Obama’s election in 
2008, DPS also became the poster child for potentially receiving millions of federal dollars from 
the newly launched Race to the Top initiative. With many parents and children opting to enroll in 
a myriad of alternative schooling systems (e.g., self-governing schools, charters, and open 
enrollment schools), the school district has shrunk by half in terms of number of schools.146 Since 
1999, DPS’s enrollment has dropped by an astounding 72 percent.147 In 2012, Detroit reportedly 
ranked second to New Orleans in the percentage of students attending charter schools.148 With the 
authority of the school board suspended, many Detroiters contend that they have lost complete 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Data Driven Detroit, “Detroit System of Schools, Then and Now,” (presentation, Detroit Schools-Higher 
Education Consortium meeting, Detroit, MI, October 15, 2012). 
147 Michael F. Addonizio and C. Philip Kearney, Education Reform and the Limits of Policy (Kalamazoo, Michigan: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research). 
148 The seventh annual report by the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools looked at the percentage of 
students enrolled in charter schools in large to medium sized cities using enrollment data from the 2011-2012 school 
year. Detroit enrolled 41% and New Orleans enrolled 76%. See Jennifer Chambers, “Detroit No. 2 in Percentage of 
Charter School Students, National Report Finds,” Detroit News, Nov. 15, 2012. 
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control of their schools. Yet, others see Detroit as an opportunity to rebuild a school system with 
new actors. Are the educational conditions in Detroit symptomatic of “the end of exceptionalism 
in American education”? After a century in which public schools have had a  “special” place in 
America’s government—autonomous, insulated, and sheltered from politics, at least 
rhetorically—are they being absorbed into general-purpose government? Importantly, can 
current displays of conflict and struggle, attempts at politically resisting change, be interpreted in 
light of seismic shifts in how public schooling is managed?  
Although educators (and educational researchers) sense the dramatic changes to public 
schooling especially in light of the twenty-first century, school governance is remarkably given 
little attention.149 Interestingly, Patrick McGuinn and Paul Manna blame the media whom they 
consider is more interested in sensationalizing or politicizing the debates around particular 
reforms: “Questions about governance tend not to lend themselves to stark narratives that pit ‘us’ 
against ‘them’ […].”150 Again, Henig argues that in the research world too often educational 
reforms and policies are studied in isolation from each other. Thus, my dissertation seeks to 
piece together a variety of reforms and episodes into the history of a single urban school district 
in the last thirty years, to examine the details of change, to characterize an emerging new era of 
public schooling within the context of U.S. education history, and to tell a story of 
transformation. Given how Detroit reflects earlier historical patterns, the Motor City makes a 
suitable case study to further understand school governance change at the beginning of a new 
century. What exactly were the factors (e.g., events, policies, social and political forces, etc.) that 
led to school governance change beginning in the 1980s? Who led and supported such reform 
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efforts, and who opposed? What was the nature of conflict during this period? How did events 
ultimately impact Detroit’s school system? These questions guide the construction of a 
contemporary history of Detroit’s public school system, a narrative from which to confirm or 
challenge existing ideas around school governance presented in this chapter, add to the 
historiography of post-Brown schooling, and most importantly to suggest what Detroit’s story 
means for future policy. McGuinn and Manna assert, “the understudied issue of education 
governance should be atop the list of anyone interested in the present and future of American 
education.”151 
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CHAPTER III 
Studying School Governance Change in Detroit, 1980 to 2014 
This dissertation seeks to understand within the context of America’s public schooling 
history what happened to the Detroit Public Schools in the last thirty years. I use historical 
methods: the periodizing and framing of events and actors, contextualizing, observing patterns of 
detail to make meaning of change over time and to tell a plausible story of causation. As such, 
Detroit provides a historical case study for a closer examination of the phenomenon of a new and 
emerging pattern of school governance at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
In this chapter, I discuss historical methods and describe the sources that informed my 
study and the ways I went about using my “data.” Such a methodological description is unusual 
in most historical studies as most historians embed their method in their footnotes and 
introduction.  However, I have deemed this chapter necessary for two reasons. First, I have 
incorporated various tools and concepts from qualitative research (e.g., coding and memo 
writing) during the very early stages of my study that could provide a model for how elements of 
qualitative research can be useful in future historical research. Second, and most importantly, not 
only do we lack in general an explanation of historical methods but also how historical methods 
might be applied in the field of education policy. In my case, my historical case study 
substantiates and provides the fine grain detail of emerging concepts or theories. As I argue in 
the concluding chapter that history should play a greater role in the framing of educational policy 
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analysis and recommendations, a discussion of the virtue of the historian’s craft becomes 
essential for future research.152 
I begin by briefly describing how qualitative methods influenced the early stages of my 
research and suggest how it could be taken up further in future research. Then I explain how 
preliminary concepts that emerged from the early phases of research in addition to the ongoing 
process of constructing a historical narrative enabled me to perceive how the story of DPS in the 
last three decades is about school governance change. In light of this, I explain how the later 
stages of my research utilized urban regime analysis as a concept for revealing key points about 
school governance change: “Good concepts illuminate significant details, and telling details 
point to illuminating concepts.”153 For example, urban regime analysis enabled me to see more 
clearly the social and political conflicts around efforts to tinker with governance. In turn, these 
details have pointed to concepts that may be helpful for both future research and policy. I 
conclude with a few words regarding plausibility in case study research, especially in terms of 
how my particular case study of DPS’s recent history elaborates on a concept or theory, poses 
new questions, and seek alternative solutions.154 
Early Stages of Research: Grounded Theory and Newspapers as Data 
To understand my approach to the early stages of my study, I will briefly describe how I 
applied concepts from grounded theory design. Sharan B. Merriam writes, “Qualitative 
researchers are interested in the understanding of how people interpret their experiences, how 
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they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences.”155 Thus, as a 
researcher who feels that it is important to richly feature the “voices” of the actors in my study, 
in this sense it appeared to me that aspects of qualitative research could be a helpful entry point 
into discovering who and what voices were in my data. Moreover, I wanted to come to my data 
with a blank slate—without predetermining the problem—so that the data would tell me where to 
go next analytically. In other words, I would not begin with theory but rather collect and analyze 
data from which to generate a hypothesis (i.e., an idea of what might be happening).156 While 
some historians may very well approach the early stages of their project in this way, concepts 
from grounded theory influenced the specific steps I took with collecting and analyzing my first 
set of data which were news articles related to DPS or school reform in Detroit between 1999-
2012. 
Because I was interested in discovering the perspectives of as many kinds of 
people as possible, I selected articles from three major newspapers in the Metro Detroit 
area that cover the gamut of political orientations: the Detroit News is more conservative 
than the Detroit Free Press, and the Michigan Chronicle has been one of the most 
politically influential weeklies in the Black community since 1936. (See Table 2.)  
Table 2. Selected Newspapers 
Michigan Chronicle Detroit News Detroit Free Press 
Established in 1936, the Michigan 
Chronicle, based in Detroit became popular 
news weekly serving the African American 
community. It was one of the first Black 
weeklies “to develop an editorial policy in 
favor of the labor movement and the 
Democratic Party. 
Established in 1873, The Detroit News, 
circulated daily, is considered to be a more 
conservative paper. It has never endorsed a 
Democrat for president, though it refused 




Established in 1831, the Detroit Free Press 
is the largest daily newspaper in the Metro 
Detroit area. The newspaper is owned by 
Gannet, which also owns USA Today. It is 
considered slightly more liberal than the 
Detroit News. 
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Techniques (Newberry Park, CA: Sage, 1990). 
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After collecting a set of newspaper articles I began a process of open coding, meaning 
that my first glance of the data involved coding for “anything and everything.”157 This was 
simply a process of scanning through every article and identifying key events, policies, 
programs, schools, figures, statistics, and themes and creating a very simple codebook to keep 
track of whether certain “themes” were reoccurring year to year. For example, I noticed that 
between 1999-2005 the code “race” appeared more frequently than other codes, bringing my 
attention to a heated debate among Detroiters over whether mayoral takeover was a “racist 
tactic” or not. This led me to establish a sense of various actors’ racial perspectives around 
school reform. Influenced by the practice of memoing, my first drafts were in essence memos—I 
wrote to make sense of what I thought I was seeing in the data. Soon I found myself discussing 
how the racial perspectives of different individuals, groups, organizations, agencies, etc. were 
essentially proxies for positions for and against mayoral takeover. In short, this brief episode of 
systematically examining the data from a specific time period led me to focus on the regime 
politics surrounding efforts to change school governance. In true grounded theory fashion, the 
data told me where to go. Landing on regime politics and school governance as the subject of my 
story, I stopped coding as I moved on to a different stage of my research.158 
While historians rarely describe their methods in the manner that social scientists do, 
what are the advantages of making explicit the historian’s way of arriving at a plausible story? 
What are the merits of applying social science methods, like grounded theory, to historical 	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research? Grounded theory, for example, assumes an inductive stance. What place does an 
inductive, exploratory position have in historical research? For me, an inductive stance enabled 
me to approach my data without an agenda, to avoid bias, and to let the data “speak for itself.” 
Thus, incorporating some qualitative methods could avoid bias in historical research. 
Additionally, grounded theory—often applied to cases in which there is a lack of theory to 
explain a particular phenomenon159—is methodologically theory-driven. How might historical 
research, particularly in the field of education, be oriented around theory building? Thus, I 
briefly sketch this early stage of my research to point to the possible merits of incorporating 
qualitative methods in historical research. 
Methods and Sources for a Historical Study 
Why a historical approach to answering the research question? What makes historical 
methods distinct from social science methods? Clarence Stone asserts: 
As one moves from the realm of physical phenomena to that of social phenomena, 
limitations in the scientific method multiply. The nature of the research enterprise 
itself is open to debate. For example, unlike many social scientists, historians are 
disinclined to search for universal conclusions or identify “iron laws” of human 
behavior. Instead, they offer the detailed texture of a phenomenon – whether it be 
a movement, an institution, a person, an era, or some combination of these.160  
 
Thus one goal of historical methods is to offer a comprehensive description of the social 
phenomenon. The historian’s answer to the question of what happened in Detroit in the last 
thirty years and why, for example, is likely to be complex and layered. Stone explains, 
“Historical analysis makes assumptions about causation, the main one being that social 
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phenomena are to be understood as having multiple causes. Research proceeds by analyzing the 
conjunction of factors, not by isolating single variables.”161  
 As opposed to choosing a bit for study, striving to tell the story of the social phenomenon 
in its entirety does what science cannot: produce characterizations that not only embrace but also 
explain the paradoxes of social phenomenon. Stone writes, 
Many historical phenomena display opposing tendencies; hence, characterization 
often takes the form, not of elaborating the implication of pure types, but of 
explaining how divergent needs or clashing propensities are reconciled. 
Appreciation of paradox pushes us toward complexity, not simplification: toward 
bridging differences, not defining them out of existence.162 
 
Paradox and complexity point to the notion of change over time. While certain aspects of 
life remain the same across time, social phenomenon is rarely static in that, for example, 
we see new technologies shape the way we organize society and impact our economic, 
social, and cultural pursuits. A historical approach seeks to illuminate such aspects of 
social change wherein the values and assumptions of one era may drastically differ in 
another.163  
 History is “unable to replicate endless observations under laboratory 
conditions.”164 Rather, the “method” proceeds from “the notion of sequence.”165 Stone 
explains, “Events have manifold causes, many of which we may never identify or even be 
conscious of. But by following events sequentially, we gain some understanding of what 
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remains constant, what changes, and what is associated with each.”166 In my study, the 
sequencing of events after 1980—where Jeffrey Mirel left off—revealed what is constant 
and what is changing. Since its inception, public school reformers in the United States 
have tinkered with school governance as a way of improving education. What appears to 
change over time are the regimes that determine what governance looks like. Regime 
change also seems to be the source of social, political, and cultural conflict among groups 
in an ever increasingly diverse America. 
Stone also explains how historical research is the interaction between patterns of detail 
and concept. Isolated details, on the other hand, can “point in quite different directions.”167 Thus, 
the historian’s work is that of both contextualization and conceptualization. Stone argues, 
Evidence consists, not of interesting facts standing alone, but of patterns of detail. 
The soundness of a political characterization (of a person, movement, institution, 
etc.) depends on the explanatory power of the conceptualization and on the 
consistency of detail. […] If a concept does not illuminate concrete historical 
events, it is not useful.168  
 
In 1989, political scientist Clarence Stone produced a historical study on Atlanta’s transition 
from a city governed by Whites to a period in which Blacks became an electoral majority and 
gained control of city hall (1946-1988).169 Stone observed that Atlanta’s transition to a Black-led 
city was relatively free from the kind of racial polarization that came to dominate other cities. 
Instead a biracial coalition of both formal and informal decision makers had formed and became 
an essential part of the city’s governing regime, cooperating around several major redevelopment 
projects that strengthened and bolstered Atlanta’s city center. Seeking to explain this 
phenomenon, Stone developed the concept of urban regime analysis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Ibid. 
167 Stone, Regime Politics, 255. 
168 Ibid., 255-256. 
169 Ibid. 
 	  55 
This political concept is based on the assumption that the government in the United States 
by itself is greatly limited in carrying out its decisions and almost always relies on extra informal 
arrangements to enhance governance. Therefore, a regime is the informal arrangements that 
“surround and complement the formal workings of the governmental authority.”170 A regime is 
not just any informal group that comes together to make a decision; it is an informal group that is 
relatively stable and has access to institutional resources that allow it to have a sustained role in 
making governing decisions.171 Importantly, a regime is empowering—“a means for achieving 
coordinated efforts that might not otherwise be realized.”172  
In cities, the regime is characteristically urban. In our postwar economy, the lack of 
financial resources in many cities across the nation has significantly constrained what municipal 
governments can or cannot do. Thus, urban regimes are distinct in that they are informal 
arrangements needing business as a key actor in sustaining agendas and policies. Stone argues 
that urban regimes thus find themselves needing “to bridge the principle of popular control of 
governmental office on the one side and the community’s need for an appreciable level of 
business activity on the other.”173 In short, an urban regime requires the active support and 
cooperation of private interests. Therefore, an urban regime is defined as “the informal 
arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able 
to make and carry out governing decisions.”174 Critically, Stone notes, private interests are not 
confined to just business interests; indeed, in practice, private interest may include “labor-union 
officials, party functionaries, officers in nonprofit organizations or foundations, and church 
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leaders.”175  
At the heart of urban regime analysis is the concept of civic capacity, the idea that a level 
of cooperation, the kind that actually brings together “people based in different sectors of a 
community’s institutional life,” is necessary for enabling a “coalition of actors to make and 
support a set of governing decisions.”176 A high level of civic capacity also determines the 
difference between policies that fade or last. Stone writes, 
The study of urban regime is thus a study of who cooperates and how their 
cooperation is achieved across institutional sectors of community life. Further, it 
is an examination of how that cooperation is maintained when confronted with an 
ongoing process of social change, a continuing influx of new actors, and potential 
break-downs through conflict or indifference.177  
 
In Atlanta, a high level of civic capacity was achieved through a biracial coalition that ensured 
policies were mutually beneficial for each group, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the 
governing regime. In short, Atlanta’s biracial coalition helped to negotiate around racial 
polarization, a path taken by so many other Black-led cities. 
In this way, urban regime analysis offers two concepts relevant to my study. First, the 
notion that an urban regime is required to facilitate and sustain change. Thus, what regime 
supported school governance change in Detroit? Second, the notion of civic capacity enables me 
to turn to the policy implications at the end of my story. Stone suggests, “This theory can alert us 
to difficulties in politics that we might otherwise underrate. If indeed politics can enhance the 
urban condition, then we must learn how to act in concert on those matters that people might 
choose by reasoning together.”178 That is, civic capacity not only illuminates the story of politics 
in my study but also reveals why changing governance towards both effectiveness and equality is 	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a struggle. Stone and other scholars have found that an urban regime perspective reveals why 
efforts to reform public schooling is so difficult.179 Stone writes, 
[…] I have argued that governance in Atlanta can usefully be understood by the 
concept of an urban regime. By implication, I also suggest that this same concept 
would be a fruitful starting point in the study of governance in other communities. 
In short, I contend that ‘urban regime’ is an illuminating concept, casting light on 
Atlanta’s political experience and, potentially, on the experience of other 
communities as well.180 
 
Applying urban regime analysis to my study has lead to questions of policy: whose cooperation 
is needed in order to improve the quality of education in urban school systems? 
Urban Regime Analysis and School Reform  
While Atlanta’s municipal government had achieved remarkable cooperation across 
racial lines, the same was not true for its school district. Rather, its school district followed the 
pattern of other postindustrial cities: efforts to improve schools were difficult and conflict-ridden. 
Thus, Stone and other scholars began to consider how urban regime analysis could be applied to 
questions around urban school reform.181 Stone and collaborators also noticed increased pressure 
on how schools had been traditionally governed. Collaborators, Michael Danielson and Jennifer 
Hoschild, observed:   
[…] during the 1990s the demands for accountability have gained ascendance 
over the structural and normative drive towards autonomy. Schools are not, after 
all, hermetically sealed. […] The fact that public education has so singularly 
failed to accomplish its task for so many children, most strikingly in cities like 
New York, Chicago, and Baltimore, has further increased the clamor from a 
widening range of outsiders. Citizens and leaders alike are increasingly realizing 
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that education is both too important and too problematic to leave to insiders and 
hope for the best.”182 
 
Perceiving that demands to improve student performance was forcing educational decision-
making beyond the usual confines of the local school district (i.e., “insiders”), scholars set out to 
better understand the phenomenon, resulting in the publication of Changing Urban Education, a 
compilation of cross-city case studies measuring for levels of civic capacity around school 
governance change. The contributors found that in every city executing some kind of school 
reform that changes governance, civic capacity was low. In other words, the education politics of 
the city was not readily organized around improving the academic performance of the least 
disadvantaged students. 
Instead what Stone and others have found is that education politics involves a coalition of 
individuals and groups organized around the protection of jobs and career ladders. Stone calls 
this coalition the employment regime.183 Wilbur Rich, in less than flattering terms, has called this 
regime the “education cartel,” who ultimately inhibit the work of school reformers and maintain 
the educational status quo.184 Therefore, urban regime analysis suggests that shifting to a 
performance regime, a coalition centered on improving the performance of lower SES students, 
will be difficult. Stone writes, 
Even though the legitimacy of the old system has weakened, a new regime has yet 
to form in more than a rudimentary way. It is not enough to destabilize the old 
order. The political challenge is to build a new set of arrangements in which 
academic performance is a focal concern.185 
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In addition to urban regime analysis, these concepts (that have been applied to the urban 
schooling context) have illuminated what I was seeing in my data: the gradual ending of 
one regime and the emergence of another. Even though I do not try to measure civic 
capacity, this concept has given me a powerful way of thinking about Detroit’s future in 
the aftermath of school governance change; what will it take to establish a performance 
regime, a political arrangement that actually includes those who can truly assist with 
improving the performance of our least advantaged students? 
Civic Capacity and Race as a Barrier 
Furthermore, studies that have applied urban regime analysis have found that race is a 
factor or force that distracts from or weakens civic capacity. In their study of school reform in 
Black-led cities, Jeffrey Henig and colleagues extend the concept of civic capacity to include 
how race is a central (though not a primary) variable: 
The concept of civic capacity, in and of itself, has little to say about the role of 
race. We believe (and present evidence to support the fact) that race is an 
extremely potent factor in determining how localities respond to the challenges 
they face. Yet, we also believe that it is possible and desirable to incorporate race 
as a central variable in a broader theoretical framework than to give it primacy. 
Understanding race helps to explain the nature of local school-reform politics; it 
does not serve as an explanation on its own terms.186 
 
Henig and colleagues measured civic capacity across the cities and found “race as a resilient 
cleavage,” a factor that continued to “define conflicts inside the city and even more sharply to 
define the orientation of the city versus the suburbs and the state.”187 With respect “outsiders” 
pushing for school reform, they argue,	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[…] race may become a defining aspect of the relationship between Black-led 
cities and important external actors. Large central cities are limited in their 
capacity to undertake meaningful school reform without the support or, at the 
least, acquiescence of suburban neighbors, state legislatures, governor, courts, and 
the national government […] While blacks control the local levers of formal 
governmental authority in each of our cities, in each case the key external actors 
are white. Conflicting priorities and interests, whether rooted in race or something 
else entirely, may easily come to be interpreted in racial terms and to engender a 
more emotionally intense and combustible politics as a result.188  
 
Thus, while authoritative intervention by higher levels of government can play a productive role 
in jumpstarting or activating the process of reform, Henig and colleagues argue that “external 
efforts ultimately require a broad local constituency if they are to be sustained.”189 The politics of 
reforming urban schools in Black-led cities is as such: “When predominantly white external 
institutions partner with predominantly white internal constituencies to impose reform on local 
black decision makers, the prospects for long-term success are undermined.”190  
Applying Urban Regime Analysis to Historical Case Study 
Urban regime analysis when applied to my case studies illuminates a way to further make 
sense of my observations around Detroit’s school governance change. Given urban regime 
analysis, the central question that guides the later stages of my analysis is who supported and 
who opposed school governance change? In other words, who was coalescing around efforts to 
change the way schools were governed? What regime ushered in change? In short, the concept of 
urban regime analysis offers a way in which to explain how Detroit’s educational landscape 
could change so quickly and dramatically in thirty years. 
The concept of civic capacity—evidence of cross-sector cooperation—also sharpens my 
ability to consider the strength of coalitional relationships and whether they will determine the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid., 29. 
190 Ibid. 
 	  61 
life of a policy. Most compelling, examining Detroit’s civic capacity allows me to return to 
earlier questions about how racial politics affect the implementation of school policy. Is race a 
barrier to forming strong cross-sector cooperation that, according to Stone, is necessary for 
institutionalizing governance change? Thus, civic capacity offers me a way to further interpret—
in the light of “theory”—my observations about the racial issues surrounding efforts to change 
who governs schools. In the “final” stages of research, these concepts sharpened my ability to 
tell a political story in which I could better understand the nature of conflict; in this case, racial 
discourse and rhetoric are symptomatic of a great upheaval in educational decision-making.  
In sum, given the concept of urban regime analysis, the following questions were applied 
to my study—featured in case studies of specific reforms in Chapter Five and Chapter Six—of 
how Detroit’s corporate school system was dismantled in the last three decades), which are: 
1. Who made up the coalitions—the informal arrangements—that supported, 
sustained, or hindered the enactment of policy?   
2. Was the regime strong enough to enact reform and make it effective? Was 
there a high level of civic capacity, evidence of strong cross-sector 
cooperation?  
3. Why was reform “difficult” or conflict-ridden? To what degree did race 
play a role in building or hindering coalitions for school governance 
change?   
 
These analytical questions enabled me to take my observations further in one direction—an 
analysis of why and how school governance changed. For example, in the case study of mayoral 
takeover in Chapter 5, the concept of urban regimes enabled me to produce a reinterpretation of 
why efforts to implement mayoral takeover failed despite a rare moment in which, I argue, 
Detroit had a high level of civic capacity. In Chapter 6, I present a case study on attempts to 
establish a statewide recovery school district, a case in which I clearly see the weakening of an 
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older regime and the formulation of a new coalition of education actors that have the potential to 
institutionalize change. 	  
Plausibility, Case Study, and Contemporary History 
Although historians do not normally include a methods chapter, I have written one in 
hopes of influencing future research. After all, my dissertation is not “purely” historical in the 
sense that actors have long passed or that I had spent most of my research process in the 
archives. My dissertation is a contemporary history, consisting of two case studies of specific 
school reforms, and one in which I have adapted some methods from qualitative research to 
approach my data and sources. In this chapter, I have attempted to articulate my method for how 
I construct the history of school governance change in Detroit since 1980. Can my story be 
trusted? 
Hence, I conclude this chapter with a few words regarding the plausibility of my study. In 
the sciences, reliability and validity are terms used to describe whether the findings from a study 
can be trusted. Historical research, however, cannot be replicated like an experimental study. In 
this way, we test for “validity” by asking whether the story is plausible. Stone argues that the 
crux of historical research is: “Good concepts illuminate significant details, and telling details 
point to illuminating concepts.”191 Therefore, we can test the plausibility of a historical study by 
assessing the strength of the interaction between illuminating details and concept. In other words, 
sound observations should lead to cogent theory. 
It is also helpful to turn to case study research to discuss plausibility. Carol Lynne Fulton 
explains, “Case studies that are deemed plausible typically elaborate on a situation, pose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Stone, Regime Politics, 255. 
 	  63 
questions, compare the cases to other cases, reframe the case, and seek alternative solutions.”192 
Fulton goes on to explain how plausibility should also be crosschecked by triangulation. Indeed, 
a key aspect to later stages of my research was triangulating between new sources of evidence. 
Newspaper articles as a single source of data has its obvious limitations; at the end of the day, 
news outlets are concerned about maintaining readership, thus having implications for which 
events are actually covered and which are not. It was imperative to provide other sources of 
evidence such as government documents (e.g., legislation), political speeches, reports, artifacts 
(e.g., original handouts, pamphlets, and websites), and a body of secondary sources (e.g., other 
historical studies of Detroit and DPS, and accounts or studies of specific policies).193 The 
corroboration of data strengthens the narrative from which claims are made. 
In interpretive case studies194 findings are considered valid if the case “rings true” and the 
“theory derived from the case makes sense.”195 Fulton states, “The plausibility of the case could 
be the ground on which to build the validity of the theory related to it.”196 Perhaps one of the 
greatest indicators of the plausibility of my study is that it validates, in fine grain detail, Jeffrey 
Henig’s concept of “the end of exceptionalism.” Indeed, the history of DPS in the last thirty 
years is a tale of two governing regimes, in which a new emerging regime undermines the older 
traditional regime, marking the end of an era. In the world of historical, qualitative, and case 
study research, the ability to land on a concept, to speak to theory, can prove the validity of the 
study. Moreover, my study’s ability to offer policy insights that are historicized—which is the 
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aim of contemporary history197—displays the strength and plausibility of the study and its 
applicability. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Five School Reforms: Changing School Governance, 1994-present 
 
In this dissertation I argue that five major school reforms over a twenty-year period have 
dismantled the traditional governing system of the Detroit Public Schools (DPS), essentially 
rendering the publicly elected school board and its constituents powerless. By 2014, the 
Progressive Era system devoted to the schooling of all of Detroit’s children was functionally 
nonexistent, though the school board continued to hold public meetings. This chapter tells the 
story of an era of significant change: how each school reform—Proposal A, Michigan’s charter 
law, mayoral takeover, emergency management, and the Education Achievement Authority—
cumulatively ended the “special governance arrangements” of public schooling.198 (See Figure 1.) 
While I do not try to do the work of determining the “ultimate” purpose of any reform measure, I 
do discuss how each initiative responded to Detroit’s persistent educational and financial crises, 
often beginning where the previous attempt at reform failed. I analyze how each reform eroded 
local control and impacted the way schools were governed, revealing a history of how DPS was 
dismantled. The public schools thus became subject to a wide range of decision-makers, with 
few them devoted solely to educating children. In short, this chapter builds a case for how 
Detroit went from the “one best system” to a fractured non-system in search of a new order in 
2014. 
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Figure 1. Five Mayor School Reforms, 1994-2014 
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Proposal A: The State Takes Over Finance 
 The dismantling of the Detroit Public Schools began with Proposal A, a radical funding 
approach approved by voters on March 15, 1994. According to Julie Berry Cullen and Susanna 
Loeb, the reform “stemmed from concerns about inequities in property tax burdens and 
expenditures,” a part of a broader movement to equalize school funding at the time.199 The 
passage of Proposal A replaced property tax with the state sales tax as the primary source of 
school funding, shifting spending decisions from the local school board to the state government. 
The state now had the ability to equalize funding by restricting higher spending school districts 
from levying additional taxes while increasing funding in previously low spending districts 
through a minimum per pupil foundation allowance.200 While this effort briefly equalized funding 
in Michigan, Proposal A would eventually exacerbate DPS’s already weak fiscal base. In 
addition to reducing local control over spending across the state, the new funding formula also 	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mandated a “dollars-follow-students” formula, enabling parents to enroll their children in 
“school of choice” while receiving school districts collect the foundation allowance associated 
with each student. This aspect of the funding formula would in particular play a crucial role in 
the dismantling of DPS.  
After nearly two decades of failed attempts to reform Michigan’s funding formula, 
Republican Governor John Engler, elected in 1991, was intent on making it happen under his 
watch. Engler had campaigned for governor partly on the promise to cut property taxes by 20 
percent.201 While Engler had pitched his plan as a way to lower taxes, he also had his sights on 
fundamentally changing the way public education functioned beginning with how schools were 
funded. Once elected, however, voters would reject the governor’s proposals to alter the school 
funding formula.202  
The opportunity to reform the funding formula came from an unlikely source. When 
Engler and his Republican allies in the Senate introduced for the fourth time a relatively modest 
property tax relief plan, Senator Debbie Stabenow proposed an amendment to completely 
eradicate property tax as a source of school funding. Having declared her intentions as the next 
Democratic gubernatorial candidate, many accounts have interpreted Stabenow’s proposal as a 
challenge to the governor, a “rhetorical statement” on how unrealistic it was to reduce taxes 
without specifying what would replace it. In any case, according to James D. Goenner, the 
governor called on the Republican majority to call her bluff; as she handed them a golden 
opportunity to not only cut taxes but also radically change the paradigm of Michigan’s education 
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system.203 By the next day, the bill had passed both chambers and the governor eagerly signed 
Public Act 145 of 1993.204 
Mirel has described these events as an “astonishingly audacious political act,” in which 
the legislature had essentially manufactured a crisis.205 With virtually no alternate plan in place 
for funding schools, the legislature had to draft a funding package that would restore the $6.3 
billion lost by eliminating property taxes. Meanwhile, the governor outlined a bold school reform 
plan in a 54-paged proposal entitled “New Schools for a New Century” that was distributed to 
students, parents, teachers, and taxpayers in October.206   
Critiquing the school funding system for having relied too heavily on property tax, which 
was susceptible to the uneven distribution of wealth and subject to frequent millage elections, the 
governor articulated the need for school finance reform.207 The governor’s specific 
recommendations reflected how the “manufactured” crisis was an opportunity for making some 
radical and unprecedented changes. First, the governor proposed a “new state role in education” 
in financing school districts, which would ensure an “adequate and equitable allocation of 
resources to all schools.”208 Referring to Michigan’s chronically low scores on national and state 
exams, Engler argued, “[o]ur generally disappointing results in public elementary and secondary 
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education have been due, in part, to the historical absence of strong state leadership.”209 Second, 
Engler recommended “school choice” for parents and students.210 His proposal stated, 
Parents and students should not be limited to the school district where they live, 
but be able to choose from among Michigan’s public K-12 schools and charter 
public schools. The Berlin Wall which now encircles each school district must 
come down.211 
 
In order to tear down the wall, the governor advocated a system by which state funding follows 
individual students, not districts. Lastly, Engler articulated mechanisms to reduce the power of 
the teachers union, which he believed played a role in undermining the quality of education. 
When collective bargaining “interferes with the educational process,” the governor explained, “it 
is appropriate to seek the development of alternatives.”212 Charter schools, for example, should 
be exempt from collective bargaining. In effect, Engler’s proposal was a blueprint for a 
completely new school system. 
Meanwhile, the legislature finally came up with two school funding plans before 
Christmas: Proposal A, which would increase the state’s sales tax by 2 percent, or a statutory 
plan that would increase the state’s income tax.213 Unlike past proposals, the voters were not 
presented an opportunity to maintain the status quo—as Andrew Lockwood put it, there was no 
going back to the “old system.”214 Voters overwhelmingly chose Proposal A by a 69-31 percent 
margin.215 The New York Times called Prop A “the nation’s most dramatic shift in a century in 
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the way public schools are financed.”216 Seeing opportunity in crisis, the governor had seized a 
rare episode in the legislature to reenvision and reshape education policy. 
Indeed, Proposal A would not only mark the beginning of a new era for Michigan’s 
schools but also the start of the unraveling of Detroit’s school system.217 If the adage “money in 
politics flows to where the power is” holds true for schools, then Proposal A marked a 
substantial shift of power from the DPS school board to the state of Michigan. In fact, Proposal 
A was a direct blow to the teachers union whose ability to negotiate with the school board on 
spending decisions was now greatly reduced. Governor Engler made it abundantly clear at the 
law’s signing ceremony, “[t]he power and control of the teachers union have had over education 
policies in Michigan ended this morning.”218 Thus, with the passage of Proposal A, we begin to 
see the first signs of decision-making arrangements between the school board and union leaders 
under threat, paving the way for the further weakening of traditional school governance. In 
Detroit, the effect was particularly pronounced given that the majority Republican legislature 
was not beholden to the interests of a largely Democratic city that held the largest number of 
teacher union members.  
Most critically, the additional aim of creating an alternative schooling system of “choice” 
through Proposal A would have the greatest impact on Detroit.219 Although changing per-pupil 
funding to follow the student successfully launched Michigan’s charter movement, it would 	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ultimately create a structural crisis for DPS; in the next twenty years, thousands of students—an 
and thereby millions of dollars—were drawn out of DPS, creating a severe strain on the district’s 
operating budget. DPS’s seemingly persistent fiscal crisis would leave it vulnerable to further 
efforts to reform school governance. Proposal A in 1994 set the conditions – the increased role of 
the state, the softening of district borders, and the weakening of the school board and unions – in 
which subsequent school reforms in Detroit were implemented. 
Mayoral Takeover: Attempt to Govern Schools with a Mayoral-Appointed Board, 1999-2005 	   Several years after Proposal A took effect, Governor Engler began to set his eye on not 
only controlling fiscal but also educational decisions, particularly for chronically failing districts. 
He turned to the mayoral control model that several cities (e.g., New York, Boston, Chicago, and 
Washington D.C.) had begun to experiment with in the early 1990s.220 In these cities, mayors had 
been given authority to control schools either by directly working with a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of schools or by appointing reform boards that worked with the CEO to make educational 
decisions. The implication was that the school boards in these cities had been failing students and 
parents for too long. At first, Governor Engler envisioned mayoral control for struggling school 
districts across Michigan but the final legislation targeted Detroit, erupting into  a political 
debate that is further explored in the case study. In this chapter, I focus on how the 
implementation of a mayoral-appointed reform board was the first tactic in DPS history to 
suspend  the school board’s capacity to make educational decisions, shifting decision-making 
power into higher levels of government (i.e., municipal and state) and the first in a series of 
school reforms that culminated in the dismantling of DPS’s traditional governing structure. 
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 Having amassed 11 consecutive annual budget deficits between 1978-1989, the state had 
begun to threaten the DPS school board with takeover in the late 1980s.221 Even Detroit’s first 
Black mayor, Coleman Young, who was typically at odds with the state, proposed mayoral 
control as a means of stabilizing finances.222 However, according to Michael Addonizio and 
Phillip C. Kearney, the school board managed to avoid such measures when they ended the 1990 
fiscal year with a small fund balance.223 Ironically, after the passage of Proposal A in 1994, DPS 
began to fall back into deficit. In short, when the economy dipped so did the state’s ability to 
raise revenue, resulting in a period in which school funding remained flat, a real problem given 
the cost of inflation. Still, in the three years preceding mayoral takeover, DPS actually succeeded 
in recovering its district fund balance. In spite of this, Engler forged ahead with mayoral 
takeover. Much of the press helped to produce the sense that the governor’s plan was about 
removing a school board that was for far too long more interested in preserving the status quo 
than the real work of improving schools. 
 The governor believed that, like Proposal A, mayoral takeover would breakup the 
deadlock long maintained by the school board and its associates (i.e. the teachers union) and 
ultimately usher in a new era of school improvement, educational innovation, and fiscal 
management. Engler had been influenced by the likes of Ted Kolderie, John E. Chubb, and Terry 
M. Moe, leading school reform intellectuals who squarely placed the blame for urban school 
failure on local bureaucracy.224 Kolderie, who was a key player in helping Minnesota adopt the 
first charter law in the nation, argued that states needed to withdraw the “exclusive” nature of 
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local school districts, institutional practices that did not welcome radical change.225 Reelected to 
his third term in 1998 and with Republicans sweeping both the Senate and the House, Governor 
Engler also had the political clout to virtually forge a state intervention in a predominantly 
Democratic city.  
The school board remained adamantly opposed to mayoral takeover, campaigning against 
Engler’s plan with the message that it was a racially motivated tactic to further weaken a Black-
led city and to deny Detroiters of their right to vote. However, as the city debated the measure, it 
appeared that many individuals and groups within the city had become so disillusioned with the 
school board’s ineptitude, that—according to the press—more than half of the population wanted 
change and supported the governor’s plan. Remarkably, even the teachers union—the Detroit 
Federation of Teachers—who was initially opposed would come to support mayoral takeover. So 
did many other individuals and groups like the Council of Baptist Pastors and the Detroit Urban 
League come to support the governor’s radical plan. The NAACP, however, would remain 
obstinately opposed. Though reluctant at first, the governor also won the support of Detroit’s 
Democratic Black mayor, Dennis Archer.226  
Although the legislature ultimately opted to not give Detroiter’s an opportunity to vote on 
the plan, many were hopeful the plan could salvage the beleaguered school district. Engler 
signed the “mayoral takeover” law, Public Act 10 in 1999, suspending the school board and its 
superintendent and authorizing the mayor to appoint a reform board. The reform board, 
consisting of seven members, would determine school policy including the selection of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). The seventh member, however, was the governor’s appointee who had 
special powers to veto the selection of the new CEO if he/she deemed necessary, revealing the 	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degree of control the governor had in the implementation of the policy. The new governance 
structure would remain in effect for five years at which point Detroiters could vote to continue 
the reform board or return to the elected board.  
Ultimately, mayoral takeover did little to improve education or finance. In fact, the fiscal 
situation grew significantly worse under mayoral control: the CEO, Kenneth Burnley, had begun 
his tenure with a $93 million surplus and by the end of his tenure in 2004 reported a $200 million 
deficit. In fact, no one would have predicted how mayoral takeover was headed on a collision 
course with Proposal A. During the period of mayoral takeover, thousands of students left the 
system along with their per-pupil funding, a loss of nearly $225 million in state funding. In spite 
of some reported educational improvements, Proposal A had created a context in which Burnley 
could not attract new students fast enough to offset the ones who were opting to leave the 
system. The fiasco would result in Detroiters voting for the return of the publicly elected school 
board in November 2004.  
Even though mayoral takeover did not last, what is central to the argument of my study is 
that the five year period was like a dress rehearsal for future reforms in which policymakers 
continued to move decision-making to other levels of government and forging new arrangements 
with new policy actors, ridding the local district of its special status as a “single-purpose 
government.” Mayoral takeover foreshadowed how educational leaders from the outside (i.e., 
figures like CEO Kenneth Burnley) could be given the authority to circumvent traditional and 
local democratic processes in order to address educational and fiscal crises. This period in which 
Engler found ways to remain in the driver’s seat also reinforced the increased role of the 
governor and state in local educational affairs, which would increasingly become a norm in 
Michigan. Although voters returned decision-making power to the school board, I argue that 
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DPS’s brief stint with mayoral takeover weakened the legitimacy of traditional school 
governance. To this day, the school board has not regained a foothold in decision-making as 
reformers are bent on shaping a new era of schooling.   
Emergency Management: State Intervention, 2009-present 
After the failed experiment of mayoral takeover, the publicly elected school board was 
restored in 2005. The school board struggled to make any significant improvements and, by 
2008, the deficit had ballooned to $400 million, causing the state to declare a state of emergency 
and to appoint an emergency manager to address the fiscal crisis.227 I argue that the effort to 
reform DPS through emergency management has only served to further dismantle DPS’s 
traditional governing system. Again, such moves were made at the behest of the governor. 
Succeeding Engler in 2003, Governor Jennifer Granholm inherited Engler’s failure to improve—
if not worsen—Detroit’s finances. Even as a Democrat, she continued on the same path, 
movements towards shifting decision-making out of the local school district. By now, 
Republican or Democrat, such tactics were increasingly a norm among self-proclaimed 
“education governors.” Emergency management also attracted new educational actors, 
particularly foundations, who believed that emergency management was a harbinger of 
institutional change and thus possibilities for revival.  
In 2007, when the school board selected Connie Calloway, an educator for more than 35 
years and a Harvard graduate to replace the interim superintendent, William Coleman III, many 
reformers found the decision promising.228 The state had just passed a law to allow 15 new 
charter high schools in Detroit and the Detroit News predicted that Calloway would finally bring 	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the charter movement to Detroit.229 Instead, Calloway—perhaps opting to take a more careful 
political route given the anti-charter sentiment in Detroit—set out to reform DPS by restructuring 
existing schools.230 Nevertheless, she infuriated the school board by designating five schools for 
restructuring without their approval. One board member accused Calloway of implementing a 
“defacto takeover.”231 “What I see is that private organizations came up with a decision that 
board members are not aware of […],” the board member said referring to foundations like 
Skillman and United Way who were funding Calloway’s efforts.232 Within a year, the board fired 
Calloway for her perceived overreach. The Michigan Chronicle speculated, however, that the 
board had removed Calloway because she was exposing too much of the district’s financial 
woes.233 Calloway had created a 228-page report on DPS that concluded that there was no 
improvement in student achievement since 2002 and there was also a lack of connection between 
money spent and what takes place in classrooms.234  
The debacle with Calloway, however, contributed to Detroiters’ growing dissatisfaction 
with the school board, which was increasingly expressed during vitriolic school board meetings. 
Detroiters regarded the ballooning deficit with extreme suspicion, interrogating board members 
about where the money had gone.235 Such public displays likely conveyed to policymakers that 
Detroit’s school board, hopelessly muddled in territorial politics, had run its course and simply 
could not be relied upon to bring the district to financial order. With State Superintendent 
Flanagan’s strong recommendation, Granholm determined in 2009 that a financial emergency 	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existed in Detroit and signed Public Act 72, appointing Robert Bobb as the first emergency 
financial manager (EFM) of DPS.236 The EFM law effectively suspended DPS’s school board 
and superintendent from managing any fiscal related issues and handed over the “authority and 
responsibilities affecting the financial condition of the school district” to Bobb.237 For the first 
time in DPS history, the state had declared that DPS’s fiscal problems were at emergency levels 
that required immediate state intervention.  
For those who supported emergency management, Granholm’s appointment, Robert 
Bobb, was met with great approval.  From Oakland, California to Washington D.C., Bobb had 
been active in a national movement towards establishing charters and privatizing school 
management.238 The emergency manager was also a graduate of the Broad Academy, a program 
sponsored by the philanthropist Eli Broad to develop leaders that will “pioneer sustainable 
breakthrough initiatives” for public schooling.239 In fact, the Broad Foundation was funding a 
portion of Bobb’s salary.240 
Beginning his tenure with an audit of DPS, Bobb initially considered two responses: 
filing for bankruptcy or lobbying for debt forgiveness. 241 Instead, Bob ruled out both options, 	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deciding that the best strategy was to hand over schools to private educational management 
organizations (EMOs). In July 2009, with $20 million in federal stimulus funds, Bobb hired four 
educational management companies (Edison Learning, Institute of Student Achievement, 
EdWorks, and Model Secondary Schools Project) with multi-year contracts to turn around 17 of 
the worst-performing high schools in the district.242 Bobb then launched an aggressive campaign 
to not only retain but also attract students back into the district. His “I’m In” campaign literally 
covered the city in thousands of posters with the now iconic image of a blue door symbolizing 
the entryway to a new and improved DPS. Bobb’s campaign included a back-to-school parade 
down Woodward Ave, from Hart Plaza to Campus Martius Park, complete with floats and the 
DPS marching band.243 Bobb’s position as an emergency financial manager enabled him to 
pursue the most radical plan to date: the bidding and contracting of education services and 
management. The idea was that the EMOs would turnaround schools and bring students—and 
lost per-pupil funding—back into the system. By the end of Bobb’s first year, the Wall Street 
Journal reported that Detroit had taken a step closer to financial stability.244 
Bobb’s turnaround strategy via EMOs, however, was an affront to the school board, who 
technically still held authority over educational decision-making. School board president, Carla 
Scott, was stunned that Bobb had not consulted with them during the entire process and charged 
the EFM with having grossly overstepped his role. She told reporters that Bobb was trying to 
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create an all-charter district.245 The school board maintained that they had control over academic 
management and they voted unanimously to seek a court order to halt Bobb’s turnaround plan.246 
Controversy notwithstanding, Bobb had crossed into educational issues: his educational 
theme was transforming DPS for the twenty-first century. This included, among others, longer 
school days, computer-based learning, flexible options for high school students such as offering 
career certification classes, and more advanced placement course enrollment.247 His strategy and 
philosophy attracted philanthropists and foundations that began to express keen interest in 
offering financial backing for Bobb’s turnaround plans.248 In 2009, when voters approved a $500 
million bond borrowed under the federal stimulus program at zero and low-interest rates for 
school construction and renovation, Bobb argued that capital investments must be tied with 
overall plans for student achievement.249 With that, the Excellent Schools Detroit, a collaborative 
group of foundations, advocated that the emergency manager’s powers be expanded to include 
education. With broader powers as a possibility and the belief that Bobb was the right kind of 
leader to transform one of the most dysfunctional school systems in the country, two of the 
biggest national educational funders, the Gates Foundation and the Broad Foundation, seriously 
considered investing in DPS.250 
However, by 2011, it was clear that Bobb’s plan was failing. Conceding that he was 
unable to bring in enough revenue and projecting the loss of another 73,000 students by 2014, 
Bobb submitted a plan, a last-ditch effort, to eliminate the $327 million deficit in the next four 
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years. Shockingly, the plan called for the closing of nearly half of DPS’s schools and increasing 
the average size of the high school classroom to 60 students.251 Claiming that salaries, pensions, 
and healthcare obligations had weighed down his ability to address the crisis, the emergency 
manager argued that without his cuts and cost-saving measures the district would have faced up 
to more than a $500 million dollars in deficit.252 But the announcement of more school closings 
angered the community. A spokesperson for Detroiters for Detroit Public Schools cried,  
We’re appalled by a man imposed on our community from the outside to solve 
our problems. We believe in Detroit solutions for Detroit problems. No stranger 
should come in to a situation so complex and act so ludicrously, especially a 
situation like this.253 
 
An attorney for the school board put it this way: White suburbs could elect who they want in 
charge, while Black Detroiters are forced to accept whoever the state installs. Emergency 
management, for all intents and purposes, was a return to separate and unequal education.254 
Facing much criticism, Bobb resigned in June 2011 with much of the deficit still remaining.  
During Bobb’s tenure, the school board had waged a legal battle against the emergency 
manager’s overreach, but Governor Rick Snyder, a Republican elected into office in 2010, would 
end the battle by signing Public Act 4 in 2011 that gave the emergency manager full academic 
authority. Supporters of emergency management argued that the law provided “a series of 
progressive steps that would constitute a meaningful way to help both local governments and 
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school districts maintain their solvency.”255 However, with Proposal A still at work, DPS would 
remain in debt even three emergency managers later.256  
With fewer students enrolling in DPS each year since 1994, the district was losing 
millions of dollars. (See Figure 2.) Like mayoral takeover, emergency management failed to 
ameliorate the school district’s rapidly deteriorating finances, let alone improve education. 
Nevertheless, policymakers continued to address DPS’s educational crisis with changing school 
governance by suspending, circumventing, or all together eliminating the power of the school 
board, which is exactly what Governor Snyder did with the passage of Public Act 4 in 2011. A 
line of governors, Democrat and Republican, both obliged and emboldened by the state’s 
responsibility to raise and distribute school funds, intervened on issues that were once 
exclusively local affairs in Detroit. Granholm’s enactment of emergency management was 
unprecedented in that Robert Bobb directly reported to the state and did not have to consult with 
the local school governing body. During this period of school reform, transformation appeared 
inevitable as emergency management attracted new education partners (i.e., foundations) to 
support and sustain school governance change. A new regime of actors was emerging, a kind that 
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Figure 2. DPS Enrollments 1994 through 2013257 
	  
 
Michigan’s Charter Movement: Creating an Alternate System, 1994-2014 
In January 1994, Governor Engler signed Public Act 362 of 1993 unleashing one of the 
most expansive charter laws in the nation.258 Undoubtedly, the law had come on the heels of a 
historic overhaul of the way schools had been financed for nearly a century. Engler now had the 
opportunity to introduce an alternate system beyond the traditional public schooling system. 
Leading charter advocates visited the governor’s office to help with conceptualizing a system 
free from the power and control of school boards and unions—whom they believed were the 
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institutional barriers to school effectiveness.259 Charters would enjoy the “operational autonomy 
of a private school,” which would result in more freedom to innovate and improve the quality of 
education.260 Parents would also be able to select any charter of their choice. Therefore, assuming 
the basic principles of competition, the quality of education would increase as schools competed 
for enrollment in a market of schools.261 One implication of this concept is that the worst 
performing schools would eventually be forced to shut down, preventing wasteful spending on 
schools that do not work. Not required to unionize, the charter system would also avoid demands 
for pay raises and benefits, so often a financial strain and burden in school districts. For the 
governor, the charter law was going to fix the financial and educational issues that had long 
plagued Michigan’s public school system. 
Twenty years later, while people are still speculating whether the charter law has 
improved education or school finance, it has definitively transformed the state’s educational 
landscape, most profoundly in Detroit. Ironically, DPS did not have an opportunity to charter 
many schools before the state reached its charter limit (or charter cap) in 1999. As a 
consequence, the charter law actually had a paradoxical effect on DPS as a steady stream of 
parents and students exited the system for charters, a gradual erosion of virtually the shape and 
size and geographical boundaries of the school district. The development of a Detroit charter 
system would not take off until the charter cap was lifted and there was a new regime of 
educational actors to support school governance change.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 In fact, according to Addonizio and Kearney, John Chubb, Terry Moe, Al Shankar, and Ted Kolderie had visited 
the governor’s office in his first term, helping to shape and outline conceptions for creating a new systems of 
schools in Michigan. See Addonizio & Kearney, Lessons from Michigan, 131-136. For more information about Al 
Shanker, see Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice are 
Undermining Education (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 121-127. 
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Although passing the charter law was an easy victory for Governor Engler and the 
Republican-controlled legislature, the law would have a rocky start. The Michigan Education 
Association, a 150,000-member teachers union, filed a suit against the state in August 1994, 
challenging the constitutionally of the new charter school law.262 While the lawsuit was pending, 
there was enough chartering of schools where, in 1996, the MEA managed to negotiate a legal 
cap on the number of university-authorized charter schools to 150.263 However, a year later, the 
Michigan Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state and sanctioned one of the most expansive 
charter laws in the nation.264 Michigan’s charter law enabled a broad array of institutions to 
establish a charter—including local school board, boards of intermediate school districts, and the 
boards of community college and state universities. Yet, most did not jump at the opportunity to 
establish charters. Because the law did not offer any means for capital funding, most of the 
institutions did not have the resources to lease, acquire, or renovate buildings for new schools. 
State universities, on the other hand, contracted with educational management organizations 
(EMOs) that had the kind of private equity to cover building costs.265 Thus, state universities 
were by far issuing the most charters. Between 1995-1999, about 35 new charters opened in 
Michigan each year, many of them granted by universities.266  
By 1999, the state had reached the charter cap on university-authorized charter schools. 
While charter growth across the state slowed after 1999, growth in Detroit was at a near-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 To be more specific, the MEA was one of the most active members of a coalition called the Council of 
Organizations for Education About Parochiaid (often referred to as CAP) who opposed the charter bills. For full 
details on the legal battle between MEA (via CAP) and Governor Engler’s charter law, see Goenner, Origination, 
90-113. 
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ruling. After the state supreme court upheld the original charter law in 1997, PA 416 was repealed. For details, see 
Goenner, Origination. 
265 Addonizio & Kearney, Lessons from Michigan, 136. 
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standstill. Universities, the most active authorizers in the state, were no longer able to start any 
more charter schools in Detroit. Ironically, the charter cap had been reached the same year 
Detroit went under mayoral takeover; it was a widely shared assumption among reformers that 
the mayoral school governance model would lead to more chartering of schools. In other cities, 
the switch to mayoral control resulted in charter school expansion because major foundations—
like the Broad Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation—were more inclined to 
invest in school districts with political arrangements that buffered them from local resistance.267 
For example, when New York City, Oakland, Boston, and Chicago school districts went under 
mayoral control, they received significant funding from foundations that enabled them to open 
charters.268 In Detroit, however, the opposite happened—Detroit lost most of its major foundation 
grants between 2000-2005.269 According to the press, foundations withdrew their support because 
they were uncertain about whether mayoral takeover would last, waiting to see if voters would 
terminate or extend mayoral takeover in 2004 before they made their investments. Moreover the 
charter cap prevented universities, the most active authorizers, from chartering in the Motor City.  
In 2003, when Bob Thompson, a philanthropist from Plymouth, Michigan offered $200 
million dollars to build additional charters in Detroit, the state legislature discussed lifting the 
cap or making an exception for Detroit.270 But Thompson’s proposal was met with widespread 
protest, especially from the Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT). Three thousand DPS teachers 	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contracting or charter arrangement with a public agency. See Sarah Reckhow, “Disseminating and Legitimating a 
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and their supporters descended on the capitol to protest any further expansion of charters. 
Negotiations among key players, which included Governor Granholm and Republican leaders, 
quickly degenerated into partisan bickering while failing to pass any legislation.271 Meanwhile, 
Detroit’s newly elected mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, advocated for more authority to manage 
Detroit’s schools and proposed his own charter plan.272 Detroiters were quick to accuse him of 
hardening the political battle line around charters. One reporter wrote, “The mayor is more likely 
to find support among the business community and Republican lawmakers than he is among 
grass-root Detroiters and most fellow Democrats in Lansing.”273 The Detroit chapter of the 
NAACP conducted a survey showing that the majority of Detroiters rejected the mayor’s 
proposal and regarded charter schools with suspicion.274  
The legislature, however, managed to pass Public Act 179 in October, allowing fifteen 
new charter high schools in Detroit. Still, reluctant to be embroiled in the politics of Detroit, 
Thompson rescinded his offer.275 Exasperated by the lost opportunity, a Republican legislator 
told one reporter that Detroit’s resistance to charters bewildered him. As he saw it, other 
American cities would have thrown a parade for Thompson.276 
In the meantime, a Democratic state senator filed a lawsuit against Public Act 179 but 
dropped it in early 2004 when no groups made moves to open new charter high schools.277 
However, as the November elections neared—at which point Detroiters would vote on whether 
or not to keep mayoral takeover—Thompson reappeared, expressing possible interest in 	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272 Mayor Kilpatrick did not welcome philanthropist Thompson’s $200 million offer, arguing that it would drain 
millions of dollars from the DPS system. His plan, on the other hand, was locally based and partnered with DPS 
schools. See Luther Keith, “Battle Lines Harden in Bid to Run Schools,” Detroit News, November 20, 2003, 2A. 
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Detroit.278  So did Detroit businessman Dave Bing (who would become Detroit’s next mayor) and 
Central Michigan University, the most active authorizer among the universities.279 However, 
Detroiters voted to end mayoral takeover and reinstated the publicly elected school board. In the 
interim, Governor Granholm created a massive 140-member transition team with the president of 
the NAACP, Reverend Wendell Anthony, as chairman. 
The transition team began its work with making recommendations, one of which called 
for a charter ban. To her chagrin, Granholm wrote a letter to Reverend Anthony, urging the team 
to reject the idea:  
This recommendation suggests that the only way to bring students back to the 
DPS is to eliminate educational options that parents and children have 
today…The Transition Team should remain focused on finding ways to improve 
the Detroit Public Schools to give parents more, not fewer, opportunities to 
choose good schools for their children. 280 
 
Although there was no ban, charter advocates did not sense any hope for expansion until the 
reinstated school board selected a new superintendent Connie Calloway in 2007, predicting she 
would be more accommodating to charters.281 In early 2008, the Detroit News citing the success 
of University Prep Academy, which opened its first school in Detroit in 2000, gleefully reported 
that more “high quality” educational choices were coming the city’s way.282 After several 
excellent national charter operators courted Detroit, but were deterred by the state’s limits on 
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university-authorized charters, one Detroit News editorial pleaded the legislature to lift the cap.283  
Finally, more than a decade later, newly elected Governor Rick Snyder signed Public Act 277, 
lifting the charter cap in December 2011.284  
Once the cap was lifted, DPS’s emergency financial manger, Robert Bobb, announced his 
Renaissance Plan 2012, which aimed to turn 41 of DPS schools into charters, affecting nearly 
16,000 students. He argued that the plan would save $75-$99 million in operating costs per year, 
avoiding the need for drastic cuts and more school closures.285 Moreover, charters, having to pay 
rent for DPS buildings, would actually bring in an estimated  $21.85 million in revenue. Turning 
DPS schools into charters would also cut costs that would otherwise go to paying teacher tenures 
and pensions. Bobb explained to the press, “We want to create a marketplace of schools. It 
enables us to design a new DPS at a level that is sustainable given our current financial legacy 
deficit situation along with an opportunity to improve our cash flow.”286 The school board—who 
still held educational decision-making power—would have to approve the Renaissance plan, but 
it was unlikely that they would. Charter advocates, however, remained hopeful as Governor 
Snyder sought to expand the powers of the emergency financial manager.287 
The same year Snyder lifted the cap, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools 
announced that Detroit ranked number two in cities with the most enrolled students (41 percent) 
in charters. New Orleans was number one (with 76 percent enrolled in charters).288 The 
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Huffington Post argued that Bobb’s Renaissance plan would be the next step in turning Detroit 
into post-Katrina New Orleans, in which virtually all its traditional public schools had been 
replaced by charters after the storm.289 The New York Times stated that although results were 
mixed there were as many as 71,000 Detroit children attending charters.290 According to Data 
Driven Detroit, in 2012, roughly half of that figure attended charters outside of Detroit. In 1999, 
80% of Detroit’s children attended DPS; in 2011, less than half attended DPS. (See Figure 3.) 
These figures show that parents were overwhelmingly exiting the traditional schooling system 
and enrolling their children in an alternative system of charters and schools of choice.  
 
Figure 3. Percent of school-going children in Detroit enrolled in schools available to the district. 
  
Total school-going children: 194,255   Total school-going children: 126,157 
 
 
Source: Data Driven Detroit, “Detroit System of Schools, Then and Now,” (presentation, Detroit Schools-Higher 
Education Consortium Meeting, Detroit, MI, October 15, 2012). 	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Thus, the charter system had effectively shrunk the total number of DPS schools (i.e., 
traditional schools) by more than half. In 1999, there were 260 traditional schools; in 2011, there 
were 109. The number of charter authorizers, on the other hand, had increased more than 100 
percent. Furthermore, DPS had lost another 15 schools that were slated for transfer to a newly 
established statewide recovery school district, accounting for 6% of all the types of schools in 
Detroit. Interestingly, to note, the development of an alternate system of charters also decreased 
the number of independent schools (i.e., private and religious schools) by almost half in 2011. 
(See Table 3.)  
 
Table 3. Number and Percent of Detroit Schools by Types, 1999 and 2011 
 1999 2011 
School Types # (%) # (%) 
Detroit Public School District   
Traditional 260 (67%) 109 (45%) 
DPS Authorized Charters 7 (2%) 13 (5%) 
Self-Governing  9 (4%) 
Charter Authorizers 36 (9%) 74 (30%) 
Independent (private and religious schools) 83 (22%) 24 (10%) 
Education Achievement Authority  15 (6%) 
Total 386 244 
Source: Data Driven Detroit, “Detroit System of Schools, Then and Now,” (presentation, Detroit Schools-Higher 
Education Consortium meeting, Detroit, MI, October 15, 2012). 
 
In sum, Michigan’s charter law impacted school governance change in Detroit in three 
ways. First, having reached the charter limit in 1999, charter growth stalled in Detroit while 
parents opted to leave DPS, inadvertently shrinking the size of DPS in terms of number of 
students, teachers, and schools. Second, the establishment of a charter school system in the state 
weakened the geographical borders of DPS that once bounded a school district to a set of 
schools. Thirdly, the eventual creation of a charter system within Detroit added to the city’s 
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educational options beyond traditional schools (i.e., what was left of DPS). All together, the 
creation of a charter school system in the last twenty years has altered the educational landscape 
in Detroit and how schools are governed. For each charter authorizer, for example, a different 
governing body makes decisions for those set of schools. The need for a local school board 
increasingly became more irrelevant as the schooling system became more fractured. Moreover, 
during this period, new educational actors such as powerful governors, emergency managers, and 
foundations helped to usher in and support change in a city that had been, at least politically, 
resistant to charter schools. Parents, on the other hand, indirectly supported this change by opting 
to enroll their children outside of DPS. When 15 schools were slated for transfer into another 
new schooling system in 2011, the implementation would to reveal just how much the school 
board, and by extension its constituents, were rendered powerless within the traditional school 
governing structure.  
The Education Achievement Authority: Another Schooling System, 2012-present 
The creation of the Educational Achievement Authority (EAA) in 2011 marked the most 
recent assault on traditional school governance in Detroit. Modeled after Louisiana’s Recovery 
School District, Detroit’s emergency manager transferred fifteen DPS schools into the new 
recovery school district designed to turnaround the lowest performing schools in the state. 
Spearheaded by Governor Snyder—who faced little legislative resistance under a Republican 
trifecta291—the EAA virtually removed school buildings, land, and pupils from Detroit. This 
effort to reform schools in Detroit, I argue, signaled the end of an era: Detroit’s “one best 
system” had been effectively dismantled. As a state authority, the EAA was not subject to local 
decision-makers, completely pushing the publicly elected school board to the sideline and 	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rendering it entirely superfluous to the lives of Detroit students, parents, and teachers. 
Additionally, the EAA was adding to at least eleven other schooling systems each with its own 
governance.  In 2014, the DPS was but a small fraction of a fragmented educational landscape. 
(See Figure 4.) 
 
Figure 4. Twelve School Systems: Detroit's Fragmented Educational Landscape 
 
Source: Excellent Schools Detroit, “Proposal” (Presentation for ESD Board, Michigan, August 15, 2014), accessed 




The origins of the EAA can be traced back to the end of Governor Jennifer Granholm’s 
tenure. In 2009, Michigan was so cash strapped that extra federal dollars offered through the 
Race to the Top (RTT) initiative was appealing. By the end of the year, the legislature put 
together a package of reform bills designed to win RTT dollars. Michigan failed to win the first 
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round, but the state was nonetheless left with a set of reform initiatives, one of which required 
the state department of education to create a turnaround district for the lowest performing 
schools in the state. In effect, legislative efforts to win RTT money became early blueprints for 
the EAA. After his election in 2011, Governor Snyder immediately began to seek a way in which 
he could establish a statewide turnaround district. 
In an unprecedented move, the governor quickly implemented the EAA without going 
through the usual legislative processes. Snyder used an Interlocal Agreement (ILA), a contract 
between public agencies to share functions and resources, to establish a freestanding K-12 
system. DPS and Eastern Michigan University (EMU) were the two public agencies that signed 
the ILA contract. However, for all intents and purposes, the contract was an agreement between 
DPS’s emergency manager and the regents of EMU. Since neither DPS nor EMU faculty were 
consulted, the governor’s plan immediately drew controversy.  
Reminiscent of Governor Engler, Snyder promised to transform public education in 
Michigan. Having campaigned on economic comeback, the governor argued that education was 
an integral part of his plan to paving a stronger economic future for Michigan in the 21st century. 
Thus, the EAA was not only going to turnaround the state’s lowest-performing 5% of schools but 
also provide a new model for innovation and instruction outside of the traditional public school 
system. Mary L. Mason and David Arsen argue that Snyder was interested in using the EAA as a 
new governing authority to pull together Detroit’s fragmented system into a portfolio 
management model.292 
EAA advocates claimed that removing DPS schools from the bureaucracy of the 
traditional school district would enable schools to innovate programs especially tailored to 	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students’ needs, which would in turn increase student performance.293 Snyder also said that the 
EAA would strive to spend up to 95 percent of its student funding on classroom expenses versus 
the 55 percent allocated to DPS classrooms.294 As a result, the EAA model would improve 
student performance by spending more on students and less on administration. Indeed, the 
governor perceived how transferring the DPS schools into a new system could unload some of 
DPS’s financial burdens, which had little to spare for spending on dramatic turnaround. The 
EAA would rely on private donations for start-up costs. 
A new regime of actors consisting of the governor, mostly Republican leaders, the new 
DPS emergency manager, Roy Roberts, the EMU Regents, and a network of foundations 
supported the EAA, firmly believing it was the long-awaited transformation of Detroit’s schools. 
The opponents of the EAA, however, perceived the reform initiative as the most extreme form of 
state intervention since mayoral takeover. Unclear as to how an effort to turnaround the state’s 
lowest performing schools was directed only at DPS, the unions, school board, and its supporters 
in Detroit were convinced that the EAA was just a part of another series of efforts to eviscerate 
DPS, deny Detroiters of their voice, corporatize public schooling, and profit from a new market 
of schools. Remarkably, the opposition to the EAA would soon spread beyond Detroit. 
Neighboring school districts that feared the transfer of their own schools into an untested system 
began to appeal to Democratic state legislators to halt any further expansion of the EAA.  
With a slew of performance data and investigate reports revealing the appalling state of 
the EAA, it appeared that opponents were on the brink of winning the war they had launched 
against the new state-authorized school district. However, Governor Snyder—in many ways, the 
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architect of the system—was reelected to office in 2014, which essentially ensured that the EAA 
would remain in effect. As soon as the governor was reelected, a cacophony of new voices (with 
the school board and teachers union notably absent) urged the governor to address the extremely 
fractured school district in which there were “twelve drivers” each driving to their own rules.295 
With the “one best system” dismantled, there was a need to search for new order. 
 
Conclusion 
 On the eve of Proposal A in 1993, Detroit’s school board essentially made all the major 
fiscal, operational, and educational decisions for all of Detroit’s public school students and 
teachers. Yet, twenty years later this publicly elected board had virtually no power over any 
schools, students, or teachers. Where once a simple organizational chart could explain the 
Detroit’s school governance, today one would need a few different charts to show the variety of 
school systems, governing boards, and levels of government that play a role in decision-making.  
When Proposal A eliminated the ability for school districts to raise revenue for 
operational costs, this was the first major blow to the school board. Not only did the new funding 
law freeze the school board’s role in financing schools but it also weakened the negotiating 
power of the teachers union, the informal actors that actually support and maintain traditional 
school governance. Between 1999-2004, mayoral takeover was the first instance in which the 
Detroit school board’s authority was literally suspended. Although the shift to a mayoral-
appointed school board had been brief, the traditional governance regime was significantly 
weakened; thus, mayoral takeover actually paved the way for subsequent reforms. In 2009, the 	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emergency financial management law effectively suspended the school board’s fiscal authority. 
By 2012, the law was amended and Detroit’s school board once again had lost all authority. In 
part, this enabled the final assault on traditional school governance: the establishment of the 
Education Achievement Authority, a system that took root in Detroit but had no local input 
whatsoever. At the same time, Proposal A and Michigan’s charter movement had created a 
structural crisis in DPS—with thousands of students enrolling outside of the district since 
1995—leaving the district fiscally vulnerable, which also contributed to the erosion of the school 
district’s power and authority.   
For most of the twentieth century, reformers envisioned public schooling as a “single-
purpose government,” a closed system of “schoolmen” in which the central actors were the 
school boards, superintendents, teacher unions, and parents.296 By 2014, this governing system 
had been all but dismantled in Detroit. The shift to mayoral control signaled the movement 
towards what some scholars have called “integrated governance,”297 opening up the job of 
educating Detroit’s children to a slew of new educational actors whom may not even be 
specialized in education.298 In short, this chapter builds a case for Henig’s concept of “the end of 
exceptionalism.”  
 This chapter also illustrates the paradoxical nature of school reform in Detroit. Much of 
the policies in the last twenty years were meant to increase capital accumulation and improve the 
financial situation of DPS. Yet, under these school reforms DPS has amassed even greater debt. 
As discussed, Proposal A and the establishment of a charter system created a structural crisis in 
which Detroit-specific reforms were headed on a collision course with; no appointed leader 
could change things fast enough to prevent the steady drain of students leaving the system. 	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Ironically, policymakers continued to blame the school board for the district’s financial 
problems. Conveniently, it provided a rationale for changing school governance. Nearly 
everyone—from every level of government and across party lines in D.C. and Lansing—
advocated for resolving DPS’s fiscal crisis by pushing the school board and teacher unions aside 
and creating new partnerships, whether governmental or private, but especially agencies that 
could provide additional resources to supplement the funding of schools. Importantly, the 
rationale of policymakers was contextualized by the need to solve a fiscal crisis, unaware that 
previous policies had created and exacerbated the crisis. The established pattern is this: the 
deeper the fiscal crisis, the more policymakers turn to non-traditional and external actors. The 
result, so far, is the situation in Detroit seems far worse while citizens, almost all African 
American, have lost their voting right, forced to watch the state and other agencies make 
educational decisions for them. Such political and racial issues are further taken up in the next 
chapters.  
This chapter presented a bird’s eye view of school reform in Michigan and Detroit.  It 
sought to assemble school reform efforts—so often studied in isolation from the others—into a 
coherent picture of how one urban school system was dismantled at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. The next two chapters go further, presenting case studies on specific reforms—mayoral 
takeover and the EAA—that detail and explain the fall of one regime and the rise of another. 
These chapters are a close examination of the regime activity that is required for school 
governance change, and the social and political conflicts that come with it. 
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CHAPTER V 
Mayoral Takeover: The Beginning of the End, 1994-2005 
Detroit became the fourth major city in the nation to implement mayoral control in 1999, 
joining the first wave of urban school districts to embrace an emerging movement towards a 
radical “new style governance”299 that dismantled the nearly century-old system of school 
governance. By the late 2000s, mayoral control of schools had occurred in at least 104 school 
districts across forty states.300 In Detroit, however, mayoral takeover did not last. Kenneth Wong 
and his colleagues have interpreted Detroit as a unique case in which new style governance is not 
for every city, concluding that by 2005 Detroit had ultimately returned to a “more traditional” 
governing system.301 However, as I argued in Chapter 4, DPS did not return to a traditional 
system but continued on a historical trajectory that ended the special status of public schooling. 
Like most scholars, Wong examines mayoral control in Detroit in such a way that it fails to 
locate this event in the continuum of America’s quest to reshape the urban public schooling 
system.302 In several other accounts, mayoral control is a single event, a “blip” on the radar. 
Mirel, on the other hand, recognized the historical significance of mayoral takeover arguing, 	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“one must go back to the Progressive Era to find reforms of equal magnitude in Detroit.”303 
Mayoral takeover in Detroit, following as it did on heels of the centralization of school funding, 
contributed to the erosion of local control. In my dissertation, it is part of a longer, continued 
assault on the progressive model of school governance. 
This chapter examines the rise, fall, and impact of a mayoral-appointed board, asking: 
what led to this major shift in governance, what happened during this period, and what were the 
effects of this policy? I begin by discussing the reasons, problems, and issues that policymakers, 
particularly in Lansing, perceived in DPS, why they argued restructuring was necessary, and how 
Michigan politicians turned to Chicago’s mayoral takeover as a model for Detroit. Digging 
deeper into this reform than I did (or could) in Chapter 4 allows us to examine the debates, 
interest groups and coalitions that formed around either the opposition or support of mayoral 
takeover. Most critically, a closer examination will enable us to see Black support for mayoral 
takeover and the ways in which the implementation of the policy collided with the structural 
issues of Proposal A, eventually leading to what Wong saw as the restoration of the old system. 
I, however, conclude by discussing the longer-term impact mayoral control had on weakening 
the older regime and opening up the path for a new coalition of actors. 
An Urban School System in Crisis  
 Mayoral takeover of DPS was, at least rhetorically, an attempt to fix a system under 
crisis. For decades, DPS increasingly struggled to improve education and manage its finances, 
while political efforts to break the status quo were at a deadlock. By the late 1990s, policymakers 
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in Lansing overwhelmingly believed that something decisive had to be done to save a chronically 
underperforming and fiscally damaged system from its continual slide downward. 
One cannot overstate the extent to which Detroit’s fiscal crisis affected the financial 
management of DPS, the largest school district in the state. Once the bastion of the U.S. auto 
industry, Detroit was the nation’s leading boomtown in the 1940s and boasted the highest-paid 
blue-collar workers in the nation.304 After World War II, however, the Motor City began to suffer 
as deindustrialization brought about the end of Fordism and its assembly line-based work.305 
Between 1954 and 1960, Detroit lost nearly 90,000 jobs.306 Manufacturers also began to move to 
areas outside of the city to cut costs. All of this, in addition to increasing racial hostility, resulted 
in a mass White-migration into developing suburbs. Black out-migration was nearly impossible 
due to discriminatory housing practices that lasted well into the late 1960s.307 By the mid 1960s, 
the majority of DPS students were Black, though Whites were still the voting majority. In 1968, 
the White voting block abruptly shifted away from supporting schools through tax increases, a 
major turning point in DPS’s financial history as “[n]ever again would large numbers of white 
working-class voters support a tax increase for the Detroit Public Schools.”308 As a consequence 
the school deficit jumped to $10 million in 1969-1970.309 
Dramatic economic changes, as well as changes in the racial and social demography of 
the city, significantly reduced Detroit’s tax base and the political will to fund schools. The fiscal 
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situation continued its steady decline as DPS amassed 11 consecutive annual budget deficits 
between 1978 and 1989, reaching a new low of $159 million in 1989.310 By 2000, the population 
had plummeted to 951,270, losing more than half of its population since 1950. Indeed, some 
have observed that anyone who had the resources to leave had left by now. Among all residents, 
82 percent were Black, 26 percent of whom lived below the poverty line.311 Thus, importantly, 
DPS’s finances play out within this postwar urban context: a shrinking city without a stronger 
tax base. With Michigan experiencing major changes in its economic health, state officials began 
to threaten the DPS board with takeover if they did not resolve their financial problems. But, in 
1989, when Detroit’s first Black mayor, Coleman Young, actually suggested mayoral control as 
a means of stabilizing finances the state legislature was unwilling to give him that power.312 
Still, remarkably, Michael Addonizio and C. Philip Kearney, maintain that DPS could 
have avoided its financial crisis. For property-poor school districts, like DPS that depended on 
state aid for its operating revenue, the guaranteed tax base (GTB) formula adopted in 1973 
actually served Detroit well. Under the GTB formula, state aid steadily increased. Though it fell 
sharply in 1980, with what would become then the deepest recession since the Great Depression, 
state aid would rebound as the economy began to recover in 1983.313 In the mean time, between 
1977-1985, Detroiters had voted to increase the district’s operating millage rate, which under the 
GTB formula brought in additional matching state aid. Because of these “sizable increases in 
operating millage rates and matching state aid of the mid-1980s,” Addonizio and Kearney 
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believe that DPS could have easily eliminated the district’s deficit. They argue that the teachers 
union’s demand for pay raises each year was what triggered a budget deficit explosion in 1989.314 
In Addonizio and Kearney’s view, the DPS school board and the teachers union had 
failed to place the public’s interest before their own interest. Costs could have been contained 
had these groups worked toward an affordable and reasonable collective bargaining agreement. 
Indeed, Republican Governor John Engler shared this view and he actively sought ways to 
diminish the power and influence of the unions in educational matters. Meanwhile, the notion 
that a corrupt and inept school board was responsible for DPS’s fiscal crisis continued to grow 
among the public.315 
Yet, the reality was that the school board was managing the finances of one of the largest 
urban school districts in the U.S under relatively unstable conditions including rapid population 
decline and the unpredictability of state aid given the rise and fall of the economy.316 Moreover, 
as the auto industry declined, DPS suddenly found itself one of the largest employers in the city 
and became a critical source for maintaining Black middle class income.317 Addonzio and 
Kearney fail to take into account how demands for pay raises were made within this context. 
They also fail to consider how the period between 1971-1981 was a particularly tumultuous 
period beginning with Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the failure to integrate schools, and then 
dramatic battles over decentralization, which resulted in the school district splitting into eight 	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regions.318 The basic lack of improvement in the quality of public schooling undoubtedly 
contributed to the exodus of families who could afford to leave, which in turn contributed to 
further decline in population and revenue. Consequently, the school board was constructing its 
budget under these complex circumstances while negotiating salaries with one of the strongest 
teachers unions in the nation.  
Since the 1950s, Detroit Public Schools’ once highly regarded academic record was also 
in steady decline both in reputation as well as student performance. For example, according to an 
alumnus of Northern High, by 1966, the once outstanding high school had become “primarily a 
custodial institution complete with police as an apparent part of the administration, and was only 
on the surface an institution where systematic learning took place.”319 In 1965, three-quarters of 
all of Northern’s tenth and twelfth graders scored below the average on national standardized 
tests. Only 20 percent of the graduating class of 1966 scored at or above the twelfth grade level 
on similar exams.320  
Northern in the late 1960s was an early indicator of DPS’s academic decline over the 
next thirty years. By 1999, one report showed that of the 30 percent that managed to graduate, 
more than half tested below an eighth grade level in reading and math.321 An astonishingly small 
percent (6%) met or exceeded state standards on the high school proficiency tests.322 The reported 
also noted that among the 180,000 students attending DPS, two-thirds lived in poverty.  
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 Given DPS’s devastating financial and academic decline, it is no surprise that by the mid 
1980s, people began to call for change.323 A diverse coalition of Blacks, Whites, labor unions, 
business groups, grassroots activists, and major political leaders sought to seek control of the 
school board in 1988. What was called the HOPE campaign envisioned DPS’s transformation 
would come by first disrupting the old school board regime, which the coalition claimed was the 
chief reason for DPS’s decline. The HOPE candidates ran on denouncing “the profligate 
spending of the incumbents,” repeated allegations of the school board’s sheer lack of fiscal 
responsibility.324 Promising an “education revolution” that would also stabilize finances, the 
HOPE campaign was stunningly successful resulting in the defeat of all four incumbents, 
creating the “biggest shakeup” in school leadership in nearly two decades.325 
Over the next two years, the HOPE team got control of the budget, reduced the deficit, 
and developed a seemingly strong working relationship with the teachers union, the Detroit 
Federation of Teachers (DFT). However, this relationship would quickly sour when the HOPE 
team began to push for its chief educational initiatives that aimed to reorganize schools.326 
Perceiving it as a threat to union contracts, the DFT launched an attack on the HOPE team by 
depicting them as union busters. This would contribute to the defeat of the HOPE team’s bid for 
reelection in 1992, which for all intents and purposes restored the old order. 
 Mirel argues, however, that the election of the HOPE team in 1988 signaled a sharp 
break with previous education politics. After all, the election was a flat out rejection of Mayor 
Coleman Young’s support of the incumbent board members and his claims that the HOPE team 	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was tied to White interests. Having been roused by the mayor in the past over racial issues, this 
time Black Detroiters opted for change, demonstrating that they were “neither content with the 
status quo in the schools nor with politics as usual in the city.”327 In spite of the short-lived 
HOPE campaign, these sentiments and attitudes would continue to resonate.  
Moreover, after the collapse of HOPE, the reinstated school board proved to be utterly 
unreliable. In 1994, when Detroiters voted for a $1.5 billion bond issue to address the school 
district’s crumbling buildings, the school board struggled to start any construction projects. By 
1997, “not a lick of paint or trowel of mortar ha[d] been applied with the money.”328 Perhaps 
worse, the value of the bond depreciated by over $30 million per year. Five years later, due to a 
variety of reasons, the school board still had not launched a single construction or renovation 
project, while asking the state for another $200 million. The state refused.329 The total 
mismanagement of the bond money contributed to the public’s waning perception of the school 
board, setting the stage for the state government to act.330  
Mirel argues that the path to mayoral takeover really began with the collapse of the 
HOPE team, when reformers realized they had underestimated the power of the DFT in 
maintaining the status quo.331 Despite a bit of a fiscal recovery leading to a fund balance between 
1996 and 1999, indeed, decades of educational failure and a history of fiscal mismanagement 
presented Governor Engler a politically opportune time for his plan for mayoral control of 
DPS.332  
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How Mayoral Takeover Took Shape in Detroit 
Governor John Engler proposed mayoral control in 1996, but Dennis Archer, Detroit’s 
mayor turned him down. Archer, an African American and Democratic mayor who succeeded 
Coleman Young, felt that the plan was too extreme and that the state should not try to dictate the 
terms of school reform to Detroit.333 The governor, however, was persistent. In his 1997 State of 
the State address, he proposed takeover of Detroit and Benton Harbor, another Michigan district 
with high dropout rates and low scores on proficiency tests but Engler was unable to enact his 
plan during the next legislative session.334 He repeated his call in the 1999 State of the State 
address of 1999, holding Chicago’s takeover as the model for educational reform:  
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley was given the power to appoint the school board 
and shake up the system. Courageous reformers—crossing racial, ethnic, and 
partisan lines—came together, crafting a bold plan and are fixing the city’s 
schools. The results are impressive […].335 
 
The governor went on to declare that mayoral control in Detroit would be a part of his broader 
plan to make Michigan a “Smart State” for the twenty-first century.336 This plan included 
breaking up school bureaucracy and expanding school choice.337  
Engler had long wanted “to fundamentally alter the paradigm by which Michigan’s 
public education system functioned.”338 When he campaigned for governor in 1990, a key feature 
to his plan was increasing parental choice in K-12 education. By parental choice, the candidate 
meant opening a new market of schooling choices, the rationale being that through competition 
schools will be forced to improve. With the country in its tenth executive year of a Republican 	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1999.), 11. (Retrieved document from the Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.) 
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presidency, the influence of Reaganomics—an economic approach that favors entrepreneurship, 
deregulation, and free markets—was strong, notably the idea that the private sector was a more 
efficient and cost-effective way to provide goods and services than the government. After 
narrowly winning the election against incumbent Democratic Governor James Blanchard, Engler 
was visited by scholars, educators, and representatives from government, business, and school 
leaders, to outline conceptions for a new system of charter schools.339 Among them were political 
scientists John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, authors of the seminal work Politics, Markets, and 
America’s Schools. These reformers suggested that school bureaucracy (i.e., the school board 
and its relationship with the teachers union) was the main issue, the root of all contemporary 
educational problems. 340 Hence, mayoral control was a part of this broader vision for 
fundamental change, one in which decision-making would be removed from the local 
bureaucracy. 
 Engler had already broken through local bureaucracy with the passage of Proposal A in 
1994. In addition to replacing property tax with the sales tax as the main source for school 
funding, the law restricted school districts from raising extra revenue to supplement their state 
allocation. This significantly diminished the negotiating powers between unions and the school 
board. Moreover, changing the funding formula to follow the student enabled the state to 
establish charter schools. In other words, the governor had already begun moving the state 
towards his educational vision for a “Smart State” and mayoral control was a part of his broader 
plan. 
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The Fight Over School Governance 
 Archer changed his position on taking control of the public schools in Detroit after the 
1998 election. With Engler’s re-election and the Republican sweeping control of the State 
House, Senate, and the State Supreme Court, Archer recognized that there was little to prevent 
the plan from happening given a Republican-controlled state government was likely to support 
the Republican governor. Nevertheless, he gave a stern warning to the legislature in his State of 
the City speech in 1999: 
I wish to caution that the plan’s provision for removing a duly elected school 
board and replacing them with an appointed board should not be embraced 
without a lot of careful and sensitive thought, legal consideration and respect for 
voters.341 
 
He also conceded that while some in the community opposed any change, it was true that many 
Detroit parents, community and civic groups, religious leaders and business organizations, and 
even several union leaders supported some form of legislative educational reform.342 Indeed, one 
Detroit News poll in February indicated that almost 80 percent of Detroiters were dissatisfied 
with the DPS administration and that over 70 percent were dissatisfied with their schools. The 
same poll also showed that 49 percent supported mayoral takeover, while 44 percent opposed it.  
Race played a key role in shaping support for mayoral takeover of the schools.  While 
three-quarters of Whites were in support of the governor’s plan, slightly more than half of Blacks 
looked upon it with suspicion. In essence, the poll showed that even though most Blacks 
believed that schools were in need of reform, they did not necessarily think that takeover was the 
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way to do it. 343 Indeed, those who opposed mayoral takeover to its very end constructed racial 
arguments. Even before the governor had made any steps towards legislation, one anonymous 
contributor to Michigan’s leading Black newspaper observed, “Critics of Engler’s initiative have 
already begun crying racism.”344  
Many people will see the governor’s tough stand and the legislators who write the 
school governance bills as trying to wrest control of Black political power. Critics 
will also accuse Mayor Dennis Archer of conspiring with Engler.345  
 
Reverend Malik Shabazz, the leader of the New Black Panther Party, for example, told a 
reporter: 
We are fighting in the name of Coleman Young.  He did not stand up for us to see 
the Negroes become the lap dogs… to the governor.  The governor may wear a 
suit by day, but at night he puts on a white sheet.346 
 
While publicly known for his incendiary and provocative rhetoric, Shabazz’s usage of Klan 
imagery to indicate the “racist” motives of the governor was not completely out of line with the 
sentiments of other Black opponents of mayoral takeover.   
At its original conception, the takeover bill applied to any district that was failing to meet 
certain academic and fiscal conditions. In fact, DPS was outperforming other failing districts 
including Inkster, Benton Harbor, Highland Park, Grand Rapids, Pontiac, Flint, and Muskegon.347  
Nevertheless, Republican Senate Majority Leader, Dan DeGrow, along with three other 
colleagues introduced a bi-partisan revision to the school code, specifying that cities with school 
districts enrolling at least 100,000 students may empower their mayors to appoint a reform 	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school board. This applied to just one city in the state: Detroit with a population of roughly 
180,000 students.348 When Detroiters descended on Lansing to pack a two-and-a-half hour 
session of the House and Senate Education Committees in mid-February, they wanted to know 
why the legislation was targeting Detroit. Senator DeGrow explained, “Because there are so 
many students in Detroit, in some ways it’s most important.”349 Unsatisfied, Representative Ed 
Vaughn of Detroit, insinuated that the plan was racially motivated: “The only school district 
targeted is the biggest and blackest.”350 When the Senate committee, expressed their intentions of 
passing the bill in two weeks, Representative Keith Stallworth of Detroit warned his Republican 
colleagues of a “civil insurrection,” imploring that, “If you want the racial climate in this state to 
change, you won’t move this legislation in a two-week period.”351 When the senate blocked an 
amendment enabling a vote on mayoral control, Representative Stallworth evoked the memory 
of one of the worst race riots in American history: “There has not been an issue that has been this 
controversial and this disruptive to the social fabric of Detroit since 1967.”352 By now, the Detroit 
chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had 
announced its opposition to mayoral control.353 
From the New Black Panther Party to the NAACP, a vast array of Black leaders 
representing different political ideologies expressed—some more explicitly than others—that the 
policy was inherently “racist.”  These leaders contextualized their arguments to a common past: 
the historical legacy of how a city once permeated by the Klan, through their triumph of the Civil 
Rights Movement and the trials of 1967, eventually brought about the election of Coleman 	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Young as the first Black mayor in a city.354  In short, they rejected mayoral control on the moral 
basis that their very mission is to protect the hard-fought democratic rights and the self-
determination of Black people. For these leaders, denying Detroiters’ right to vote for their own 
school board was a complete negation of the Black struggle for power. 
Yet, there was also a growing view among the Black population that supported mayoral 
takeover and rejected racial arguments, though their worldview was not deracialized. For 
example, Bill Johnson, an African American columnist for the Detroit News, downplayed the 
claims that mayoral control is racially motivated and an insidious plot to seize control of the 
district’s assets.355  As Johnson saw it, there was “nothing magical about black political power, 
particularly as it relates to education improvement.”356  He emphasized that by every measure 
Detroit’s schools were worse than they were in 1967, and therefore “Detroit’s historical record 
makes it clear that radical rather than racial solutions are demanded.”357 Likewise, one editorial 
in the Michigan Chronicle, Detroit’s most important Black weekly, read, “This is not racism. 
The education of a generation of you people affects the quality of all our lives, the viability of 
the state’s economic system and the state of the race of Black people.”358 The correspondent, 
while conceding that mayoral control was an emotionally charged issue, attempted to appeal to 
the readers’ logic as opposed to their emotions. 
Yes, it sounds like the White man is “coming to the rescue” of those black folk 
again. Is it a little condescending? Perhaps. But what is the alternative? Let the 
education system remain as it is? If we’re satisfied, then that is the way to go. If 
we are not happy, then the status quo is not an option. It is certainly not an option 
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for Detroit parents who hope to see their children progress beyond dead-end jobs 
and dead-end lives.359 
 
By March 1999, the periodical made an official endorsement in support of the policy: 
The plain fact is that conditions in Michigan’s schools and communities 
necessitating the use of reform school board have been festering for years […] It 
is plain and simple: put control of the board in the mayor’s hands and take it out 
of the hands of a politically oriented, public elected school board [...] 
[…] true reform happens only when Detroit community rises up and takes 
responsibility for educating our children the way Black folks did years ago. Real 
healing can only happen when we admit the problem.360 
 
For these advocates, the philosophical debate about the relationship between education, 
Black history, and voting rights was less imminent than the realistic need to address the 
economic collapse of their community. They stressed being honest about the problem, personal 
responsibility for educating children, and even the need to participate in elections. Scholars have 
found that race (in Black-led cities) is often a barrier to creating the necessary partnerships to 
support and sustain new education reforms.361 Remarkably, Detroit, who was known as being a 
particularly racially divisive city, was gradually coming to a consensus to support mayoral 
governance. (See Table 4.) Even the DFT and the Council of Baptist Pastors had come around to 
support mayoral takeover, an extraordinary development since for decades the unions and 
religious leaders formed a tight alliance around the school board in an effort to maintain and 
protect jobs.362 
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Table 4. Who Supported and Opposed Mayoral Takeover 
Supported Mayoral Takeover Opposed Mayoral Takeover 
 
100 Black Men363 
Council of Baptist Pastors364 
Detroit Association of Black Organizations365 
Detroit Federation of Teachers366 
Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce367  
Detroit Urban League368 
Ecumenical Ministers Alliance369 
The Michigan Chronicle370 
New Detroit Inc.371 





Alumni of the Million Man March373 
Detroit City Council 
Grassroots community activists 
NAACP 
The New Black Panther Party  
Parents, students, and teachers 
State Representative LaMar Lemmons374 
State Representative Kwame Kilpatrick375 
Wayne County Commissioner376 
 
Although the school board launched their own reform plan and insinuated that the governor was 
actually targeting DPS to acquire the city’s $1.5 billion bond, it did little to fend off the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 “100 Black Men, an organization of Detroit business and community leaders, is the latest to embrace Gov. John 
Engler’s plan to give Mayor Dennis Archer control of Detroit Schools.” See Steve Pardo, “100 Black Men Favors 
Archer-led Reform,” Detroit News, March 9, 1999.  
364 “The proposed takeover of Detroit’s schools has the support of Mayor Archer, who is black, and one of the most 
powerful political forces in the city, the largely black Council of Baptist Pastors.” (The Council of Baptist Pastor’s 
support of mayoral takeover was surprising because the school board president was a Baptist pastor and a member 
of the council, and who abstained from the council’s vote.) See Keith Bradsher, “Detroit Mayor Is Step Closer to 
Control of Schools,” New York Times, March 5, 1999.  
365 See Franklin, “Mayoral Takeover.” 
366 See Kerry A. White, “Power Shift for Detroit Moves Ahead,” Education Week, March 3, 1999, accessed 
December 18, 2014, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1999/03/03/25det.h18.html. 
367 See Franklin, “Mayoral Takeover.” 
368 “In recent weeks, business groups, churches, and prominent city groups, including the Detroit Urban League, 
have endorsed the plan.” See White, “Power Shift; Anonymous, “Urban League Board Votes to Support Appointed 
School Board,” Michigan Chronicle, February 17, 1999, A10. 
369 See Franklin, “Mayoral Takeover.” 
370 Anonymous, “The Michigan Chronicle Endorses School Reform,” Michigan Chronicle, March 10, 1999.  
371 See White, “Power Shift for Detroit.” 
372 See Franklin, “Mayoral Takeover.” 
373 See Brian Harmon, “Protesters Rally Against Takeover,” Detroit News, February 17, 1999. 
374 See LeMar Lemmons, “Don’t Believe the Hype!” Michigan Chronicle, February 17-23, 1999, A-11. 
375 See “Opponents of State School Plan Vow Fight,” Michigan Chronicle, February 17-23, 1999, A-11. 
376 “Wayne County Commissioner Bernard Parker introduced a resolution encouraging the Michigan Legislature to 
refrain from taking any action that would remove the Detroit School Board or curtail their authority. The resolution, 
which passed overwhelmingly, challenges the Legislature to pass laws that would help strengthen the reform plans 
and efforts of the board.” See Bernard Parker, “Wayne’s Commission opposes state takeover in Detroit School,” 
Michigan Chronicle, February 17-23, 1999, A-11. 
 	  114 
forces in Lansing.377 While the legislature debated the details of the final law, Black support was 
growing, with the hope that mayoral takeover was the kind of organizational change that would 
salvage their school system.378 
Nevertheless, the final Senate bill was a compromise. The governor’s proposal had stirred 
enough political controversy and debate to force the legislature to find a middle ground, 
especially because they needed a two-thirds majority to move forward with the plan 
immediately.379 Several Democrats, including future Senatorial candidate Gary Peters from 
Bloomfield Township, argued that the elimination of the elected board indeed had implications 
for the “voting rights” of Detroiters. Peters recommended two alternative amendments: require a 
referendum by Detroit voters to approve the takeover or require an election at the end of five 
years to determine if Detroiters wanted the takeover to continue. The other significant debate 
was over a House version of the bill, one in which the governor would appoint a monitor to run 
the schools while the Board of Education remained in an advisory capacity.380 Ironically, six 
Detroit Democrats, holding a deep antipathy towards Archer—whom they saw as overly 
accommodating towards White politicians and business unlike the outspoken Coleman Young—
broke rank and helped pass the bill.381 Representative LaMar Lemmons explained to one Free 
Press reporter, “If you want a plantation analogy, it’s African American’s experience that 
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overseers are often worse than dealing with the master.”382 The political ruckus finally came to an 
end when Engler signed Michigan Public Act 10 on March 26, 1999, suspending the school 
board and authorizing the mayor to appoint a reform board. The reform board, consisting of 
seven members, would select a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of schools to replace the DPS 
superintendent. The law also designated the governor to appoint the seventh member, who could 
veto the selection of the new CEO if he/she deemed necessary. The new governance system 
would remain in effect for five years at which point Detroiters could vote to continue the reform 
board or return to the elected board.383 For Governor Engler, the takeover was a major victory.  
Implementing the Takeover of Detroit’s Schools’ Governance System 
 Mirel suggests the early transition to the mayoral-appointed board was relatively 
smooth.384 However, it would soon erupt into controversy. After an extensive search for the CEO 
involving 320 candidates and 11 finalists, the reform board settled on John Thompson, a 
superintendent of schools from Tulsa, Oklahoma. But, when the governor’s appointee, Michigan 
Treasurer Mark Murray, exercised his “super-veto” against the board’s nomination, he reignited 
the political conflicts surrounding mayoral takeover. What had apparently eluded many was that? 
the final version of the takeover law enabled the governor to maintain a degree of control 
through his appointee. For those who had opposed the governance change, the super-veto 
confirmed their worst suspicions—state intervention meant a blatant disregard for people’s 
voting rights.385 One of the reform board members lamented to the Michigan Chronicle, 
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We teach our children about the benefits of democracy, and that the best form of 
government gives people the right to determine their own future.  Yet, last week, 
our children witnessed the spectacle of one vote outweighing the consensus of the 
majority.  They saw a fundamental tenet of our democracy turned on its head.386 
 
Nicholas Hood III387, a city council member, also wrote in the Chronicle that the implications 
should send a “chilling message” to every city and municipality in Michigan and elsewhere: 
It seems that the vote of Mark Murray, gubernatorial appointee to the board and 
non-resident of this city, carries more weight than the considered opinion of local 
businesspersons and educators hand-picked by Mayor Dennis Archer […] How 
can those who champion the cause of local control deprive certain people from 
exercising that right?” 388 
 
Hood felt shocked and disappointed that “the governor’s legislatively bolstered authority was 
used to humiliate the mayor of Detroit and disrespect the city’s residents.”389 Suspecting that 
Murray voted against Thompson because the latter was known to be anti-voucher, Hood would 
appeal to the public that “Lansing has its own agenda with regard to Detroit” and if people had 
not figured that out yet, now they will.390 Another community member wrote that she felt duped 
and that reform was nothing more than Lansing’s Trojan Horse. 391 The city council would adopt 
a resolution calling for the removal of the super-veto, but Engler maintained that there would not 
be any changes.392  
In early May 2000, the reform board would finally agree on a CEO, voting for Kenneth 
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Colorado Springs, the American Association of School Administrators voted Burnley as 
Superintendent of the Year. Having grown up in Detroit and attended DPS schools, Burnley was 
a logical choice: Detroiters would consider him “one of their own.”393 
When Burnley took over in July 2000, he faced many challenges. Having inherited a 1.5 
billion construction bond, Burnley was expected to jumpstart projects unlike the previous 
administration. Second, he had to restructure school bureaucracy to provide more efficient and 
effective services to administration, teachers, and students. Furthermore, he would have to 
negotiate contracts with the DFT without provoking strikes in this volatile time. Finally, to 
improve and sustain teaching and learning in every classroom, he would have to find additional 
funds amidst a statewide economic downturn in order to pay for salary increases, teacher hires, 
and new programs.394  
When Mayor Archer announced he would not seek reelection, CEO Burnley would 
virtually become “the face of the school system.”395 Despite Governor Engler’s attempt to 
emulate the Chicago model in which Mayor Daley was in charge, Archer would keep his 
distance. After selecting a “blue-ribbon” reform board, the mayor largely stepped aside, allowing 
the reform board and the CEO to manage all decisions.396 Archer’s deputy press secretary 
explained, “He has enough on his plate trying to run the 10th largest city in the country.”397 In 
sum, the implementation of Detroit’s mayoral takeover—one in which the governor maintained 
control and the mayor was largely absent—was distinct from other cities like Chicago. 
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The Effects of Mayoral Takeover: Collapsing Enrollment, 2000-2005 
The first two years of Burnley’s term as CEO was met with considerable public approval.  
Detroiter’s perception of the CEO was that he was a “sensitive and compassionate” man with a 
“tough-love approach,” who worked around the clock by visiting students at home and even 
consoling families at hospitals and memorial services. 398 Corporate leaders also liked him 
because he had explicit goals for improvement and reported progress. Jeffrey Mirel credits 
Burnley for the following accomplishments: initiating an audit that uncovered $1.5 million in 
misappropriated funds; reorganizing payroll; outsourcing operations such as food service, 
grounds maintenance, and information technology; saving $7 million annually by purchasing 
buses for special education; and using the $1.5 billion bond for a substantial infrastructure 
project.399  Reportedly, building projects had pumped $25 million dollars a month into the local 
economy. (The fact that he contracted Detroit-based and Black-owned business was not lost to 
the public.)400 At the start of his tenure, Burnley also negotiated a three-year contract with the 
DFT well before start of the school year—an unprecedented achievement.401 Wilbur Rich 
contends that Burnley’s biggest impact was organizational as well as curricular; his leadership 
resulted in the spending of the construction bond on twenty-one new schools, renovations, and 
updating technology, while the district saw fourth-grade reading scores reach the 70th percentile 
on the MEAP, a new high in DPS history.402  
Yet, in the end, mayoral takeover failed to fundamentally fix DPS’s deep fiscal problems 
or significantly improve the quality of education for more students, thereby failing to win over 	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the voters to the legitimacy of a new governance structure. In spite of prioritizing district 
finances and capital programs, the district’s finance began to quickly deteriorate in Burnley’s 
third year. The sudden turn in fiscal stability was in large part due to a steady stream of students 
that continued to leave the school district. For decades, the district had been shrinking with 
population decline but because students were now leaving for charters, with every student 
leaving DPS so did the funding tied to them, as mandated by Prop A. In Burnley’s first year, the 
DPS lost some 4,700 pupils, a loss of $31.5 million in state funding. By January 2002, school 
leaders predicted a $70 million deficit for that school year, growing to $135 million for the 
following school year. To make matters worse, the DFT contract stipulated increases in salaries 
for 2002-03, adding a $27 million burden to the budget.403 Indeed, 11,503 students left the district 
at the beginning of fall 2003 and another 10,577 students in the following year.404  
In November 2004, Burnley announced a $48.7 million budget deficit and anticipated 
that $150 million needed to be trimmed from the budget. The news came as a shock to the public 
because just five months ago Burnley had reported that the school year had ended in the black. 
Burnley explained that he and the board had miscalculated student attrition and that the budget 
was based on assumptions that failed to materialize.405 Other school districts through charter and 
choice laws were recruiting away DPS students at an ever-growing pace, while state aid had not 
gone up in 3 years.406 The CEO worked furiously to amend the situation. He suggested using the 
bond money to fill the deficit to avert further cuts. He implored the legislature to keep up with a 
$15 million annual grant. Burnley attempted to compete with out-of-district charters by making 
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kindergarten full day and extending preschools—items that were in high demand by parents—b  
but to no avail.407  
By the end of 2004, 9,308 more students transferred from the DPS to charter schools 
outside of the district, resulting in a crushing $198 million budget deficit. Burnley announced he 
would have to cut 4,000 jobs and close 25-40 schools by the end of the school year.408 “School 
closings are painful.  For an older city like Detroit, they represent the embodiment of several 
generations of memories, but we are left with no choice,” wrote Burnley to the Chronicle.409 
Burnley’s words did little to console a disappointed and disenchanted public. 
In all, by 2005, due to six consecutive years of significant student losses totaling 33,000, 
the DPS lost $226 million in state funding.410 The collapse in enrollment in addition to cuts in 
state aid forced Burnley to lay off almost half of the teaching force (from 8,000 teachers in 1999 
to just over 4,600 teachers in the fall of 2005).411 In essence, greatly underestimating the drawing 
power of charters in the last two years of his tenure, Burnley had ended up spending more than 
the district was taking in. The defeated CEO left the district in June 2005 with nearly a $200 
million deficit and 13,000 kids projected to lose their schools (an estimated 34 schools) in the 
fall—what would likely be the country’s largest school closure in a single district. Experts 
projected that in the next three years 60-75 more schools would close, completely changing the 
face of the district.412  
No matter what Burnley did, he could not attract new students fast enough to offset the 
ones who were leaving, forcing him to close schools and pink-slip hundreds of employees. In 	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other words, even though Burnley was improving the schooling system, the pace of improvement 
was not fast enough where more parents desired to keep their students in the system. The system 
was also far from measuring up to the rest of the state. For example, while the number of 
students passing the MEAP rose by 14 percent between 2000-2005, the gap remained large 
between DPS and the state, often scoring about half of the state average even when the student 
population is broken down by family, income level, race, or gender.413 Even the Mackinac Center 
for Public Policy, a conservative think tank, reported that improving the quality of schooling 
through mayoral takeover had failed to materialize after six years. They noted that while it was 
true that MEAP scores had risen in reading, scores for math had actually dropped dramatically. 
Students in high school were also performing poorly in math: in 1999, 48.5 percent of high 
school students scored below basic on math and, by 2005, the number of low performers 
increased to 59.1 percent. During the same period, while the number of high students who could 
read proficiently rose from 36.3 to 57.4 percent, again, relative to the state average the 
improvements were not enough to keep parents from opting to exit the system for other schools 
available through choice policy.414  	  	  Thus, the collapse of enrollment greatly overshadowed Burnley’s achievements. From 
Detroiters’ perspective, the CEO had began his tenure with a $93 million surplus and left with a 
crushing $200 million deficit, it was infuriating. Many would accuse the state of robbing the 
district of their bond money and leaving them worse off. According to Wilbur Rich, the attacks 
would become “personal,” not only attacking the law but anyone associated with it.415 With 	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Detroiters scheduled to vote on mayoral takeover in November 2004, earlier debates were 
reignited and traditional school board advocates launched a campaign to restore the old order. 
Ironically, mayoral takeover, in many ways, a tactic to remove decision-making from local 
politics, was now embroiled in politics. The failure to legitimize the value of a new governing 
structure would only help to harden the political lines over school reform for the next several 
years. 
Campaign for the Return of the Elected School Board 
 In 2002, state representative Kwame Kilpatrick succeeded Dennis Archer who declined 
to run for reelection. A product of DPS who had also taught in the system, Kilpatrick was an 
advocate of a modified mayoral control plan independent of Lansing. Under the Kilpatrick plan, 
a modified school board would report to the mayor who would select the CEO with the board’s 
approval. Eager to put his plan to action, the new mayor even tried to move up the referendum on 
the Engler plan to 2003. When this did not happen, State Senator Buzz Thomas of Detroit crafted 
a ballot initiative in which voters could vote for a publicly elected school board with modified 
powers.416 Kilpatrick and Thomas appealed to the public that “No” to Prop E meant a return to 
the traditional board with the same old problems and politics that had afflicted the district in the 
past.417 
Once again, the Michigan Chronicle, the state’s oldest Black-owned newspaper and key 
political voice in Detroit, officially endorsed governance change.418 A Detroit News editorial, 
however, countered that the Chronicle is taking a questionable stance, citing several polls 
indicating that “a considerable number of Detroiters” were opposed to the plan. Meanwhile, the 	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Detroit Urban League and the NAACP were at odds with one another over the issue. Like it did 
in 1999, the Urban League endorsed governance change. Urban League president N. Charles 
Anderson told the Detroit News, “What we need is a 21st century governance arrangement for a 
21st century school district.”419 The president of the NAACP, largest chapter in the nation with 
about 50,000 members, argued that “This has never been about education,” reflecting the view 
that Prop E is fundamentally about usurping millions of dollars in contract spending.420In 
response, the Chronicle criticized the NAACP for “recklessly play[ing] upon the emotions of 
voters and use of children as pawns in this heated debate.”421 
The NAACP was joined by a long list of organizations calling for a return to the elected 
school board: the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigrant Rights and 
Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN); the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); and Voices for Working Families, etc. (See 
Table 5.) According to Kenneth Wong and his colleagues, Voices for Working Families put 
together a get-out-the-vote campaign specifically to counter the opposition. Voter turnout was 
expected to be high. 422 
Helen Moore who had gathered thousands of petition signatures against mayoral takeover 
in 1999 was now the legal chair for the Keep the Vote--No Takeover Coalition. She summed up 
in the Free Press, “We want our right to vote back, period.”423 A flyer to voters, distributed by 
BAMN, in bold large font at the top read: “On November 2nd -Vote NO on E.”424 The flyer 
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encouraged voters to “take back control of our public schools,” defend Detroit’s Public Schools, 
and to “fight for equal, quality education for students of Detroit.”  
 
Table 5. Constituencies that Supported and Opposed Proposal E in 2004425 
Supported Prop E Opposed Prop E (i.e., campaigned for the return of 
the publicly elected school board) 
 
Black Slate426 
The Detroit Chamber of Commerce427 
Detroit Urban League428  
The Michigan Chronicle 
The New Marcus Garvey Movement429 
Vote for Kids, Vote Yes on Proposal E430 
 
AFSCME Council 25 (public workers) 
BAMN 
City Council member Sharon McPhail431 
Detroit Federation of Teachers432 
Keep the Vote Coalition 
NAACP 
Voice for Working Families 
 	  
BAMN’s flyer was indicative of how opponents of Proposal E were equating their 
campaign to the ushering in of a new civil rights movement: 
We are building a mass civil rights campaign for a ‘NO’ vote. […] The new civil 
rights movement demands an end to the disgrace of unequal funding for our 
schools. No more second class education for Detroit’s students! No more back of 
the bus!433 
 
By voting NO, they said, voters will be taking a historic stand for “inner-city school districts 
around the country that are facing crowded classes, privatization, layoffs, and the closing of 	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schools.”434 BAMN argued that only a democratically elected school board would fight for all the 
funds squandered by the state takeover efforts. They warned voters that the Chamber of 
Commerce, contractors, and corporations profited off of Detroit from privatization and that the 
same sources are pouring million of dollars into campaigns to deceive the people.  
 On November 2004, Detroiters went to the ballot and 65 percent voted to eliminate 
mayoral takeover, thus reinstating the traditional school board.435 Unlike most other cities that 
had since shifted to mayoral governance, mayoral takeover did not last in Detroit.436 Although the 
coalition campaigning for the elimination of mayoral control believed they had restored 
traditional school governance, as I argued in the previous chapter, it was only a brief period 
before the implementation of another policy—emergency management—that would suspend the 
school board again. 
Analysis: Why Mayoral Takeover Was Eliminated 
Other accounts of Detroit’s mayoral takeover tend to emphasize how reformers were 
unable to build enough political support or legitimacy to sustain the initiative. For example, 
Kenneth Wong and his colleagues argue that, in contrast to Chicago and Cleveland, Mayor 
Kilpatrick was met with stiff resistance from the DFT because he had failed to form strong 
working relationships with teacher union officials, community leaders, and state politicians.437 In 
truth, 41 percent of the union actually voted to remain neutral on the issue of Proposal E. 
Although 54 percent voted ‘NO’ on Proposal E and 7 percent voted ‘YES,’ the president of the 
DFT told reporters that “Ultimately the DFT will work with whatever governance structure the 
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citizens choose.”438 Thus, a poor relationship between the mayor and unions was unlikely the 
reason for why the policy was eliminated. 
In his account, Wilbur Rich also points to the mayor’s failings as one explanation for why 
the policy was eliminated. Rich contends that some voted “No” to Proposal E as an indictment 
on the mayor’s character. In 2002, the mayor was involved in a mini-scandal and “did not 
engender trust from his constituency.”439 Rich argues, “mayoral credibility can be a legitimating 
mechanism.”440 However, Rich cites other reasons for why Detroiters voted “No” to mayoral 
takeover: to some it was a restoration election, for others it was a message to Lansing about local 
control. Most of all, Rich argues that the “public school cartel” (i.e., what I generally refer to as 
the traditional governance regime) was able to characterize Proposal E as a power grab, 
portraying the motives of state politicians as racist, partisan, and undemocratic. “The narrative 
shifted away from student performance and the district’s fiscal problems toward Detroit as a 
victim of state encroachment.”441 The BAMN fliers vividly demonstrate how opponents of 
Proposal E characterized the vote as a chance to stand up for all inner-city school districts across 
the nation and even the launching of a new civil rights movement. Therefore, Rich concludes, “A 
rational voter could decide that his or her vote was directed at the civil rights issue alone and was 
not an endorsement of the performance of the schools system.”442  
While Rich’s analysis offers powerful insights into the campaign against Proposal E’s 
framework and the logic of the Detroit voter, it minimizes the discussion around the policy itself, 
mayoral takeover as a mechanism for addressing DPS’s chronic issues. How did the 
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effectiveness of the policy affect voters’ decisions? How would events have played out if 
mayoral takeover had been more effective? Thus, my analysis highlights the structural issues that 
led to the elimination of mayoral takeover. Governor Engler’s broader vision for creating a new 
market of schools for Michigan was actually harmful to DPS. The concepts of school choice and 
competition created an invisible structural crisis not well understood by the public. In particular, 
the change in the funding formula in 1994 (i.e., Proposal A), allowing per-pupil spending to 
follow the student, created a system in which operating revenues are determined by enrollment. 
In spite of CEO Burnley’s efforts, they could not stem the tide of parents and students leaving 
the district for charters or schools of choice during the entire period of mayoral takeover, a 
course towards financial collapse. By year four, greatly underestimating the number of students 
that were leaving the district, the only option was “radical triage—desperate efforts to cut fixed 
costs even faster than revenues drop.”443 Peter Hammer, a law professor at Wayne State 
University, describes the school finance formula as creating a winner-take-all system, one in 
which school districts that lose students are penalized.444 He argues, 
The real sources of DPS’s financial problems are defects in Proposal A itself, 
exacerbated by changes in demographics and the adoption of state policies 
encouraging schools of choice and increased competition from charter schools. To 
begin with, Proposal A never leveled the economic playing field.445 
 
Such were the invisible forces at play. Once clinging to the hope that mayoral takeover 
would fix DPS’s finances, the dismal outcome of $200 million deficit rekindled feelings 
of suspicion and distrust, and even accusations that Burnley (and the state) had 
squandered or stolen the bond money. Few at the time understood that Engler’s broader 
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vision for school reform in the state had created a structural crisis that no CEO, mayor, or 
school board—whatever leader—could successfully address.  
 Quoting from political scientist James Gibson, “Legitimacy is an endorphin of the 
democratic body politic,” Rich argues that the failure to create legitimacy is what 
eliminated mayoral takeover and that the “case study of Detroit demonstrates the folly of 
retrospective citizen participation,” that citizens should have facilitated the legitimacy of 
the takeover from the start.446 But this argument greatly overlooks the growing political 
support for mayoral takeover in 1999. My analysis demonstrates a moment in which 
enough Detroiters were open to a new form of governance because they were so 
frustrated by the traditional governance regime. Mayoral takeover, I argue, was a lost 
opportunity to solidify new political and institutional arrangements that could have better 
supported governance change. In a study conducted by Jeffrey Henig and colleagues on 
urban school reform between 1988-1997, Detroit was a high conflict, low-level 
cooperation city in which race was a splitting factor.447 Thus, remarkably, in a short 
period leading up to mayoral takeover, a growing number of Detroiters were considering 
how the issues were not racial.  Newspaper accounts also indicate that Burnley, 
considered an “insider,” was well liked and respected until he shocked the community 
with the announcement of the deficit in 2004. Unfortunately, the need to close schools 
and layoff teachers, which had real consequences on student lives and adult employment, 
appeared to be an assault on the Black community. Feeling betrayed and infuriated, 
people fell back on preexisting racial charges to make sense of the crisis, which 
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ultimately gave opponents of Proposal E the upper hand in generating a large voter 
turnout for eliminating the policy. 
Conclusion 
From the vantage point of time, it seems to me that the Detroit mayor’s short-lived 
authority over the public schools was a dress rehearsal for another form of control that further 
reduces the “exceptional” system of school governance in Detroit. Digging deep into this 
“reform” also highlights several critical features of this story, features that contributes to our 
understanding of the demise of the system of local control of schools.    
To begin with, while Wong and Rich tell a story of how mayoral takeover failed, ending 
with the restoration of the old governing system, my account argues that this was the beginning 
of the end: mayoral takeover was the first instance in which the state suspended the authority and 
power of the DPS’s elected school board. This was a historic moment in which both politicians 
and the public perceived the traditional governance regime itself as the problem, an institutional 
barrier to change. The board’s exclusive and exceptional power over the schools—what had been 
one of the progressives’ most compelling reasons for creating this structure in the first place—
appeared to be the cause (not the answer) for all of DPS’s problems. 
Mayoral takeover also reflected the rise of the “education governor,” a new policy actor 
who wielded unprecedented powers over what was in the past highly localized decisions. Indeed, 
Engler “wanted to break up and spread around the ‘lock’ that the MEA (teachers union) had on 
policy, plans, finance—everything about education,” explained Art Ellis, Engler’s State 
Superintendent of Instruction.448 Engler argued that the traditional governance regime was too 
bureaucratically fixed and tied to union demands, a drag on the finances of school districts like 	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DPS.449  Although Governor Engler’s stance typified the long-standing Republican position 
towards unions, Engler’s plan to break up the logjam in Detroit was not a partisan one. My 
analysis not only shows that there was Democratic support, including Mayor Archer (albeit 
reluctantly) and Black Detroiters (who are mostly Democratic), but also foreshadows the 
significant role governors would play in Detroit’s educational affairs in the next decade. 
Transcending partisan politics, all of Engler’s successors, both Democrat and Republican, would 
claim the mantel of “education governor,” introducing policies that would continue to erode local 
control and render the traditional governance regime irrelevant for most of the Detroit school 
population. 
While other accounts of Detroit’s mayoral takeover emphasize the success of the 
counteroffensive campaign, my analysis highlights the opposite: the traditional governance 
regime’s failure to maintain its power and legitimacy. One major indicator of the older regime’s 
breakdown was the robust support for mayoral takeover from a variety of Black Detroiters. In 
hopes of finally ushering in revolutionary changes for DPS, as early as the late 1980s, Black 
Detroiters opted to break away from “politics as usual,” electing the new HOPE members. 
Unlike what the literature suggests, during this period, race—while it was up for debate—was 
not a barrier to change. Rather, remarkably, in a city where race has been an obvious dividing 
factor, the wide spread agreement that DPS needed radical change superseded the racial 
discourse, with many rejecting the notion that mayoral takeover was inherently a “racist” tactic. 
Perhaps, for the first time since the break-up of the liberal-labor-black coalition in 1973, there 
was a growing consensus of diverse players around the need for “shaking up the status quo,” 
who hoped that a mix of state intervention and mayoral leadership would finally improve school 
and student outcomes.  	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This part of my story not only stresses the weakening of the regime but also points to 
another critical feature of this analysis. If urban regime analysis posits that a high level of civic 
capacity is necessary for sustaining governance change, why then was mayoral takeover short-
lived? If there was considerable support, why did reformers fail to institutionalize mayoral 
control? I argue that the reason is simply because the policy failed to address DPS’s fiscal and 
educational problems, if not worsened the school district’s conditions. Thus, we can interpret the 
vote to abandon mayoral takeover in 2004 not as a vote of confidence in the old system but 
rather an indictment of the fiasco of the “new” system. 
 Therefore, the implementation of mayoral takeover demonstrates the depth of the 
structural crisis both created and intensified by changes to the school funding formula. Tinkering 
with or even overhauling the governance system could not alter the economic, demographic and 
fiscal situation Detroit schools faced. “The real source of DPS’s financial problems,” Peter J. 
Hammer claims, “ are defects in Proposal A itself, exacerbated by changes in demographics and 
the adoption of state policies encouraging schools of choice and increased competition from 
charter schools.”450 In other words, some of Engler’s reforms undermined the ability of the 
takeover board to address DPS’s educational and fiscal issues. With Proposal A, the decline in 
enrollment each year was a major loss of revenue, decreasing the funds with which the district 
had to work with.”451 Hidden from the public was a terribly difficult scenario in which Burnley 
had to keep up with relatively higher fixed costs, plus rising pensions and healthcare costs, with 
an increasingly smaller budget. 
 This aspect of my account problematizes Engler’s vision of a new market of schools and 
the principles of competition. The case of mayoral takeover in Detroit leads me to question the 	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ideological foundations of market-based reform, competition, choice, etc., which I further 
comment on in the concluding chapter of this study. 
Finally, this hidden crisis had severe social repercussions around future school reform 
efforts. Because the policy had failed them, Detroiters missed the opportunity to unite a variety 
of new and emerging alliances around school governance change. When Burnley was forced to 
close schools and fire DPS employees, it reignited the deep distrust and suspicion that Black 
Detroiters had of the state. This is unfortunate because today the “events of 1999” has been 
seared into people’s memories as the first state takeover and the beginning of DPS’s downward 
slide. The Black-city-versus-White-suburb trope had been rekindled, making it difficult to 
establish a sense of trust that is required to forge a cross-sector coalition (i.e., a high level of 
civic capacity) that includes teachers, community activists, and parents that can help to raise 
student performance.  
Further complicating matters, advocates of what I call new style governance often 
downplay or even ignore these racial tropes, rationalizing their extreme actions as crisis 
management, and continue to aggressively and radically dismantle the traditional school system 
without consulting any local authorities. Henig and Rich write,  
“While this ‘mayor-centric’ approach is sometimes promoted and adopted by 
local interests, more often it has involved intervention by governors and state 
legislators who claim that they must take extraordinary steps in order to rescue a 
faltering system unable to heal itself. While the theories and rationales for this 
reform are famed in universal terms that should apply to any community 
struggling with disjointed educational initiatives and ineffective schools, actually 
cases to date nearly always involve central city school districts with 
predominantly Black students and school leadership.”452 
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Thus, my account highlights the racial aspects of school reform in Detroit, but it does not 
indicate that mayoral takeover was a racist tactic. Instead, it shows the conflict and tension that 
arises from shifting decision-making out of the local institution, the dismantling of the traditional 
governance structure, while not yet making enough significant improvements for the vast 
majority of Detroit children who are African American. Although White suburban districts 
during this period evaded the affects of shifting control to higher levels of government, the next 
chapter indicates how subsequent renditions of takeover would begin to loom over White 
neighborhoods as well. 
 In sum, even though Detroit’s mayoral takeover was short-lived, it weakened the 
traditional governance regime, set the precedent for further efforts to erode local control, opened 
the pathway for distinctly new educational actors, and ultimately results in “the end of 
exceptionalism” of America’s public schooling system. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Education Achievement Authority: The End of Exceptionalism 
On April 2, 2012, a crowd of more than two hundred students, teachers, and concerned 
parents gathered outside of Detroit’s Mumford High School carrying signs and chanting, “No 
way to EAA!” They had come to protest the state’s unprecedented removal of Mumford High 
and 14 other schools from DPS, transferring the schools to a new state-run reform district called 
the Education Achievement Authority (EAA).453 Established in 2011, the EAA was a part of 
Republican Governor Rick Snyder’s broader vision to reinvent education in Michigan for the 
twenty-first century. Modeling after Louisiana’s recovery school district that virtually took over 
all of New Orleans’ schools after Hurricane Katrina, the EAA promised to turnaround the lowest 
5% performing schools in Michigan.454 The governor declared his plan “will jettison the status 
quo” that had for so long failed the state’s children.455 However, when the state announced that 
only Detroit Public Schools (DPS) were slated for transfer, several protests were staged across 
the city.456 
Mumford High was Detroit’s cultural and historical gem and a “neighborhood school” in 
every sense of the word. The original building, built in the late 1940s on the northwest side of 
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Detroit, was a stunning—everyone remembered its iconic baby-blue limestone entrance and art 
deco style.457 The school had also produced generations of famous alum such as jazz musician 
Earl Klugh, Grammy-winning songwriter Allee Willis, and even appeared in a Hollywood film 
in the 1980s.458 In the 1970s, Mumford was known for its Black student activism.459 By the 
2000s, however, the iconic building was deteriorating. The community unable to salvage the 
building, agreed to fund the rebuilding of the school by approving a $50 million bond in 2009. In 
2012, Mumford students eagerly awaited for the opening of the “new” Mumford, a state-of-the-
art facility for 1,500 students. Thus, when the state announced the transfer of Mumford to the 
EAA, the community erupted into outrage and protest, claiming the transfer was “an act of 
theft.”460 A junior at Mumford said, “I hope the EAA is stopped.  While it’s true we need some 
improvement on our test scores, there are some signs of progress and that’s something we can 
build on.”461 One Mumford teacher said, “This school belongs to Mumford students and they’re 
trying to turn it into a charter school.”462 Helen Moore, a longtime community activist in Detroit, 
put it in these words “They went against the promise.” She and other protestors felt betrayed.  
Without Detroiters’ consent, the state had decided to take from the Detroit Public Schools a 
brand new facility constructed with a bond approved by the citizens of Detroit.463 The Detroit 
News reported that the move signaled a new era for DPS.464  However, as I am arguing, the EAA 
did not signal a new era but rather was another event in an era that began with Lansing removing 
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the power of local Boards to raise revenue.  The EAA was another step toward eliminating the 
traditional system that gave local communities control of their schools.   
However, the step the governor took in establishing the EAA was unprecedented as it 
nominally created a statewide school system, separate from local bureaucracy and decision 
making, not limited a district’s borders. Further, the EAA’s startup costs did not come from 
public funds alone, as a network of foundations came forward to invest in a new and innovative 
schooling system, a model for the rest of the state. The governor also managed to form the EAA 
quickly, without having to deliberate his idea in the legislature. The EAA also added yet another 
system of schools to an already fragmented educational landscape in Detroit. Further 
disgruntling the community, the governor arranged for the emergency manager of DPS to have 
authority over the EAA. In short, the establishing of the EAA was fast and controversial, yet just 
one more dramatic measure in a succession of policies in the last thirty years to dismantle the 
traditional public schooling system. 
It is tempting to see another educational governor creating the EAA and the controversy 
around it as replicating the mayoral takeover in Chapter 5. There is, however, a significant 
difference in that by the time EAA comes into being, there is a history of “outsiders” controlling 
the Detroit School Board or ignoring the Board to make educational decisions for the schools.  
While resistance and contention over the policy would become widespread, nevertheless, the 
governor and Republic legislators met with little substantive opposition to reduce the 
jurisdictional authority of DPS Board and administrators.   
In this chapter, I argue that the EAA represents the latest piece in the new order of school 
governance and a new twist on the idea of the decentralized American system of schooling. In 
the past, when scholars discussed the centralization of school governance, they referred to the 
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amalgamation of locally centralized school districts. However, with the advent of EAA and the 
aftermath of 30 years of moving educational decision making beyond the school board and 
superintendents, Detroit has a fragmented educational landscape, consisting of multiple 
“systems,” and actors, each with limited and situated authority with no coordination or common 
oversight. With EAA’s special authority over Detroit students and schools, the exceptional status 
of the elected Detroit School Board had over the city’s education has essentially come to an end. 
The traditional governance regime (i.e., school board and teachers union) had little political 
power to resist this and other changes.465 For EAA schools, educational decisions formally 
moved up to the state-level and out of the hands of Detroiters.    
This chapter presents the case of the EAA by setting the policy and reform in context of 
the enduring crisis of the academic record of Detroit students and DPS’ crushing fiscal problems. 
Second, I describe the EAA, its purpose, design, and educational goals and how the advocates of 
the new system claimed it would address DPS’s chronic problems. Then, I tell the story of how 
the EAA was established, driven by a so-called education governor who wanted to put together 
the EAA very quickly, and focusing on the conflicts and struggles that emerged around the effort 
to change school governance. Next, I situate the EAA in its time, using regime analysis to argue 
that the EAA is evidence of a new coalition of actors—what I call a new style governance 
regime—to implement, sustain, and “normalize” this change in school governance. I conclude by 
discussing how the story of the EAA contributes to our overall understand of a new era of 
schooling and extends Henig’s ideas about the “end of exceptionalism” in American education.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Jeffrey R. Henig, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education; The Changing Politics of School Reform,” 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education Press, 2013). 
 	  138 
The Ongoing and Persistent Crises of Detroit’s Public Schools 
 When Democratic Jennifer Granholm succeeded Governor Engler in 2003, Michigan’s 
finances were in tatters. Its shrinking tax base forced Granholm to cut $127 million in public 
spending within weeks of taking office.466 Michigan’s economy would remain poor resulting in 
the Governor having to eventually cut higher education funding, and was ultimately unable to 
raise any new money for the public school system.467 Therefore, DPS was not receiving any 
significant increases in state aid in the 2000s. Furthermore, the school district was left with a 
$200 million deficit in 2005. As explained in the previous chapter, thousands of students were 
leaving the district for charters and schools of choice and, following the reinstatement of the 
elected school board, the decline in enrollment actually accelerated, and continued well into the 
decade. In 2006, DPS enrollment dropped to 117,567, a loss of more than 14,000 students and 
millions in funding.468  
 In 2007, the school board hired a new superintendent, Connie Calloway, but she was 
unable to overcome the district’s deteriorating finances as Detroit school children continued to 
flee the system, costing the system millions in revenue.469 The fall 2007 count showed a loss of 
about 11,400 students from the prior year, with the district closing the 2007-2008 fiscal year with 
a $140 million deficit. When Calloway projected a $409 million deficit for 2009, the state 
superintendent recommended that Governor Granholm appoint a review team to examine the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Associated Press, “Cuts to Education Hurt Governor Granholm’s Education Legacy,” MLive, December 8, 2010, 
accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/12/cuts_to_education_hurt_gov_jen.html. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Valieri D. Lockhart, “DPS Loses Students and Millions in Funding,” Michigan Chronicle, November 17, 2004; 
Michael F. Addonizio and C. Philip Kearney, Education Reform and the Limits of Policy: Lessons from Michigan 
(Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2012). 
469 After Superintendent Connie Calloway publicly aired the district’s “financial laundry, ” there was a lot of tension 
between her and the school board. The board fired her at the end of 2008. See Addonizio & Kearney, Lessons from 
Michigan, 223. 
 	  139 
school district’s finances. DPS’s financial situation had become so bad that Granholm declared a 
state of emergency, appointing the district’s first emergency manager in 2009.470  
As the fiscal crisis continued so did the educational crisis. According to Michael 
Addonozio and C. Philip Kearney, after the restoration of the elected school board, the district’s 
academic performance worsened significantly.471 Their study found that “by any valid measure of 
district performance,” DPS was “in a more perilous position” in 2012 than it was in 1999.472 In 
2009, the U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, told reporters that DPS’s drop-out rate was 
“devastating” and arguably the worst in the nation.473 A white paper on the state of the Detroit 
child published in 2010 declared that the majority of Detroit public schools had “shockingly low 
standardized test scores.”474 With a little more than half (62%) of DPS students graduating in 4 
years,475 only 37% had passed reading and 16% had passed math in the Michigan Merit 
Examination (MME). Data on the ACT showed that only 1.2 percent of Detroit public school 
graduates were considered college ready.476 
In spite of the emergency manager launching an educational campaign, data analyses in 
2012 revealed that test scores—including those from lower grade levels—hardly budged in the 
last five years.477 More than a decade since mayoral takeover, DPS was not only under 
emergency management but the majority of its schools were in academic crisis. Before the end of 	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her tenure in January 2011, Governor Granholm’s last attempt to address these issues included 
seeking additional federal dollars through a new federal initiative called Race to the Top and the 
establishment of a redesign district for the lowest performing schools in the state. Rick Snyder, 
the newly elected Republican governor, would not only inherit the problem of DPS but also the 
policies and structures that his predecessor had put in place. 
The EAA Dream:  “A Different System, for a Better Outcome”478 
Months after his election, Governor Snyder delivered a special message on education to 
the Michigan legislature in April 2011. Referring to the state’s dismal student performance on a 
number of assessments, the governor argued that the key problem was that the education system 
was an “outdated model of the past.”479 Thus, the governor outlined a plan to transform and 
modernize the delivery of education, which included more charter schools, performance-based 
teaching, and a new public schooling model called an “Any Time, Any Place, Any Way, Any 
Pace.” The crux of the model depended on that funding follow the student, as a variety of 
schooling options, including 24-hour online learning, were made available. Snyder envisioned 
minimizing “all state and local barriers that hinder innovation at the local level” in order to offer 
a new unfettered educational system adaptable to all types of students and learning situations.480 
Although the governor did not mention his intentions for establishing the EAA, which he would 
two months later, his message was clear: the old system of education had to be overhauled.481  
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Though Governor Snyder is often given credit—or blame—for creating the EAA, the 
blueprints for a recovery school district predates his election. As mentioned, Governor 
Granholm’s education legacy included an attempt to receive Race to the Top (RTT) funds, a new 
federal initiative central to President Barack Obama’s and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan’s 
efforts to reform education. A part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
RTT incentivized school reform by awarding stimulus funds to states with the strongest, most 
innovative and workable submissions, meeting certain requirements such as adopting standards 
for work- and college-readiness, building data systems that inform educators on areas of 
improvement, lifting caps on charter schools, and turning around the lowest achieving schools.482  
The promise of an additional $400 million in stimulus dollars encouraged both the 
governor and the cash-strapped Michigan legislature to propose sweeping reforms. Within a 
month of RTT’s announcement in March 2009, the Michigan legislature had hastily introduced a 
set of “Race to the Top” bills. 483 By January 2010, Granholm signed a package of RTT bills, 
extolling them as “revolutionary.” 484 The Michigan School Board Association also praised the 
bills for putting Michigan in serious competition for RTT dollars, stating that it was “one of the 
more major reforms in education policy in recent memory and will result in changes in almost 
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every district in the state.”485 In the end, Michigan failed to win the stimulus dollars, but the bills 
had nevertheless become law.486  
One of the laws, Public Act 204, required the Michigan Department of Education (MDE) 
to establish a State School Reform/Redesign District (SRRD) to turn around the lowest achieving 
schools.487 State Superintendent Mike Flanagan had envisioned modeling the SRRD after the 
Louisiana Recovery School District, which virtually took over all of New Orleans schools after 
Hurricane Katrina.488 When Snyder entered office a year later, no schools had been transferred to 
the SRRD. Thus, past reform efforts under Granholm had already established both the concept 
and a governing structure for a statewide recovery school district. In fact, the SRRD would 
eventually provide a legal basis from which to launch the EAA.  
Still, as early as his gubernatorial campaign, having supposedly approached a range of 
educational leaders, Snyder dreamed of creating an entirely new educational system for the state 
of Michigan. Once in office, one of the first things the governor did was not only broaden the 
powers of the emergency manager but also appoint Roy Roberts who agreed to assist the 
governor with his vision.489 Snyder dreamed big. In one draft of EAA plans, the document states 
that the EAA schools will “ascribe to the non-negotiable for the radical transformation of the 
traditional paradigm of public education.”490 These non-negotiables included a student-centered 
learning platform, common assessments, global partnerships, individualized learning plans for all 
students, and the use of technology as a learning tool. In short, Snyder’s vision for the EAA was 	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not just establishing a recovery district, but also the actual inventing of a new educational model 
for the twenty-first century. 
Earlier drafts of EAA plans also indicate that “disrupting” the traditional public schooling 
system was an appropriate action for getting started.491 For too long, the system was entrenched 
in the customs and the demands of interest groups. A new educational authority could break free 
from such constraints. For example, the EAA could replace all teachers, staff, and principals of 
the lowest-performing schools and bring in new blood, like hiring from Teach for America 
(TFA), and partnering with the Harvard Graduate School of Education to recruit new principals 
from across the nation.492 According to Mary L. Mason and David Arsen, Snyder’s vision was 
“shaped by a loss of faith in the system of traditional public schools and a belief that shifting a 
greater portion of education service provision outside that system would advance opportunities 
and outcomes.”493 
In the EAA’s first year of implementation (2012-2013), the EAA promised to replace the 
“one size fits all” education with an “innovative learning environment.”494 This environment 
included such features as extending both the day and year, abolishing grade levels, letting 
students master concepts at their own pace, requiring individualized learning plans, and 
delivering instruction through a technology platform called “Buzz,” an array of curricular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 See Education Achievement Authority, “A Strategic Plan for the Radical Transformation and Disruption of the 
Traditional Public Schooling” (Draft of EAA plans, Michigan, 2011). 
492 Joy Resmovits, “Detroit’s Teach for America Recruits Stuck in the Middle of Broader Battle,” Huffpost Detroit, 
November 7, 2011, accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/16/teach-for-america-
detroit_n_1095367.html; Education Achievement Authority, “Harvard University Graduate School of Education 
Collaboration for the Principal Selection Process,” (Principal Appointment Roster, Michigan, 2012). 
493 Mason & Arsen, “Michigan’s Education Achievement Authority,” 11. 
494 See Education Achievement Authority, “Education Achievement Authority: Definition” (Pamphlet materials, 
Michigan, 2013).   
 	  144 
materials and adaptive assessments.495 Additionally, new hires accounted for 80 percent of the 
teaching staff, of which 27 percent were from TFA. Only a handful of principals were kept, 
Harvard recruited the rest. The EAA did not require unionization.496 Most importantly, in light of 
Snyder’s dream, the EAA’s governing structure was radically divergent from the traditional 
public schooling system. The chancellor of the EAA, John Covington, and a small administrative 
team managed the EAA, directly reporting to the EAA’s founding board. The founding board 
consisted of (among the original eleven members) the likes of the emergency manager, the 
president of the Skillman Foundation, and the head of the Detroit Medical Center, Mike Duggan 
(who would become Detroit’s first White mayor since the early 1970s).497 It was the complete 
eradication of any publicly elected body in charge of the recovery school district, and the 
establishing of an educational authority with a slew of new actors and players. It was a different 
system, for a better outcome.  
Establishing the Education Achievement Authority 
According to the Free Press, a dinner at an Ann Arbor steakhouse on May 16, 2011 
“marked an explosion of activity” that led to the materialization of the EAA. Present at the 
meeting were Snyder and officials from his administration, State Superintendent Mike Flanagan, 
and representatives from the Eli Broad Foundation and Eastern Michigan University (EMU). 
Purportedly, Richard Baird, a representative from Broad, pitched the idea to the EMU 
administrators, explaining how the university “was the right fit for this project.”498 EMU’s 
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history of teacher education efforts, personal ties with the governor and Lansing, and familiarity 
with the governor’s idea would be a suitable partner for launching the immediate creation of a 
new school system.499 Moreover, the governor also needed another public entity, in addition to 
DPS, to use the Urban Cooperating Act of 1967 to establish a new governing entity or authority 
necessary for the launch. 
The Urban Cooperation Act, a provision in the state’s constitution, enabled two or more 
public entities to enter into an “Interlocal Agreement (ILA)” to share functions and resources to 
assist with a public undertaking. According to Nelson Smith, ILAs were frequently used, but no 
two public agencies had ever “merged powers to create a freestanding new K-12 system.”500 
Sometime between May and the announcement of the EAA in June—with the signatures of 
EMU President Susan Martin, DPS’s emergency manager Roy Roberts, and Governor Snyder—
the university and the school district agreed to a fifteen-year contract, to form the EAA.501 In a 
way, it was a bold and innovative move towards establishing a new mechanism for providing 
improved public educational services.  
Snyder’s move would also avoid deliberating his concepts for the new school system 
through the usual legislative process. Seemingly, the governor was eager to implement the EAA 
quickly. With neither the EMU regents nor the emergency manager having consulted with EMU 
faculty, DPS school board officials, or the teachers union, the plans were shrouded in secrecy up 
until its public announcement in June. EMU Regent Jim Stapleton told reporters later on, “It’s an 
aggressive plan, and it needs to be.”502 Attorneys were hammering out the final details of the plan 	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on Friday; by Sunday, Roy Roberts briefed the teachers union of the plan. On Monday morning, 
June 20th, Roberts informed the DPS school board—just hours before the public announcement 
of the EAA.503  
Although the public announcement alluded to the likelihood of starting with the transfer 
of DPS schools on the list of the lowest 5% performing schools in the state, it immediately 
caused a great stir in Detroit’s educational community. The apparent disregard of the local 
system drew considerable concern from DPS teachers and the union. The president of the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) stated, “We are troubled at the lack of teacher and 
school employee voice in the current plan, especially in the light of the hard work Detroit 
education unions and school district have already done in collaborating to develop and 
implement workable solutions for the city’s schools.”504 Many speculated whether this was a 
repeat of mayoral takeover in 1999, in which DPS was unfairly targeted. Some denounced the 
plan, at it core, was racially motivated. In response, Mike Flanagan assured one reporter that the 
new recovery district focused on the education of all children: “This isn’t a Detroit problem or 
Grand Rapids problem or a black problem or a white problem.”505 Soon after being appointed by 
Snyder as chancellor of the EAA in August, John Covington set out immediately to dispel these 
concerns. In hopes of conveying to Detroiters that the EAA was serious about being a system for 
the entire state, Covington campaigned throughout Michigan to include schools from other 
districts.506  
For Snyder, DPS’s chronically failing schools and ongoing fiscal problems were enough 
to justify that the new recovery school district begin with Detroit. Snyder argued that removing 	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schools from DPS would lessen the school district’s financial burden, as operational costs for 
turnaround measures would be funded by private donations.507 Additionally, students removed 
from DPS would benefit—with the EAA model promising 95% of school funds for instruction.508 
In contrast, in DPS, nearly half of school dollars went to bureaucracy, management, and debt 
reduction.509 The EAA would also receive additional funding through Michigan Public Education 
Finance Project, a non-profit accepting donations from private sources. These private donations 
topped off by 5.9 million dollars in federal grants would foot the EAA’s one-time startup costs.510   
Thus, private donors were essentially investing in an opportunity for DPS schools to start 
over. Through its transfer to a new governing authority, unfettered by local governmental, 
political, and financial constraints, new and innovative educators, leaders, and agencies could 
experiment with ways to educate the students most in need. Not surprisingly, then, when the state 
announced the first schools to be transferred to the EAA on March 13, 2012, all 15 were from 
DPS.511 (See Table 6.) 
Table 6. Detroit Public Schools Transferred to the Education Achievement Authority in 2012 
Elementary and Middle Schools High Schools Charter Schools 
 
Brenda Scott Elementary/Middle 
Burns Elementary/Middle 
Law Academy 





Central Collegiate Academy 
Denby High School 
Henry Ford High School 
Mumford High School 
Pershing High School 
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Through such strategies and partnerships, Governor Snyder was able to quickly launch 
the EAA in Detroit without having to first codify the new school system into law. Still, the 
governor sought to expand the EAA’s authority to include the lowest performing schools across 
the state. By fall, the governor figured he could meld the powers of the SSRD (Granholm’s 
“redesign district”) with the EAA. On November 1, 2011, the SSRD signed a contract with the 
EAA agreeing to the “transfer of functions and responsibilities,” essentially passing on the 
SSRD’s power to turnaround the states lowest achieving schools to the EAA. Now the EAA was 
the state’s preeminent reform district with the EAA chancellor at its helm and the political and 
financial support of the Broad Foundation and other philanthropies.  
That the EAA could transfer any of the 98 schools that the Michigan Department of 
Education had identified as the bottom 5% in August,512 would soon garner concern beyond 
Detroit. Several news outlets, including Education Week, speculated that if these schools could 
not improve in the next two years, they could very well be transferred to the EAA. 513 Fears of 
loosing schools, privatization schemes, and the dismantling of the traditional public schools 
would result in a growing movement to stop the EAA and thwart the governor’s plan to 
eventually make the EAA law. 
Resistance to the EAA: Conflict and Struggle 
The struggle against the EAA began in Detroit but would gradually include other school 
districts that began to feel the threat of the state’s increased power and authority in educational 
matters. The EAA’s announcement of the transfer of the 15 DPS schools triggered weeks of 
protests in the spring of 2012. DFT president Keith Johnson accused the EAA of “union 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 See Michigan Department of Education, “Persistently Lowest-Achieving Schools By District,” (August, 2011). 
513 Lori Higgins, “98 Struggling Schools May End Up in Michigan Reform District,” Education Week, August 29, 
2011, accessed October 31, 2014, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/08/29/03mct_mireform.h31.html.  
 	  149 
busting,” no more than a plan to privatize services and underpay employees. 514 Custodians that 
were in schools slated for the EAA, for example, had to go through a process of rehire, expecting 
to earn anywhere between $1.50-2.50 less per hour.515 The president of the school custodians 
union told the Free Press, “What (the EAA) is going to save on custodians is minimal at best. 
EAA is nothing but smoke and mirrors, a social experiment.”516 Johnson declared war on the 
emergency manager, who had the power to transfer DPS schools and create contracts without 
collective bargaining.517 In May, the DFT filed the biggest lawsuit against DPS (i.e., the 
emergency manager) in living memory.518  
With the public largely in the dark about why Detroit was yet again singled out, they 
could only speculate on the state’s intentions. Elena Herrada, a school board member, told the 
Huffington Post, “It’s very, very insidious.”519 In her view, the highest-risk students would still 
receive the least amount of resources while EAA experimenters had nothing to lose because the 
students – nearly all African American children—had been failing anyway. Herrada argued the 
new school district was separate and unequal—“basically a Jim Crow District.”520 School board 
member Herrada’s view underscored the persistent notion among Detroiters that they were being 	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unfairly targeted because of their race, and the governor’s tactics were terribly reminiscent of 
mayoral takeover in 1999. However, fears about such tactics and/or objections with the 
emergency manager’s broad powers and connection with the EAA as a gross violation and threat 
to democracy began to spread across the state.521 Especially in the Metro Detroit, people began to 
vocalize their disapproval of the EAA, indicating that efforts to “corporatize and dismantle 
public education” had implications that reached beyond Detroit.522 
The broader struggle against the EAA began as early as 2011 and the strategy was to 
eliminate the emergency manager. A coalition called Stand Up for Democracy initiated a 
grassroots campaign against the “emergency manager law” (i.e., Public Act 4) by collecting 
petition signatures to force a ballot referendum during the November 2012 elections.523 
According to one of its leaders, the campaign was truly a working-class movement.524 Stand Up 
for Democracy drew from unions, church groups, the NAACP, progressive organizations, and 
some state congressional representatives.525 Earlier, in February 2012, 500 people from Lansing, 
Flint, and Detroit rallied at a church in Lansing before sending off delegates to the legislature 
with 15 boxes filled with petition signatures.526 
When the Board of State Canvassers approved the ballot referendum, it effectively 
suspended the full activity of the emergency manager and reinstated the school board until the 	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524 David Sands “Michigan Emergency Manager Repeal Delivers 226,637,” Huffpost Detroit, February 29, 2012, 
accessed October 14, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/michigan-emergency-manager-
repeal_n_1311582.html. 
525 Representative John Conyers (D-Detroit) released a report that showed that PA 4 was unconstitutional and called 
on U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder to investigate. See Sands, “Repeal Deliver 226,637.” 
526 Ibid. 
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November vote.527 For the first time in three years, the school board had some power restored, 
and, it immediately set out to sue the state.528 Parents of students slated for the EAA transfer 
worried how this would affect their children, with only a month before school re-opened. 
Chancellor Covington, however, assured them that they would nevertheless move forward with 
the transfer. In September, all fifteen of the EAA schools opened.  
Victory appeared to be near. As Michiganders went to the polls on November 4, 2012, 
they repealed the emergency manager law by a 52-48 percent margin.529 Believing that they had 
rid the district of the emergency manager, the Detroit school board quickly took the opportunity 
to close down the EAA by voting to break its interlocal agreement with EMU.530 However, 
within days, Snyder and Roberts declared that repealing the law (PA 4) simply meant rolling 
back to the first emergency financial manager law established in 1990, PA 72.531 Thus, Roberts 
would remain as emergency manager, while rendering the school board’s actions to discontinue 
the ILA illegitimate. Remarkably, rather than weaken under such great opposition, the EAA was 
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Certified,” Huffpost Detroit, April 26, 2012, accessed May 1, 2014, 
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takeover: mayoral control from 1999-2005. In turn, the State Attorney filed a suit seeking to completely remove the 
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had been filing lawsuits against the emergency financial manager since 2009. See Benoit, “Student Achievement,” 
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530 Sands, “Elena Herrada.” 
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poised to expand as Snyder and the legislature were intent on codifying the reform district into 
law by the end of the year.532  
Thus, the struggle against the EAA took a different turn; this time, the coalition—which 
by now clearly consisted of both Detroiters and non-Detroiters—would directly attack the EAA 
and persuade the legislature from codifying the school district into law. When the federal 
government announced at the end of the year that the EAA was at last a Race to the Top finalist, 
a group of parents, university professors, and advocates of the traditional public schooling 
system wrote a letter to Arne Duncan and President Barak Obama outlining their grievances 
regarding the EAA.533 Garnering national attention, Democratic lawmakers also began to take 
note, siding with constituents who wanted to stop Snyder’s experimental model.534 
The anti-EAA movement’s biggest weapon was the overwhelming data that indicated 
that the EAA was not working. Within its first year of implementation, a short list of problem 
areas included financial mismanagement, lack of operational support, lack of transparency, poor 
student outcomes, and disciplinary problems. In January 2013, the EAA requested $2 million to 
fix glitches in the software and to add computers.535 After filing a Freedom of Information Act 
request, Thomas Pedroni, Wayne State Professor and education activist, found hundreds of 
emails attesting to a botched online platform: significant disruption during the baseline 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 HB 5923 included language indicating that the EAA would provide new forms of public school governance, 
expand the number and types of public entities permitted to operate public schools, and repurpose educational 
buildings, effectively seizing unused public school buildings from local districts and redistributing them. See 
Michigan Association of Secondary School Principals, “Education Achievement Authority (EAA) Analysis of SB 
1358 and HB 6004,” November 18, 2012, accessed January 8, 2015, http://mymassp.com/files/EAA%20analysis-
11.18.12.pdf. 
533 Jaclyn Zubrzycki, “Michigan Education Achievement Authority Special School District a Lightening Rod for 
Controversy,” Huffpost Education, December 12, 2012, accessed November 13, 2014, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/mich-achievement-authori_n_2287214.html. 
534 The legislature tried to expand the EAA during the lame-duck session at the end of the year (2012), but it stalled 
in committee. In addition, with a slimmer GOP majority in the House, Kathleen Gray predicted that it might be more 
difficult for Snyder to achieve his educational goals. See Kathleen Gray, “Bitter Feelings Mays Linger As 
Lawmakers Get Back to Work,” January 17, 2013, Detroit Free Press. 
535 Chastity Pratt Dawsey, “EAA Schools Ask for $2M to Fix Tech Glitches, Add Computers,” January 12, 2013, 
Detroit Free Press. 
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assessment in the fall, headsets needed for audio were not available, weak wireless signals 
resulting in failure to load the online tests, and many students unable to login to the system at 
all.536 Pedroni also found that discipline incidents in the EAA increased by 500 percent in the 
second quarter: in an 8,000-student district, some 5,200 incidents were reported in less than three 
months.537 When the EAA claimed a 22% increase in math and a 27% increase in reading, state 
Senator Bert Johnson of Highland Park accused the EAA for withholding from the public the 
data on those students who experienced no such results.538 There were also concerns regarding 
the educators: the EAA had lost 12.6 % of its teachers since September. As Johnson told the 
Free Press, there were about a dozen cases of Teacher for America teachers walking out of their 
jobs, and leaving their pupils unattended. At the end of its first year, EAA enrollment dropped by 
nearly a quarter.539 Armed with preliminary reports on the performance and implementation of 
the new district, state Democrats Bert Johnson, Hoon-Yung Hopgood, and Ellen Cogen Lipton 
launched a full throttle campaign against the EAA, urging Snyder and the legislature to “scrap 
the EAA’s failed experiment.”540  
In the meantime, teachers unions across the Detroit Metro Area and EMU faculty had 
been pressuring EMU regents to pull out of its contract with the EAA, deeming the university’s 
affiliation with the EAA “pedagogically unsupportable.” The EAA, they lamented, had 
“tarnished” the reputation of its teacher preparation program across the state so much that some 
school districts were refusing to hire EMU student teachers.541 By November 30, 2013, the Dean 
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537 Ibid. 
538 Bert Johnson, “EAA’s Biggest Backer Ignore Biggest Shortcomings,” Detroit Free Press, May 6, 2013, A15. 
539 EAA enrollment dropped by 24.9% (from 8,682 to 6,517). See Mason & Arsen, “Michigan’s Education 
Achievement Authority,” 47-48. 
540 Johnson, “EAA’s Biggest Backers.” 
541 David Jesse, “Educators Urge EMU: Cut Ties With State Districts,” Detroit Free Press, May 16, 2013. 
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of the EMU College of Education became the third EAA board member to resign in the system’s 
short history.542  
Perhaps the single most damning evidence of the failures of the EAA was the firsthand 
accounts of the severity of the poor teaching and learning conditions and the overall chaos of the 
system. During the middle of EAA’s second year, a number of EAA teachers (many remaining 
anonymous for fear of losing their jobs) disclosed these alarming stories on a blog led by a 
prominent  Democrat.543 Undoubtedly these stories drew much public attention and scrutiny. By 
February, the mounting negative publicity was enough to pressure the state superintendent to 
terminate the EAA’s contract with the SRRD, which had given them the exclusive function of 
turning around the state’s lowest performing schools.544  
Still, in March, the House’s Republican majority managed to pass the “EAA expansion 
bill” (adding 50 more schools) by just two votes—ironically both from Detroit legislators.545 The 
Michigan Citizen, a local, pro-community, and progressive weekly newspaper, lambasted their 
legislators:  
Harvey Santana and John Olumba are on the wrong side of history, the wrong 
side of the school question and on the worst side for children. They are preparing 
to join Gov. Rick Snyder, the Republican corporate ‘school reform’ movement 
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Emergency Manager Roy Roberts also resigned in May. See Chastity Pratt Dawsey, “As DPS Steps Up, Roberts to 
Step Down,” Detroit Free Press, May 3, 2013, A1. 
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authority-teachers-speak-out-on-abuse-of-students-and-the-failure-of-the-eaa.html. 
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Passes EAA Expansion Bill,” Detroit News, March 20, 2014, accessed May 1, 2014, 
http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140320/POLITICS02/303200131. 
 	  155 
and vote yes to expand the Education Achievement Authority […] We say it is a 
Jim Crow district – separate and unequal.546 
 
But, the stream of incriminatory evidence was relentless. By the end of the EAA’s second year, 
the Michigan Department of Education’s report on MEAP scores revealed that Detroit students 
had suffered tremendously under “state-managed DPS and EAA schools”—since takeover in 
2009, the proficiency gap in reading had widened in every tested grade relative to state peers.547 
Soon after this release, State Board of Education members John Austin and Dan Varner—both of 
whom had previously supported the EAA—joined the ranks of four other state board colleagues 
who had already come out against the EAA.548  
In June, the EAA Board released the 2014-2015 budget showing steep declines in 
projected revenues, from $112.6 million in 2014 to $86.2 million for 2015. The drop reflected, in 
part, the end of private funding for start-up costs.549 John Covington resigned the same day.550 
Bad news would continue: in August, the Free Press reported that an authorizer for the EAA was 
among ten other charter school authorizers at risk of suspension for deficiencies.551 Lastly, soon 
after her appointment, the interim chancellor, Veronica Conforme, found herself embroiled in a 
mini-scandal. Cash-strapped, the EAA attempted to enroll more students by recruiting from 
neighboring suburbs. The effort resulted in an embarrassing public apology from Conforme 	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when it came to light that the recruitment letters, which were titled “Confirmation of 2014-2015 
School Assignment,” seemed to mislead and deceive parents to think that they had already been 
assigned to an EAA school.552 Given its poor outcomes, negative press, and with key state-level 
figures reneging on their support, it appeared that the hopes of codifying the EAA into law was 
all but dashed. 
Still, extraordinarily, (at the time of writing) the EAA lives on. During the tail end of 
Snyder’s reelection campaign, an opinion editorial featured in the Detroit News argued that if the 
governor was reelected, it should finally “push the legislature to give the EAA authority, and the 
funding, to be successful.”553 Citing the success of the recovery school districts in New Orleans 
and Tennessee as “one of the most promising educational innovations in America today,” the 
authors—the president and vice president of research at the Thomas B. Fordham Institute, an 
advocate of providing quality choices for every family—claimed it was “not too late for 
policymakers to resuscitate this promising reform.”554 In November 2014, Governor Snyder was 
re-elected by a 52-46 percent margin.555	  
Discussion 
 In recent studies of the EAA, scholars have wondered how the policy would have fared 
had Snyder established the recovery school district through the typical legislative process. Mary 
L. Mason and David Arsen argue that Governor Snyder’s tactics did nothing but postpone the 	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political contention and controversy that is described in the latter half of this case study. They 
contend, “Indeed the route chosen likely generated political obstacles to crafting coherent 
policies for low-performing schools and for Detroit […].”556 Nelson Smith, on the other hand, 
argues that from the perspective of EAA advocates, Snyder’s tactic made sense especially given 
how difficult it has been to expand the bill. In either case, the political struggle around the EAA, 
another effort to radically transform school governance, can be examined through the lens of 
urban regime analysis. 
 Indeed, one explanation for why Snyder and EAA reformers have struggled to codify the 
EAA and bring about governance change was their failure to establish a sufficient level of civic 
capacity. Circumventing local decision-making has only served to further alienate the traditional 
schooling community from the prospect of building a new turnaround model for persistently 
low-achieving schools. Instead, the school board and teachers union went on the offensive with 
weeks of protests like the one at Mumford and launching legal battles claiming that the EAA was 
a “Jim Crow” district. Their challenge put a slight pressure on the state’s ability to establish the 
new school system.  
In reality, beginning in the 1980s, through a series of policies, the power and influence of 
the school board and teachers union had been significantly weakened. As this dissertation shows, 
policies of the last twenty years have in one form or another geared towards the eradication of 
school board and unions’ centrality in decision-making. As a consequence, I argue, what I call 
the traditional governance regime was not a serious threat to Snyder’s efforts to expand and 
codify the EAA. Rather, remarkably, the EAA would draw controversy and critique from 
individuals and groups beyond the borders of Detroit, essentially galvanizing a resistance 
movement. This battle, one that would involve key Democratic legislators who could place the 	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issue of the EAA on the stage of state politics before the governor’s reelection year, pitting 
Democrats against Republicans, was a threat to the governor’s plans. Despite all the negative 
press and the Democrats’ campaign against Snyder, claiming the he was responsible for a 
dangerous and failed experiment gone wrong, the governor was reelected by a 51-47 margin in 
2014. Along with his reelection came renewed voices to not only expand the EAA but also calls 
to bring order back into a system that had been fractured to the point where, ironically, too many 
were in control.  
These new voices reflect a powerful regime of new actors whom I argue support change 
and sustain initiatives like the EAA. The fact that the EAA is still standing, then, must mean that 
there is some level of civic capacity sustaining the new recovery school district. Thus, the EAA 
is a case study of the rise of a new style governance regime—an informal arrangement that 
support, advocate, and provide resources for state initiatives like the EAA. The regime includes 
foundations, the business community, pro-school choice organizations, charter advocates, and 
universities (i.e., the regents of Eastern Michigan University) who assist and support formal the 
increased role of the governor and the state. Importantly, the new educational actors reveal a web 
of relations that have been nurtured beginning as early as the 1980s, when people increasingly 
lost faith in local school governance. (See Table 7.) 
Table 7. Traditional Governance Regime versus New Style Governance Regime 
Traditional governance regime New style governance regime 
School board 
Teachers union 
Teachers and administrators 
Some parents 
Broad Foundation 
Eastern Michigan University regents 
Emergency Manager 
Excellent Schools Detroit  
Governor Snyder 
Harvard Graduate School of Education 
Republican legislators 
Skillman Foundation 
Teach for America 
Other foundations (Kresge, W.K. Kellogg, McGregor 
Fund) 
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Still, whether this new coalition of actors, what I call the new style governance regime, 
will sustain the EAA, remains to be seen. At the end of the day, the policy needs to work. As 
seen in the case of mayoral takeover in Chapter 5, it was the policy’s basic failure to address 
DPS’s chronic issues that resulted in the breakdown of political support, resealing divisions, and 
hardening political lines. Even though Republicans currently dominate the legislature, if the 
EAA fails to address DPS’s academic and fiscal issues, Democrats could very well continue their 
campaign against a Republican-driven effort to expand the EAA. The Democrats could play on 
people’s fears of an era of corporatizing schools, experimentation on children, unregulated 
charters and the end of local control and the infringement of democratic rights everywhere, 
including White neighborhoods. 
Conclusion: The Final Assault?  
What are we to make of the EAA? Is it a turning point in the quest to dismantle the public 
schooling system? Was it the next logical step in a 30-year search for a way to manage a system 
long mired in fiscal and educational problems? Indeed, by establishing a new schooling 
authority, a powerful education governor was able to pull 15 schools out from a chronically 
failing system. In 2013, Bill Rustem, the governor’s director of strategy, told Michigan Radio 
that the EAA is more than an education initiative but is a part of the governor’s larger, state-led 
effort to “transform traditional public education” and “to build another model for the delivery of 
education services.”557 It was the governor’s dream for “a different system, for a better outcome.” 
The creation of the EAA was also about creating a more cost-effective system while attempting 
to shrink DPS’s budget deficit. In sum, the governor had achieved radical governance change 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 Sarah Cwiek, “The Educational Achievement Authority, Part 3: True Reform, or a Questionable Experiment?” 
Michigan Radio, April 16, 2013, accessed November 10, 2014, http://michiganradio.org/post/education-
achievement-authority-part-3-true-reform-or-questionable-experiment. 
 	  160 
made possible by the systematic weakening of the traditional governance regime while rallying 
the support of new educational actors.  
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CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion: Characterizing a New Era of Urban Public Schooling 
 
Who will take responsibility when the last public school in the city is closed?  
– Peter J. Hammer558 
 
As Detroit emerged from Chapter 9 bankruptcy in mid August of 2014, the largest 
municipal bankruptcy filing in U.S. history, many media outlets speculated about the Motor 
City’s future. Notably, many argued that the city’s revival was dependent upon improving the 
public schooling system. For instance, the Detroit News and the Free Press reported that an 
increasingly influential education coalition called the Excellent Schools Detroit (ESD) had 
released a proposal for mayoral control, claiming that it would significantly improve schools and 
finally usher in a new era of public schooling for Detroit.559 With no less than twelve separate 
schooling systems in place, the ESD argued it was nearly impossible to bring about any 
meaningful and comprehensive reform without centralizing schools, suggesting that the newly 
elected Mayor, Mike Duggan (Detroit’s first White mayor since 1973), to oversee a portfolio of 
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schools.560 The ESD’s proposal immediately sparked debate. Advocates of the traditional public 
schooling system were quick to remind the public of how mayoral “control” in 1999 had failed. 
The dissenters were weary as mayoral takeover in 1999 did little to address DPS’s fiscal and 
educational problems. There was nothing by way of past successes that could convince dissenters 
that anymore state interventions would turnaround Detroit’s schools. On the other hand, from the 
perspective of the reformers, mayoral takeover had been one step among many to effectively 
dismantle the traditional public schooling system in order to usher in a new era of innovation and 
school choice (i.e. charters and the EAA). Besides two very brief moments since 1999, the 
elected school board has yet to be fully reinstated. The ESD’s influence, in fact, reflects how 
unlikely either the school board or the traditional governance regime will be restored. Instead, 
this dissertation tells the story of the emergence of a new regime of educational actors, the 
informal arrangements that “surround and complement the formal workings of the governmental 
authority.”561 The new style governance regime supports mayoral takeover, one of the sharpest 
indicators of a new era of public schooling in which educational decision-making is gradually 
being absorbed into multi-level, general-purpose government.562 
This dissertation tells the story of how one major city’s school system unraveled in the 
last thirty years. In Chapter Four, I show how five key school reforms—Proposal A, mayoral 
takeover, emergency management, Michigan’s charter law, and the EAA—contributed to the 
gradual erosion of local control and the final breakup of the one best system. Using urban regime 
analysis to highlight the governmental dimensions of Detroit’s story, Chapters Five and Six tell a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




561 Clarence Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988 (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 3. 
562 Jeffrey R. Henig, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education; The Changing Politics of School Reform,” 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education Press, 2013). 
 	  163 
political story of how governance change is made possible by the end one regime and the 
beginning of another. Indeed, in the aftermath of these school reforms, a clamor of new voices—
especially philanthropic organizations and education entrepreneurs—are urging Governor Snyder 
to implement a portfolio management model, the next logical step in urban schooling advances. 
With the elected school board’s authority suspended and dissenters marginalized, I argue that 
Detroit is a case study of the “end of exceptionalism in American education.”563  	  
“The End of Exceptionalism” in American Education 
Just twenty years ago, Detroit’s elected school board and superintendent had full 
authority over DPS. School governance in Detroit was still functioning as a highly 
localized, single-purpose government, dominated by a small array of interest groups. 
Before 1994, the traditional governance regime was still intact. Today, however, general-
purpose elected officials, from federal government on down, have considerable power 
and control over city schools—and this shift in school control is supported by a regime of 
new actors.564 For example, Arne Duncan’s first official act as secretary of education was 
to go to Detroit and tell the mayor and governor that the federal government would 
provide millions of dollars if DPS would follow the Chicago model, in which mayoral 
takeover is a key mechanism that leads to the closing of failing schools and the expansion 
of charters.565 Thus, Robert Bobb, Detroit’s emergency manager, followed up with a 
proposal to close schools and expand a market of schools. A year later, in 2010, the 
coalition of foundations—the ESD—also released a plan for establishing at least 70 high 
performing schools in Detroit by 2020, garnering the attention of national funders. “For 	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the first time they [philanthropic foundations] believe that Detroit is serious about true 
reform, that it really is focused on children,” the president of the Skillman Foundation, 
Carol Goss, told reporters.566 Thus, Detroit saw an “interweaving of philanthropic 
organizations and city government.”567  
From the beginning, Governor Snyder worked closely with the ESD envisioning a 
portfolio management model for Detroit, with the establishment of the EAA as a way to 
ultimately form a new authority in which to establish the new model.568 When the EAA 
was on the brink of elimination, the ESD proposed that the governor put Detroit’s 
fragmented school system under the control of the mayor. The role of the ESD and other 
such organizations in Detroit constituted a “new type of local education regime”—
characterized by new actors that advocated for mayoral control, adopting a portfolio 
management model, and contracting services.569  
This new style governance or what Henig has called the emerging reform regime 
redefines the power of the local actors in education, such as teachers and parents, as it draws 
power, legitimacy, and authority from others.570 
Parents, teachers, and school boards may at times play a role even in the newly 
emerging reform regimes, but that role tends to be less central and episodic. In 
their place, general-purpose elected officials are constructing supporting regimes 
that incorporate a new set of actors, notably foundations and other philanthropists, 
private charter school operators, organizations (like Teach for America and New 
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Leaders) that represent an alternative source of teachers and principals, and for-
profit providers in the publishing and testing business.571 
 
The emerging reform regime, Henig observes, often replaces a “national constituency for what 
historically was a very localized one.”572 The core values of the new regime are different as well, 
shifting from a focus on pedagogical and instructional skills to an emphasis on management and 
technology. (See Table 8.) Some of the most prominent stakeholders include consulting 
organization such as McKinsey, Parthenon, or the Boston Consulting Group; national 
foundations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Walton Family Foundation, and 
Broad Foundation; and advocacy groups like StudentsFirst and Stand for Children. Added to this 
mix are national charter management organizations and publishers and testing firms. 573 
 Detroit exemplifies these new political arrangements. The Broad Foundation, for 
instance, has played a pivotal role in supporting new style governance. Broad has not only 
financed the emergency manager’s salary but also helped to craft the idea of the EAA and 
finance the chancellor’s salary. In fact, Robert Bobb was a graduate of the Broad Academy, a 
program to develop educational leaders. Bobb would hire four educational management 
companies (Edison Learning, Institute of Student Achievement, EdWorks, and Model Secondary 
Schools Project) with multi-year contracts to turnaround the lowest performing schools in 
DPS.574 The Michigan Educational Excellence Fund (MEEF), a multi-donor fund (whose 
honorary chair is the governor himself), contributed $9.5 million to the EAA during its second 
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year.575 The EAA would also pay Agilix, a partner in the School Improvement Network, for 
providing a largely experimental technology platform called “Buzz” as the main feature of the 
new school district’s instructional and curricular innovation.576  
 
Table 8. Traditional Governance Regimes Versus Emerging Reform Regimes577 
 Traditional governance regimes Emerging reform regimes 
Core stakeholder 
groups 
• Teacher unions 
• Parent organizations 
• School boards 
• Superintendents and bureaucracy 
• Mayors 
• National foundations, venture 
philanthropists 
• Service providers (for profit and 
nonprofit, local and nonlocal) 
• State and national advocates 
• Private education industry 




Core values and 
premises 
• Local control 
• Teacher as professional 
• Parents (as junior partners) 
• Markets 






• Professional development 
• Higher salaries 
• Class size reduction 
• Curriculum reform 
• Charter schools 
• School closures and turnarounds 
• Portfolio management 
• Test-based accountability 
• Educational technology 
 
 
 Detroit’s new style governance regime, with little to no involvement of school boards, 
superintendents, teacher union, and parents, places the authority and power to make decisions 
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about the education of Detroit’s school children into “general-purpose” arenas.578 No longer are 
actors working in school specific agencies. Indeed,  
As more and more key decisions about schools are migrating into general-purpose 
areas, the mix of influential actors and ideas has begun to look more similar to 
that involved in policy decisions about economic development, taxes, 
environmental protection, zoning, housing, crimes, and social services.579 
 
The recent example of Governor Snyder transferring the state’s school reform office (i.e. the 
SSRD) to the Department of Technology, Management and Budget is simply the logical 
extension of a change that is no decades-old.580   
What is less clear in Henig’s work and this study is why at this juncture in time we are 
turning from a single-purpose government to a more general-purpose government. Why is it 
more acceptable or more reasonable to address education of our children in ways similar to other 
policy arenas?  
Some argue that this question does not matter so much because “exceptionalism” was 
merely the result of happenstance and habit, decisions made in an earlier era when “both 
attention and stakes were low.”581 Social scientists who examine political institutions and public 
policy refer to this as path dependency and they argue: “Path dependency played a role in the 
creation of school-specific governance in the U.S., and it is a part of the story of the end of 
exceptionalism unfolding today.”582 Henig, however, believes that the story of school governance 
in the U.S. can be best understood from a perspective that rests on politics and power.583 Still, his 
study falls short of examining the historical contexts in which choices and decisions are made. 	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While my dissertation obviously confirms how power and politics are central to governance 
change, it also seeks to distill the historical changes that do impact decision-making.  
Ever since the ascendancy of Reagan and the empowerment campaign in the 1980s, 
school reformers have embraced the idea of markets and choice that have broken up the 
traditional school system. Why have policymakers chosen these concepts and ideologies over 
others? This study argues that structural crisis has shaped the responses, rationales, and 
decisions of policymakers. How do we go about characterizing this structural crisis that shaped 
this new educational age? For instance, how have the economy and the politics of postwar cities 
like Detroit driven reformers to call on substitute actors like venture philanthropists and 
educational entrepreneurs? 
Structural Crisis 
At first glance, the desire to radically alter the shape and form of Detroit’s schools, the 
search for new order and efficiency, and the need to adapt to great social, economic, and 
technological changes is not unlike that of the Administrative Progressives, a century ago. 
However, there is at least one dramatic difference between yesterday and today that have shaped 
decisions that ultimately become pathways. During the time of the administrative progressives, 
America’s cities were burgeoning sites of industry, employment, and population growth—the 
centers of wealth and growth. In cities like Detroit and Newark, palatial high schools were 
popping up like mushrooms after a rain.584 The school reformers at the dawn of last century were 
making educational decisions during a prosperous time. Today’s school reformers are dealing 
with the complete opposite. After decades of disinvestment and population decline beginning in 
the late 1950s, many postwar cities—Detroit in particular—are now the centers of concentrated 	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poverty. Considering our most recent economic depression beginning in 2008, with state and city 
budgets slashed, the strategies and tactics to reform urban schools are shaped and crafted within 
this context of fiscal crisis. 
Ironically, as we have seen, Proposal A—Governor Engler’s conservative idea to cut 
taxes, equalize school funding, and encourage competition—exacerbated Detroit’s problem. 
Prior to the dramatic change in the way schools are funded in Michigan, Detroit actually received 
more state aid.585 The combination of lower state aid, relatively higher fixed costs, and sharp 
declines in its enrollment due to competition with charters “guaranteed the continued existence 
of chronic structural deficits.”586 Without additional external resources, the only option is “radical 
triage,” frantic efforts to cut fixed costs even faster than revenues drop.587 Peter J. Hammer 
argues that Proposal A is essentially a zero-sum game in which the winners from the start (i.e. 
wealthy districts) will continue to win while the losers (i.e. poor districts, especially Detroit) will 
eventually lose everything. From Hammer’s perspective, this fiscal path will lead to, in the near 
future, the closure of the last standing traditional public school.   
Proposal A created a steady stream of students leaving DPS, resulting in a snowball 
effect; no state-appointed educational/financial leader has yet to address the fiscal crisis because 
the budget deficit continues to worsen with each year. In Chapter Five, I argue that the vote to 
return to the elected school board was not a vote against mayoral takeover (or CEO Kenneth 
Burnley) per se, but rather an indictment on the massive budget deficit that had accrued during 
that five-year period. In fact, Jeffrey Mirel, Michael Addonizio, and C. Philip Kearney, have 
praised Burnley’s efforts and, whether test scores had been raised or not, there are reasons to 
believe that he had improved curriculum and instruction, what actually happens in the 	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classroom.588 Still, none of this could be done to transform the system fast enough to prevent 
students from leaving the system, driving up the budget deficit. By the time Governor Snyder 
contemplated establishing a recovery school district for the lowest performing schools in the 
state, the fiscal crisis had become so severe that DPS had been put under emergency financial 
management. I think that the governor’s vision for the EAA was as much about creating a new 
model of schooling as it was to create a more cost-effective system while attempting to shrink 
DPS’s budget deficit. To do this, the governor sought out informal partners that could assist him, 
such as private donors who could fund start-up costs and the salaries of school leaders. 
Therefore, the context of structural crisis and austerity do affect the paths taken (or not taken): 
the privatization of public schooling, for example, is a response to the need for lifting a crippled 
municipal system out and into better and broader management.  
We need something beyond the concepts of urban regimes and “the end of 
exceptionalism” to understand the emergence of a new era. It occurs to me that that 
applying a neoliberal framework to my finding could help us understand the nature of the 
structural crisis, both as historical outcome and as a set of assumptions that shaped 
policymakers’ choices and responses to the changing political economy of urban spaces. 
Neoliberalism can also help to articulate the social conflicts of todays’ efforts to reform 
urban schools. 
So, is the structural crisis in Detroit a case of neoliberal reform? 
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Search for New Order: Neoliberal Reform? 
Scholars studying other cities have made the case that neoliberalism is both a cause and 
effect of changes in urban life. For example, David Menefee-Libey argued that Chicago Public 
School’s 2010 adoption of the portfolio management model was a clear case of neoliberal school 
reform. The blending of diverse public and private provision for students and the “differentiation 
of entrepreneurial schools into a diverse portfolio to be managed by district leaders,” this 
combination of strategies, he argues, follows patterns of what is called a neoliberal policy 
approach “common in businesses and governments across the developed world.”589 Other 
indicators of a neoliberal policy approach include what were historically public components 
“increasingly staffed by conditional employees rather than career civil servants or union 
workers” that are subjected to “bottom-line accountability” heavily focused on outcomes and 
numerical data and “sharp fiscal management discipline from above.”590 Indeed, reformers in 
Detroit continue to turn to Chicago as a model, and there is evidence that Governor Snyder has 
been pursuing a portfolio management model since he was elected into office. 
 Menefee-Libey, however, delimits the discussion of neoliberal school reform as 
but a strategy and the portfolio management model as an indicator of its application. 
Other scholars, on the other hand, have described neoliberal policy approaches as a new 
rationality or a defining social paradigm, in which they outline its origins, and are much 
more critical of neoliberalism and its outcomes. Pauline Lipman writes, 
Neoliberalism has been the defining social paradigm of the past 30 years. 
Neoliberalism is a particular, historically-generated state strategy to manage the 
structural crisis of capitalism and provide new opportunities for capital 
accumulation. Put simply, neoliberalism is an ensemble of economic and social 	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policies, forms of governance, and discourses and ideologies that promote self-
interest, unrestricted flows of capital, deep reductions in the cost of labor, and 
sharp retrenchment of the public sphere. Neoliberals champion privatization of 
social goods and withdrawal of government from provision for social welfare on 
the premise that competitive markets are more effective and efficient. 
Neoliberalism is not just “out there” as a set of policies and explicit ideologies. It 
has developed as a new social imaginary, a common sense about how we think 
about society and our place in it.591 
 
To Lipman, neoliberalism explains why certain policy actions have been taken in the last 
30 years; there is actually an ideological paradigm, a way of managing the structural 
crisis of capitalism in such a way that it has become commons sense.  
Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval argue that neoliberalism is a new rationality 
that “tends to structure and organize not only the action of rulers, but also the conduct of 
the ruled.”592 They reason, we will not understand the “obstinacy” or “fanaticism” with 
which the experts of government pursue a policy of austerity, if we do not appreciate that 
they are trapped in a normative framework.593 That is, in light of fiscal crisis, their very 
commitment to the economic future is something that they themselves have actively 
constructed over decades. Dardot and Laval write, “Unable and unwilling to break with 
this framework, they are embroiled in the headlong rush to adapt increasingly to the 
effects of their own previous policy.”594 Given this, it could be argued that Proposal A 
created the structural crisis that twenty years later the EAA, using the same strategies and 
tactics, is attempting to ameliorate. Yet, such “obstinacy” is not readily recognizable by 
all. In the name of crisis management, austerity and solvency, the EAA is a 
“commonsense of the times” that legitimizes the “rulers”—even in a democracy—to act 	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severely, such as stripping Detroiters of their voting rights and removing Mumford High 
School without the permission of the school district. 
 Thus, while a neoliberal regime may take on the moral ethical tone of government 
austerity and solutions for solvency, Dardot and Laval argue that the new rationality 
radically subverts the meaning of citizenship.595 Since the eighteenth century, western 
democracies have been built on the premise that the elected officials answer to the 
governed. Today, the new rationality justifies the subversion of this relationship: from 
government to governance. Lipman writes, “The shift from government by elected state 
bodies and a degree of democratic accountability to governance by experts and managers 
and decision making by judicial authority and executive order is central to neoliberal 
policymaking.”596 Dardot and Laval warn that the very existence of the “public 
community”—that which promotes the “citizen’s direct participation in public affairs”—
is at stake.597 Lipman, however, argues the centrality of race—that the neoliberal project 
is actually targeted against people of color.598  
School Battles: Beyond Race? 
Was mayoral takeover and the EAA racially motivated? As this dissertation has shown, 
some—especially those associated with what is left of the traditional governance regime—
believe so and resort to racialized arguments in their activism. A notable example occurred in the 
beginning of this year, when the EMU Regents went to vote for whether or not to stay contracted 
with the EAA, young protestors in the audience staged a “die-in,” lying on the floor chanting 
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“Black Lives Matter! The EAA is killing me!”599 They linked their protest of the EAA with a 
broader national movement that had begun with the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the 
shooting of unarmed Black teenager Trayvon Martin. Appropriating the “Black Lives Matter” 
slogan, the protesters were making a connection between the school system and the police and 
judicial system: all were biased and harmful to the lives of Black children. (The EMU Regents 
nevertheless voted 6-2 in favor of supporting the EAA.)600  
Critics of neoliberal school reform, like Pauline Lipman, argue that race is a central 
“variable” in the relationship between neoliberalism and education. Lipman writes, “In the 
United States, a 400-year legacy of White supremacy has been pivotal to the country’s 
development, the triumph of capitalism, and more recently, to advance the neoliberal project.”601 
Racism, she asserts, is the “ideological soil” for constructing the idea that people of color are 
underserving  (i.e. lazy, uncontrolled, and welfare dependent) and thus providing policymakers 
“with a rationale to restructure or eliminate government-funded social programs and to diminish 
state responsibility for social welfare.”602 A “cultural politics of race” and a “racialized logic” in 
essence, are central to constructing justification and consent for dismantling public institutions 
and privatizing public goods, such as schooling.603   
Another aspect of the neoliberal project is “disaster capitalism,” the notion that a crisis is 
an opportunity to further privatize the public sphere. Again, this disproportionately affects 
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communities of color,604 one of the most vivid examples being how Hurricane Katrina provided 
an opportunity to privatize nearly all of New Orleans’s (mainly Black) schools. Lipman argues 
that the Obama administration has continued to seize on the “fiscal crisis of cities and states to 
further restructure public education along neoliberal lines.”605 She illustrates this by pointing out 
that one of Arne Duncan’s first tasks as secretary of education was to convince Detroit to follow 
the Chicago model. The federal government created an impetus for Democratic governor 
Jennifer Granholm to sign a package of radical reform measures, which indeed resulted in the 
restructuring of DPS. As I have shown, the EAA actually originated from Race to the Top 
blueprints. Given this perspective, one could also perceive Republican governor Rick Snyder 
seizing on DPS’s fiscal crisis to create the EAA. In spite of being one of the most segregated 
regions in the U.S., Snyder selected Detroit to implement an untested model. Seeing that White 
neighborhoods have been left unaffected, some have argued that the implementation of the EAA 
was racially motivated, calling the new school district a Jim Crow system.  
Yet, claims about the centrality of race weaken in the face of several realities. First, this 
study has shown that there was considerable Black support for mayoral takeover, which helped 
to weaken the traditional governance regime. These Black Detroiters rejected racial tropes, and 
instead they argued a position that reflected a tremendous loss of faith in the school board. They 
welcomed the opportunity to shift educational decision-making elsewhere.606 Second, many 
Black leaders (from mayors to the President of the United States) have supported and promoted 
new style governance in the last 30 years. Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, beloved by Detroiters until 
his mini-scandal, argued for mayoral control as a way for him to help fix DPS. CEO Kenneth 
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Burnley and emergency manager Roy Roberts, for example, were native Detroiters who saw 
themselves as returning home and their work as a way to give back to the community. The 
president of the Skillman Foundation, Tonya Allen, was a native Detroiter; so was the chief 
executive officer of Excellent Schools Detroit, Dan Varner.607 Third, as enrollment data shows, 
many parents have tacitly supported new style governance by enrolling their children in charters. 
Although a powerful metaphor for the disturbing reality that so many decades later Black 
children in Detroit are still receiving a lesser education than most White children, the Jim Crow 
imagery falters when many Black leaders have been supporting—even leading—such school 
reform initiatives like the EAA.  
 The centrality of race also weakens when governors reveal their wish to spread their 
educational project across Michigan, triggering Whites to retaliate also. Barry Franklin points out 
that during the debates over mayoral takeover, there was opposition coming not just from 
African American Detroiters but also a number of largely all White school districts including 
West Bloomfield, Royal Oak, Hazel Park, and rural communities like Boyne and L’Anse. “The 
issue for these opponents was not of course race but local control,” observed Franklin.608 For 
White opponents, if the takeover proposal passed, it might threaten the future independence of 
their own districts. 609 This phenomenon, in effect, was repeated during debates over the 
expansion of the EAA. Remarkably, an anti-EAA movement formed beyond Detroit and claims 
about the infringement of democratic rights and the unsavory notion of the further corporatizing 
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of neighborhood schools proved to be a significant obstacle to the expansion of the EAA. Detroit 
is the canary in the coalmine—a warning sign for all other districts. If this is so, Dardot and 
Laval better capture the perils of the neoliberal project: citizenship is under threat everywhere.  
 Thus, the racial undercurrent of school reform in Detroit is likely more attributable to the 
extent of how the racial resonances of America’s postwar history continues to affect 
policymaking. In his study of postwar Detroit, Thomas Sugrue argues that the consequences of 
past racial struggles, especially White flight, continue to endure. 610 For instance, Detroit’s 
political influence in the state legislature has significantly decreased as its population continues 
to decline. In 1950, Detroit held 30 seats compared to 13 in 1999. In the 1958 gubernatorial 
election, about 25 percent of the votes came from Detroit, compared to only 7.5 percent in 1998. 
Soon term limits would force out the most influential senior members of the Detroit legislative 
delegate. 611 With literally less seats in a Republican-swept legislature and low voter turnout, the 
stakes are low if politicians choose to implement newfangled and untested schooling models in 
Detroit. With elected officials in Lansing and Washington “beholden to a vocal, well-organized, 
and defensive white suburban constituency” and the “growing marginalization of the city in 
local, state, and national politics,” Detroit makes for easy pickings.612  
In sum, applying a neoliberal framework might be helpful for understanding and 
characterizing a new era of public schooling in Detroit and other cities. In this brief discussion, 
the concept illuminates the relationship between a new rationality that shapes the decisionmaking 
of policymakers and school reformers and a structural crisis that shapes the political economy of 
urban spaces. We see the quest for a policy of austerity trapped in a normative framework: the 
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fiscal crisis itself a result of the same ideological approach for decades. Crises and disasters 
enable governmental experts to justify shifting school governance and subverting citizenship. A 
neoliberal framework also enables us to highlight the complexity of the role of race—or to 
disentangle its role—in contemporary school battles. When examining the racial undercurrent of 
Detroit’s story, there seems to be a key distinction between motives and effects. We could stop 
with the notion of the end of exceptionalism, but by understanding the path taken—that which 
brings us to this historic moment—is a necessary foundation in the discourse about improving 
policy. In the search for new order, are we in danger of losing forever the democratic aspects of 
public schooling? Will shifting governance to enable new educational actors actually improve 
instruction? To conclude, I discuss “lessons” that can be gleaned from my study. 
Lessons for Educational Research and Policy 
The story of the dismantling of the Detroit Public Schools in the last thirty years offers 
lessons for all. To conclude, I discuss the policy implications of my dissertation by offering 
lessons to various audience members, including policymakers and school reformers, educators, 
community activists, and civic leaders, and educational researchers and historians.  
Policymakers and School Reformers 
In his study of Proposal A’s effect on Detroit Public Schools, Peter Hammer asks, “Who 
will take responsibility when the last public school in the city is closed?”613 In the aftermath of 
dismantling the traditional school system, are policymakers and reformers ready for the new 
world that they have helped to create? In other words, before it is too late, policymakers and 
reformers must take pause and assess their approaches to urban school reform in the last several 
decades.  	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Increasingly, in Detroit and Michigan (and other cities and states), reforming urban 
school districts and urban renewal come hand-in-hand, a task that politicians seem both obliged 
and eager to commit to. The absorption of public schooling into general-purpose government is 
an indicator of this trend. Thus, it seems that increasingly one objective of public education at the 
turn of the century is to create a new, efficient, and cost-effective system that will prepare a 
workforce that will produce future returns on capital. This is one major reason, as this 
dissertation has shown, that educational decision-making has been lifted out the hands of the 
traditional governance regime (e.g. teachers and parents) and into the hands of those who can 
create a new system. But the central question is will this shifting actually improve urban schools? 
In the late 1990s, when reformers began to gravitate towards market-based school reform, 
David Labaree worried that this new approach was fundamentally altering the goals of public 
education. Early twentieth century reformers had envisioned public schooling as a way of 
preparing a democratic citizenry. By the end of the century, however, reformers were advocating 
for public schooling as way of attaining individual credentials, which at its very core challenged 
the democratic aspects of public schooling.614 As this dissertation has shown, in Detroit, the goal 
of “democratic equality” is on the verge of extinction. Policymakers and reformers must ask 
whether the pursuit of creating a new system at the expense of democracy is good for society.  
In their quest to solve the urban schooling problem once and for all, new experts and 
managers have a special aversion to the democratic aspects of public schooling, blaming these 
structures for its inefficiency and inability to deliver better education. Open deliberations 
between the school board and the public are considered not only a nuisance but irrelevant in the 
age of the age of “emergencies” and “crises.” Moreover, teaching to prepare a citizenry is also 	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extraneous. If John Dewey was to be taken seriously, it would require intense and complex 
teacher training, far too costly and time-consuming in the age in which Teach for America 
recruits—who only have a matter of months for training—are preferred. Nor would teaching to 
prepare a citizenry guarantee better test scores, the gold standard of the “new style governance 
regime.” While building more federal and state accountability to ensure that no child is left 
behind is a tremendous achievement in the history of public schooling in the U.S., how has 
NCLB’s testing culture actually improved the quality of instruction?  
For policymakers and school reformers, the lesson drawn from Detroit is that we are at a 
historic juncture in which today’s choices and decisions will matter a lot. The traditional public 
schooling system has been virtually dismantled, now what? In the search for new order, we must 
move beyond the paradigm of tinkering with school governance as a response to structural 
crisis—but actually move forward with establishing what Stone and other scholars have called a 
“performance regime,” informal political arrangements that will actually improve student 
outcomes. I suggest “instructional regime” as a better term that begs the question of who needs 
to be seated at the table to assist with advancing instruction? The answer is teachers, parents, and 
the community, those who understand the student population intimately. How do we reimagine 
the role of the school board, as they remain a crucial part of the community? While they may no 
longer have the capacity to make technical decisions as higher-level government seeks to include 
schools in the urban renewal plans, how can they maintain the democratic aspects of public 
schooling that strengthen society by making it more equal? Stone writes,  
It is not easy to have a regime that is both effective and equitable, but no regime is 
truly effective unless it is equitable. Tension between equity and effectiveness is 
largely a matter of how regimes are put together. The problem is that the path of 
least resistance lies in the direction of slighting equity.615  	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How will policymakers and school reformer move forward with a regime that is both effective 
and equitable? 
Educators, Community Activists, and Civic Leaders 
My findings show that Detroit’s school battles at the turn of the twenty-first century—
while they occur in the context of America’s postwar racial history—are not like the struggles of 
the past in the face of de jure segregation. The 1960s and 1970s was a revolutionary period in 
which the federal government acknowledged schooling was indeed unequal and ever since then, 
closing this achievement gap is a top priority regardless of party. The No Child Left Behind Act 
in 2001 was a culmination of that bipartisan vision and, by many accounts, a cornerstone in 
terms of federal law and education. Given this trajectory, one could argue that there is a great 
deal of consensus around improving the quality of education for the least advantaged.  
On the other hand, as we have seen in this study, these innovations—which have required 
tectonic shifts in governance (i.e. the virtual dismantling of DPS)—have also negatively affected 
Detroit’s schools and communities. Today, with the school board suspended and little 
representation in Lansing, Detroiters have no say in how their schools are run. The debt has 
worsened and little improvement of the quality of education has been seen. Ironically, those who 
have the most influence on students have been pushed out of educational decision-making, as 
“urban renewalists” are eager to solve Detroit’s fiscal crisis and to build a new and cost-effective 
system. 
One lesson that can be drawn from this study for educators, community activists, and 
civic leaders is that the framing of political discourse maters because today’s struggle for 
educational equality is complex and rife with contradiction, it is language that will either lead to 
the exclusion or the inclusion of teachers, parents, and community members. The problem with 
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some of the strategies employed by educators and activists thus far is the use of a confrontational 
language that lends itself to the further marginalization of their cause. A paradigm shift is 
required in seeing the need to leverage resources, which means that venture philanthropists, for 
example, offer extra dollars for educators and students during a time when Detroit’s tax base is 
insufficient. In this way, the movement against the privatization of public schooling should really 
be targeted at those who are merely profiteering or leeching off this institutional shift. By 
recognizing the structural crisis that shapes the actions and choices of policymakers, as opposed 
to racial biases or motives, what is left of the traditional governance regime can reassert 
themselves by building consensus. Campaigns against policies like the EAA will be more 
effective if activists join forces with neighboring suburbs where there voting is more impactful in 
Lansing. (Protests in the form of marching in of themselves in Detroit will not do much.) The 
goal is to maintain—even reimagine—the democratic aspects of public schooling and to ensure 
that those who are experts in instructing students are seated at the decision-making table.  
Educational Historians and Researchers  
 I hope this dissertation has not only contributed to the historiography of post-Brown 
schooling but also provided an example of how historical analysis can be useful in educational 
policy. By bringing attention to historical patterns of school governance, I hope various readers 
can gain further insight into the political levers and impediments, the limitations and potentials 
of their current sites, aims, and objectives—a bird’s eye view. In Detroit’s context, a historical 
analysis offers a story from which educational actors can build the kind of consensus that is 
required to establish not just a new style governance regime but an instructional regime, a 
political arrangement of actors that can actually assist in offering a rich and exciting education 
for Detroit’s children. As educational historians, how can we offer a historical context—beyond 
 	  183 
just anecdotal tools—in which policy is carefully considered. While historical research cannot 
predict the future, it can delineate the paths taken and not taken, show that choices and decisions 
are not made in a vacuum, and illumine a path forward. Given the strengths of historical analysis, 
how can we present our methods so that educational researchers might incorporate some of these 
methods into their own research design? 
The application of urban regime analysis in this historical study also provides insight into 
how we can further understand school governance and politics in cities like Detroit, particularly 
with regards to building civic capacity. It was no accident that among the sea of theories and 
perspectives that I embraced Stone’s concept of regimes. From the beginning, I was weary of 
adopting a perspective that might limit me to just naming problems or taking a side in our current 
education debates. At the end of the day, it was important for my historical analysis to arrive at 
the shore of solutions. By nature, the concept of urban regime analysis is solution-oriented, a 
search for better politics. Stone draws a distinction between “power over” and “power to”: 
“Conventionally we think about policies and practices in ‘power over’ terms. We assume that 
what is in place was put there is maintained by some powerful group or collection of groups.”616 
Rather, he continues, “if we think in terms of ‘power to’ and acknowledge that intentions are not 
always fixed, then we are led to think about politics in a different way.”617 Thus urban regime 
analysis lends itself to a narrative that moves away from the assumption that preferences are 
fixed, and rather people can develop better political strategies. How can the concept of civic 
capacity, for example, help us to reimagine the democratic elements of public schooling in the 
aftermath of dismantling DPS? How can it enable us to see racial barriers and resonances in a 
way where we can actually remove them? In education policy, the combination of historical 	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analysis and urban regime analysis offers the potential to develop a better politics to support 
urban school reform in cities like Detroit.  
*** 
“Who governs American schools, and with what results?”618 Patrick McGuinn and Paul 
Manna argue that that simple question has surprisingly received scant attention and is a 
“stunning oversight given that several decades of intense American school reform efforts […] 
have produced at best marginal gains in student achievement.”619 They say it will be hard to 
imagine much dramatic improvement without a more focused attention on how schools are 
governed.620 
This study has sought to examine the question of school governance, bringing to light an 
institutional shift that is occurring but generally ignored in contemporary debates about 
education policy.621 Detroit is case study that stunningly reveals that the days in which public 
schooling is defined by a publicly elected school board and superintendent who make almost all 
educational decisions are far-gone. Moreover, if Detroit is like other cities, there is an emerging 
pattern of governance, one in which governance is pushed into higher levels of government and 
new educational actors are in charge. This would be the third time that the United States 
fundamentally shift who controls schools in its roughly 250 year history. This study also 
explores the school battles around such dramatic changes. If Detroit is like other cities, this 
historic moment calls for the urgent need for building political consensus to finally ensure that 
urban school children receive a high quality education in the twenty-first century.   	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